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The purpose of a corporate governance code is to put into practice the principles of best 
corporate governance in Bahrain, and to provide protection to the stakeholders of 
companies and investors through compliance with those principles. International 
experience has shown that the results of good corporate governance enhance the value of 
companies, protecting the investors and attracting investments. This research comprises  
two empirical studies. In the first study, it examines the relationship between corporate 
governance characteristics, including financial expertise of the board, number of 
independent members, frequency of the audit committee meetings and the of audit and 
the  board of directors, and board size and the quality of the audit. The second study 
examines the efficiency of higher quality auditors and corporate governance 
characteristics in earnings management in the context of the Kingdom of Bahrain and 
provides more data  about the effects of the audit committee and board of directors’ 
characteristics on earnings management. The research used three proxies of quality of 
audit; the proxies are auditors’ industry specialists, audit and non-audit fees.  This study 
designed a conceptual framework that could be used to help explain the relationship 
between the effectiveness of the characteristics of the audit committee, boards of 
directors, and audit quality in respect of constraining Earnings Management. Based on 
data  obtained from the listed companies in Bahrain between 2010 and 2013, the current 
findings recommend that the independent directors on the board should demand that the 
auditors do additional audits in the firm for the ratification of the function of supervision, 
which will lead to an increase in the quality of the audit and an increase in audit fees. The 
findings also suggest the positive association between the fees of non-audit services and 
independent boards, indicating that  independent boards view joint provision of non-audit 
services and audit as not necessarily compromising audit independence, but perhaps 






The results of the second empirical study indicate that a higher quality of audit (which 
means either charging a higher auditor industry specialist fee or audit fees) are expected 
to reduce manipulation of earnings. However, no evidence of an association between the 
management of earnings and non- audit services fees been found. In addition, this study 
found inconsistent results linking the opportunistic earnings and the characteristics of 
corporate governance. Generally, both results are consistent with agency theory, which 
indicates that a high quality of audit and an independent board of directors are linked 
with effective supervision, which leads to improved financial reporting quality. The 
results of the issues of the practices of corporate governance, audit quality and 
management of earnings continue to be important to academics, professionals, 
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The issues of earnings management (EM), corporate governance (CG) and quality of 
audit (AQ) have received significant attention from the regulator and the public in the 
Kingdom of  Bahrain, especially after the unexpected business failures and high profile 
corporate scandals, which occurred  in the early 1990s (such as Polly Peck and Maxwell 
Communications). EM, as a phenomenon of the prior scandals, which received 
considerable attention, is one of the most important challenges facing the CG 
mechanisms that attempt to resolve the negative impact of the EM on financial reporting 
(Goncharov, 2005; Jaggi and Tsui, 2007). Academic research has concluded that 
managers participate in EM to achieve certain objectives such as avoiding violations of 
debt covenants, meeting  market expectations, and avoiding a loss. Whatever the 
motivation, it is documented that EM has mislead users of financial reporting and harms 
the quality of earnings (Jaggi and Tsui, 2007). Even in developed countries, adopting the 
practice of auditing standards and international accounting has failed to provide adequate 
assurances that financial reports are free from EM (Pornupatham, 2006).   
 
The confidence of investors depends mainly on the strength of the financial reports 
associated with various monitoring mechanisms such as CG, which has recently received 
considerable attention in many developing countries. The primary objective of CG is not 
to improve the performance of companies directly, but to resolve the problems of agency 
by aligning the interests of shareholders with interests of management (Demsetz and 
Lehn, 1985). The Corporate Governance Code of the Kingdom of Bahrain (2010) 
supports the effectiveness of CG as a system monitor. Klein (2002) and Xie et al. (2001) 
show that CG reduces the ability of management to manage earnings. 
 
DeFond and Francis (2005) argue that business failures and the results of corporate 
scandals have renewed the significance of the independent external audit and its 




The independent external auditor is shown as another significant monitoring factor that 
may assist in reducing agency problems between the shareholders and managers and 
assist in reducing the possibility of opportunistic behavior of managers by providing 
financial statements free from mistakes (Wallace, 1980 and Lin and Hwang, 2010).   
 
The auditors can be considered as part of the structure of CG because they monitor the 
financial report quality (FRQ) process (Beasley and Salterio, 2001). The auditor can 
improve the FRQ through their experience and skill to detect any mistakes in the 
financial statement (DeAngelo, 1981). 
 
In general, the shareholders rely on the ability of the audit committee (AC) and board of 
directors (BOD)s to monitor the management and the independent auditors. Therefore, 
the FRQ is laid on the effectiveness of ACs and BODs.  Prior studies focussed on the AC 
role as the main factor for ensuring financial information and monitoring of the external 
audit (Bedard and Gendron 2010; Chen et al. 2005; Abbott and Parker 2000). 
Specifically, this study will examine the relationship between the characteristics of the 
CG including the number of meetings of ACs and BoDs, number of independent 
members, size, and financial expertise of the BoDs and the AQ with respect to 
constraining EM. It has been claimed that companies that have effective ACs and BoDs 
always request auditors of a higher quality, because by hiring auditors with higher-
quality, they increase the value of the company and reduce the conflict of interest 
(Carcello et al., 2002).  
 
When participants in the market lack the ability to directly monitor the earnings reported, 
they may expect managers of the companies to have strong control and engage less in 
manipulation of earnings. Therefore, the study also showed that companies that have 
monitoring mechanisms, which consist of a higher AQ and effective characteristics of 





1.1 Background of the Kingdom of Bahrain 
 
In order to study the business environment in the Kingdom of Bahrain it is necessary to 
give a general background about Bahrain politics and economics. This section provides a 
brief background of the Kingdom of Bahrain by presenting the most important aspects of 
the Bahraini environment. 
 
Bahrain is an island in Arabian Gulf between Saudi Arabia and Qatar, having an area of 
741 square kilometers (See Figure 1.1). In 2011, the population of Bahrain was 
1,195,020, of which 51 percent were non-Bahraini citizens (WTO, 2014).  The local 
currency is the Bahraini Dinar (BD), and the (BD) has been pegged to the U.S. dollar (1 
BD = US$2.659) since 2001. Arabic is the official language of Kingdom, while English 
is used in most business activities. 
 
Figure 1.1: Map of the Kingdom of Bahrain 
 
Source: BBC News (2015) 
 
 
In 2002, Bahrain became a constitutional monarchy, and established a democratically 
elected parliament. The government’s system is based on the separation of legislative, 
judicial and executive authorities. Executive authority is vested in the King together with 
the Council of Ministers, while Legislative authority is vested in the Parliament and the 
King. The King exercises his powers directly and through the ministers: they are 
responsible for the general policy of the government. Each minister is responsible for the 
work of his ministry.  
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The King also appoints and dismisses the Prime Minister by Royal Order, and appoints 
and dismisses Ministers by Royal Decree as suggested by the Prime Minister. The King 
is also the supreme commander of the armed forces and has the right to propose 
amendments to the constitution, propose laws, and vest authority. 
 
Although Bahrain was the first Gulf state to discover oil, in 1932, in the past 40 years the 
country has seen relatively modest hydrocarbon resources compared with its neighbors. 
Subsequently, as first Gulf state to move away from dependence on oil, the country 
became the most diversified economy in the region. 
 
Bahrain's economy continues to be dominated by the oil sector and related industries, 
although Bahrain's oil and natural gas reserves are limited, in comparison to its 
neighbors. According to the US Energy Information Administration (EIA), Bahrain's oil 
reserves were estimated at 125 million barrels in 2012, lasting for about 10-15 years 
(WTO, 2014). The economy of Bahrain is based primarily on oil exports as a main source 
of national income,  accounting for approximately 24.6% of GDP in 2012 and 75% of 
government income. In general, the business environment has seen growth in the 
Kingdom, which has contributed to strengthening the Bahraini economy, including 
regulations, the Bahrain Bourse (formerly the Bahrain Stock Exchange) and the 
accounting and auditing professions. 
 
1.2 The Bahraini Legal System 
 
The legal system of the country plays a significant role in the creation of systems and 
practices. The Kingdom of Bahrain is based on the rulings of the Qur'an and Prophet 
Muhammad's Sunnah . Therefore, Bahrain is a Muslim country in terms of its legal 
system and, in general, is committed to Islamic law (WTO, 2014). Religion influences all 
aspects of life in Bahrain; including the constitution, the routine of daily lives and social 
behavior. In other words, Islam affects business life, with a strong emphasis on faith, 




Therefore, when the Kingdom adopts practices, such as CG, or auditing and accounting 
standards, there is generally an attempt to change these practices or standards to comply  
with Islamic law and local customs.   
 
As Bahrain has good historical relationship ties with the U.K and the United States of 
America, the business environment has been affected by the legislation in those countries 
in terms of standards of auditor independence, auditing and accounting standards, and 
company regulations (Hussain, 2011). Although these systems are the national standards, 
they were originally borrowed from the U.K and United States of America.    
 
All companies (including listed companies on the Bahrain Bourse) and banks in Bahrain 
are required to comply with the international financial reporting standards (IFRs), while 
accounting companies must comply with International Accounting Standards (IAS).  
There are also financial institutions that are required to comply with the financial 
accounting standards issued by the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic 
Financial Institutions (AAOIFI).  
 
However, according to the requirements of the Accounting and Auditing Organization for 
Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI), for matters on which AAOIFI standards do not 
exist, the relevant institutions are required to comply with the relevant International 
Accounting Standards (IAS) and international financial reporting standards (IFRs). 
Bahrain University, the only public and the biggest university, has played a significant 
role in the development of accounting and finance standards by using American 
textbooks in their programs, including textbooks on accounting. Moreover, analysts and 
auditors are expected to seek professional qualifications from the United Kingdom and 
United States, in both the private sector and government.  
 
In general, the perspective of the legal system in Bahrain in relation to the business 
environment is a combination of rules of the United Kingdom, the United States and 
other countries, controlled and influenced by Islamic law. In other words, the borrowed 
or derived laws must be in accordance with the nature of the Bahraini environment and 
Islam.     
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1.3 Monitoring Authorities 
 
1.3.1 The Ministry of Industry and Commerce (MOIC): 
 
The Ministry of Industry and Commerce (MOIC) is considered the main regulator for 
monitoring Bahraini firms. Registration, licensing, and supervision are the most 
important responsibilities of the (MOIC), to ensure that Bahraini companies comply with 
local regulations. Additionally, the MOIC indirectly acts in a supervisory role for 
monitoring from the Central Bank of Bahrain (CBB) and Bahrain Bourse. The practice of 
CG is one of the most significant regulations that was issued by the MOIC (effective 
January 1st, 2011). All companies to which this code applied were fully compliant by the 
end of 2011. 
 
1.3.2 The Central Bank of Bahrain (CBB) 
 
The CBB is an entity of public companies established by the CBB and Financial 
Institutions Law 2006, created on September 6, 2006.  The CBB is responsible for 
financial stability in the Bahraini market and was the successo to the Bahrain Monetary 
Agency, which previously carried out the regulatory functions and was the central bank 
since its inception in 1973. Since the CBB has both financial and legal roles, it is 
supervised by a board of directors formed of seven members, including a representative 
of the Ministry of Finance appointed by Royal Decree for a renewable term of four years. 
Moreover, these members are not allowed to have a “personal interest” in a transaction or 
engage in any commercial activities. 
 
The CBB is responsible for supervision of financial institutions, licensing and ensuring 
the implementation of regulations. To fulfill these objectives, the following summarize 
the CBB's duties: 
 
 To improve all activities that are carried out by the exchange in accordance to the 




 To monitor all transactions and activities in the Bahraini market. 
 To develop and organize the Bahrain Stock Exchange (now Bahrain Bourse) and 
enhance appropriate transactions and standards. 
 Act as the government’s fiscal agent. 
 
1.3.3 Bahrain Bourse 
 
The Bahrain Bourse is mandated to achieve significant growth in Bahrain's economy, and 
plays a key role in enhancing economic and investment relations. In 2002, the regulatory 
and legislative authority and supervision of the Bahrain Bourse was transferred from the 
(MOIC) to the Central Bank of Bahrain (CBB), so that the CBB supervises and regulates 
all the activities of the bourse.  
 
Moreover, the Board is supervised by an independent board of directors, chaired by the 
governor of the CBB. The Bahrain Stock Exchange goes back to 1957, when the first 
Bahraini Public Shareholding Company was established. Since then, more local public 
shareholding companies appeared, reaching their peak in the beginning of the 1980s. 
During this period, public companies were being traded in an unofficial market known as 
"Al Jowhara Market". This market soon collapsed with the collapse the Souk Al-Manakh 
stock market crash in Kuwait at the beginning of the 80s of the last century. Following 
the crash, the Bahraini government has prepared with the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC) a feasibility study for highlighting the importance of the establishment 
of an official stock market in Bahrain. As a result of the recommendation of the study, the 
Amiri Decree No. 4 was issued to establish the Bahrain Stock Exchange in 1987.  
The Bahrain Stock Exchange officially began operations in June 1989 with 29 Bahraini 
shareholding listed companies. The only instruments traded in that time were common 
shares.  
 
Today, there are 48 firms spread over various industries in the Kingdom of Bahrain 
market with different percentages of ownership. However, 5 firms were excluded because 
they were suspended from operating, leaving 43 remaining companies. Consequently, the 
Bahrain Bourse has the following objectives: 
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 To ensure that the markets conduct fair, efficient, diversified and transparent 
activities.  
 Providing unique services for customers including investors, brokers, vendors, 
etc. 
 
1.4 Research Problem 
 
The practice of opportunistic EM provides less earnings accounting reliability, which 
does not reflect the reality of the company’s business performance.  EM is useful for 
making  decisions regarding investment and investor confidence in the financial reports 
but is likely to reduce the financial reporting quality. However, accounting earnings are 
improved when the opportunistic behavior of management is reduced through the use of 
monitoring systems (Wild, 1996; Dechow et al., 1996). 
 
Therefore, policy makers, regulators, and investors are concerned about EM, especially 
after the financial failures (with several of the big companies) in recent decades, and they 
have responded through enhancing the CG systems and independent auditors. CG is one 
of the important monitoring systems. Its primary objective is not to improve the 
performance of companies directly, but to resolve the problems of agency by aligning the 
interests of shareholders with interests of management (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985).  
 
The Corporate Governance Code of the Kingdom of Bahrain (2010) supports the 
effectiveness of CG as a system monitor. Klein (2002) and Xie et al. (2001), show that 










The independent auditor is another significant monitoring factor that may assist in 
reducing the agency problems between the shareholders and managers and reducing the 
possibility of opportunistic behavior of managers.  Cohen et al. (2007) notice that the 
auditor carries a large responsibility of the reliability of financial reporting and the 
preparation of financial statements, as the role of the AC is primarily ceremonial, 
although significant efforts of the committee can lead to effective questioning of 
management.  Krishnan (2003) and Frankel et al. (2002) notice that the monitoring that 
been offered through independent auditors and high quality of audits reduce the 
management’s capability to manage earnings.    
 
Particularly, the characteristics of CG and the independent auditor are recommended 
through the previous literature to be effective in balancing the interests of management 
and shareholders, reducing opportunistic behavior of management, thereby enhancing 
reliability of financial reporting and the process of preparation of financial statements 
(United Kingdom CG Code, 2010; CG Code of Bahrain, 2010; Watts and Zimmerman, 
1986). 
 
1.5 Aim and Research Objectives  
 
The aim of this research is to empirically examine the relationship between the 
characteristics of Corporate Governance (Audit Committee and board of directors), and 
Audit Quality (by the external audit) in constraining Earnings Management in the 
Bahraini listed companies on the Bahrain Stock Exchange (now Bahrain Bourse), to aid 
such companies in improving their financial report quality (FRQ).     
 
To achieve this aim, the specific objectives of this research are determined: 
1. To identify and study  the AC and BoDs’ characteristics, AQ and EM. 
The aims of this objective are to identify and compare previous studies relating to 
characteristics of CG, AQ and EM that have been conducted in the United States and 
United Kingdom. This comparison helps to understand the different institutional settings 
of the market in the United Kingdom and Kingdom of Bahrain and therefore limits the 
generality of their findings to contexts beyond the United States. 
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2. To identify the relationship between the effectiveness of the characteristics of the AC, 
BoDs, AQ and EM by reviewing the existing literature.  
This objective helps to identify the gaps and inconsistencies in the existing literature, and 
provide an opportunity for future research to investigate this relationship. 
3. To develop a model to test the association between the effectiveness and characteristics 
of the AC, BoDs, and AQ in respect of constraining EM. 
This objective helps to construct causal models and hypotheses that can be used for this 
study. The current study used four-equations (models) for analyses. The hypotheses are 
examined with four models. The first study used three models of AQ proxies: AFs, non 
audit services, and auditor industry specialists, while the second study used only the EM 
model.  
4. To design an appropriate conceptual framework and a set of associated hypotheses.  
This objective attempts to contribute theoretically by proposing a conceptual framework 
that could be used to help explain the relationship between the effectiveness of the 
characteristics of the AC, BoDs, and AQ in respect of constraining EM. 
5. To develop a comprehensive framework and measurement of the relationship between 
the effectiveness of the characteristics of the AC, BoDs, and AQ in respect of 
constraining EM. 
This objective focusses on the theoretical framework, specifically the use of agency 
theory; as the theoretical base to develop the two empirical studies, research hypotheses 
and conceptual framework.   
6. To test the models and examine the findings. 
The present thesis is testing four models and examines the findings in the context of the 
Kingdom of Bahrain, based on the Bahraini companies listed on the Bahrain Stock 
Exchange (now Bahrain Bourse) between the financial years 2010 and 2013. 
 
1.6 The rationale for the study: 
 
This thesis has four main rationales to be considered. Firstly, the studies of  CG, AQ and 
EM remain important to the policymakers and the regulators.  Levitt (1998) argues that 
the evaluation of the EM and AQ is critical to the investor confidence in financial reports 
and their influence on resources allocation.  
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Lack of confidence of an investor in AQ could pose a serious threat to the financial 
market, because investors are the largest group of users that support the capital of an 
economic system. Notwithstanding, the significance of BoDs,  committees and AQ are 
recognized as a monitoring function that may affect the FRQ (Lin and Hwang, 2009; 
Abbott et al., 2004; Carcello et al., 2002). Therefore how the monitoring of the role of the 
ACs and BoDs affects the perception of the market of reported earnings remains 
significant to the regulator. 
 
Secondly, the code of CG is one of the most significant regulations that been issued by 
the MOIC, on January 1st, 2011. All companies to which this code applies had to be fully 
compliant by the end of 2011. However, recent amendments and recommendations 
remain empirically untested. This study examines the effectiveness of the characteristics 
of the Corporate Governance Code (2010). 
 
Thirdly, due to the absence of research conducted in the Kingdom of Bahrain relating to 
the characteristics of CG, AQ and EM, the current study compares studies relating to 
characteristics of CG, AQ and EM that have been conducted in United States and United 
Kingdom to Bahrain. This comparison provides different institutional settings of the 
market of the United Kingdom and the Kingdom of Bahrain and therefore extends the 
results to contexts beyond the United States.   Although the two countries share some 
common features, the systems of CG are different (Hussain and Mallin, 2002; Toms and 
Wright, 2005).  
 
In the United Kingdom and the Kingdom of Bahrain, the nature of investors’ activities 
are different, ownership is less dispersed than in the United States and consists of various 
rights of shareholders (Kirchmaier et al., 2005: The Corporate Governance Code of the 
Kingdom of Bahrain, 2010; Amico, 2014).   
 
Aguilera et al. (2006) and Hussain and Mallin (2002) noticed that investors from British 
and Bahrain institutions, such as insurance companies and pension funds, tend to be more 




Also, significant differences exist with respect to the disclosure system of the United 
States and the preparation of financial statements is more demanding. American 
companies are required to disclose more information regarding the auditors and ACs than 
the Kingdom of Bahrain (e.g. whether AC approves audit firm dismissals) (Hussain and 
Mallin, 2002).  Another area of difference is the constraints to exercising leadership in 
the BoD (Aguilera et al. 2006).  
 
Most of the listed companies in the Bahraini bourse separating the role of the CEO and 
the Chairman, while most Americans’ CEOs are also Chairman of the BoD demanded 
(Hussain and Mallin, 2002; Higgs Report, 2003).  
 
The Kingdom of Bahrain adopts the international system of CG with ‘comply or explain’ 
model, which is followed in the UK and a number of European countries. The 
requirement of CG system is stated that the listed companies have to declare in their 
annual reports whether they comply with the provisions of the code, to identify any areas 
of non-compliance, and explain the reasons in light of the particular circumstances.  
 
This differs from the CG system adopted in the United States under SOX. In fact, the 
international system of CG in the Kingdom of Bahrain has become one of the most 
commonly used, because the system provides more guidelines on the structure of the AC 
and BoD (The Corporate Governance Code of the Kingdom of Bahrain, 2010). 
Moreover, the environmental litigation in United Kingdom and (Kingdom of Bahrain) are 
different from those in the United States and other countries, and therefore it has a 
different impact on the auditors’ performance and their reputation (Hussain and Mallin, 
2002; Khurana and Raman, 2004; Francis, 2006). When the reputations of the auditors 
are less probably to be influenced by the litigation or by the regulator, there is also less 
incentive for them to supply high AQ (Al-Ajmi, 2009; Francis, 2006; Khurana and 




Therefore, in the Kingdom of Bahrain, this study is expected to find it highly 
recommendable that the responsibilities of the supervision of the AC and BoDs are to 
ensure that the work of the AQ is not threatened by the lower environmental liability.  
 
Fourthly, non audit services still arguable and are viewed with skepticism because they 
has potential that may impair the independent audit (Beattie and Fearnley, 2002; SEC, 
2000; Panel on Audit Effectiveness, 2000). In this study, non audit services will be one of 
the AQ’s proxies. Previous evidence continues indicates that the policy makers, 
regulators, and investors may perceive that the services of non audit impaired the audit 
independence (Wines, 1994; Sharma and Sidhu, 2001; Firth, 2002; Frankel et al. 2002; 
Raghunandan, 2003; Larcker and Richardson, 2004). 
 
For example, in the United States, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) banned most of the 
auditors to provide a variety of services related to non audit services. In line with the 
legislation of SOX, the regulator of the United Kingdom also responds to the non audit 
services by issuing for auditors the Ethical Standard.  
 
For example, Ethical Standard (5) requires the independent external auditors to evaluate 
the possibility of getting threats that may impact the independence and objectivity, and to 
identify good protection system to minimize these threats.  In addition, Ethical Standard 
(5) has also banned most of variety of services related to non audit services that were 
thought to be the impact of the independence of auditors and objectivity. In brief, both 
regulatory are arguing that the high of non audit services provisions can compromise 
auditor independence. In spite of the negative impact of non audit services on the 
independence of the auditor, many of the studies claim that the joint provision of non 
audit services and audit may expanding the knowledge of the auditors and improve their 
judgments, which led to increase the FRQ (Goldman and Barlev, 1974; Simunic, 1984; 
Beck et al., 1988a; Wallman, 1996; Arrunada, 1999a; 1999b; 2000). These arguments are 
motivating this research to examine the levels of the fees of non audit services and their 




Moreover, a recent research made by DeFond and Francis (2005) on the studies of non 
audit services, the finding of their studies was to merge the fees dependency as a 
substitute measure of independent audit.  They argue that during writing the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act legislation, the study carried out by Frankel et al. (2002) was used general 
cases of the highest impact on the audit service fee levels, and that the subsequent studies 
in on audit services fees has indicated that Frankel’s study was sensitive to the selection 
of the sample, specification of the model, and research design. They also claim that the 
(Securities Exchange - SEC) did not raise any problems of fees dependency when 
recommended to ban the all non audit services in 2000. Consequently, the calls by 
DeFond and Francis (2005) for research of non audit services studies are consider that the 
total service fees (the total amount of the audit and non audit services fees) as a measure 
of alternative financial dependencies that believed to impact the objectivity of the auditor. 
With regard to the current study, no studies in the Kingdom of Bahrain have been used 
the total amount of the audit services (AFs) in examining the correlation between non 
audit services and CG, and between non audit services and CG in respect of constraining 
EM. 
 
Therefore, the total amount of the audit services will be one of the non audit services 
measures that been observe to fill the gap in the literature. In fact, there are 3 other 
measures that will be used in this study, will include (the ratio of non audit services fees 
to AFs, the level of fees of the non audit services compared to the total amount of 
services of non audit fees and AFs, and the ratio of services of non audit fees to total 
fees) for the purpose of ensuring that the findings are robust to different measures of 
independent external audit.   
 
In brief, given that the market of United States provides different environmental 
litigation, institutional settings, and governance structures from those in the United 
Kingdom and in the Kingdom of Bahrain, in general findings of U.S is limited. For these 
purposes, this study examines the relationship between the AQ and practices of the CG 







In addressing the concerns mentioned in the objectives of the research, the researcher 
adopted a quantitative methodology,  relying on secondary data. In particular, companies’ 
annual reports, on line versions and phone calls were used, as well as information from 
the Thomson One Banker database.  The study focused on Bahraini companies listed on 
the Bahrain Stock Exchange from which a sample was selected for this study. The 
objectives used a conceptual framework to help explain the relationship. The research 
analyzed the testable hypotheses. In all, thirty five main hypotheses were tested, twenty 
four for the first study, and eleven for second study. The study covers a four-year 
financial period from 2010 to 2013. 
 
The data collected was analysed using various estimations including:  
 
1. Standard errors of least square regression and Robust Standard Errors. 
2. Ordinary least-squares (OLS) regression. 
3. Robust regression estimator with heteroscedasticity.  
4. Probit and quantile regression. 
5. Heteroskedastic ordinal regression 
 
The purposes of using the various estimators was to ensure the efficiency of the data and 
analyses, because (OLS) regression may not be effective when certain assumptions are 
not fulfilled. Furthermore, the current research uses aggregate accruals models. The 
models include a cross sectional Jones (1991) model, a modified cross sectional Jones 
model and the model of performance adjusted discretionary accruals. The popularity of 
the aggregate accruals models and other alternative approaches (various estimations), is 
suggested for  examining earnings management (McNichols 2000). One of these 
methodologies is to capture managerial discretion through modeling the behavior of a set 




Studies which adopt this approach mostly focuses on a particular industry, such as 
banking (Ahn and Choi 2009; Cornett et al. 2009; Whelen 1994) or property-casualty 
insurance (Gaver and Paterson 2004; Beaver et al. 2003; Petroni et al. 2000; Petroni 
1992). Other studies examine the statistical properties of earnings to recognize the 
behavior that might affect the earnings (Beaver et al. 2007; Kerstein and Rai 2007; 
Burgstahler and Eames 2006; Degeorge et al. 1999; Burgstahler and Dichev 1997). 
 
Furthermore, previous research on the AQ and CG argues that none of the research uses 
heteroskedastic ordinal regression which indicates increasing the efficiency of both the 
regression of the probit and logit if heteroskedastic is present. Moreover, this analysis 
takes into consideration the endogeneity problems that have been neglected in some prior 
studies. 
 
1.8 The structure of the thesis 
 
This study is composed of seven chapters. This chapter provides a discussion of the 
background to this research and its motivation. 
 
Chapter 2 reviews previous studies on three groups of subjects: EM, CG and AQ. Under 
the AQ reviews, this research defines AQ and its possible measures. The effect of AQ 
and the BoDs characteristics, including the frequency of the BoD and AC meeting, 
(financial expertise) background of the BoD and AC members, BoD and AC 
independence, and BoD and AC size are also discussed, using documented evidence and 
on the theory of agency theory. The reviews on EM look at the definition of EM, the 
motivation of the earnings measurement and opportunistic earnings. Furthermore, it 
discusses prior studies relating to the relationship between CG and AQ and between AQ 
and the effects of CG on constraining EM.   A the end of this chapter, a hypotheses has 






Chapter 3 concentrates on the theoretical framework underlying the research. It focusses  
on the primary theory (agency theory), which indicates that the current roles of the 
supervision of the AC and BoDs, and the requirement for independence of the external 
auditor assist to reduce the conflict of agency.   The significance of the various levels of 
AQ and independence of the external auditor for participants in the market and 
companies is described through various hypotheses such as : 1) Hypothesis of the 
insurance, 2) signaling or reputation hypothesis, 3) Information hypothesis ,4) 
Monitoring hypothesis. 
 
The chapter also explains the role of the AC, BoDs and the independence of the external 
auditor in demanding different levels of AQ and limiting opportunistic EM. Furthermore, 
the chapter provides the conceptual framework and a number of hypotheses to help 
explain the relationship and to provide solutions to the research problems identified in 
Chapter 1.  
 
Chapter 4 presents the methodology of the research. It explains the research paradigms, 
methods of data collection, including secondary data, summarizes the measurements and 
the definitions of the variable hypothesis (including the characteristics of the audit and 
board committee, proxies of AQ and EM). Furthermore, it discusses the description of the 
data source, procedures of data collection and analysis. 
 
In Chapters 5 and 6, the results are presented of the empirical findings of the relationship 
between CG and AQ, AQ and CG and the relationship between EM, respectively. 
 
Finally, Chapter 7 concludes the research and discusses the implications and limitations 









LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
2. Introduction 
This chapter introduces existing literature on three subjects: the first is the AQ, the 
second is the characteristics of the CG (the Boards and audit committees), and the third is 
about  EM. In the first part will be reviews and defines the AQ and how to measure it. 
Then it discusses the characteristics of the ACs and boards. All of these reviews will 
provide  comprehensive knowledge and understanding of the area being investigated in 
this research.  
 
At the end of this chapter, the discussion will concentrate on the relationship between CG 
and the AQ and between CG and AQ with respect to constraining EM. These discussions 
assist in identifying similar studies which provide evidence of research gaps.  For each 
relationship, the development of the tested hypotheses is also provided in this chapter. 
Finally, a summary and a conclusion are provided.   
 
2.1 Definition of Audit Quality 
 
DeAngelo (1981) defines AQ as the combination of two characteristics associated with 
the auditor specifically: the technical capacity to identify errors and independence 
required to correct the errors. 
 
This definition illustrates the expertise and ability of the auditor in reporting and 
detecting material misstatements and then expressing them in an appropriate manner. 
Watts and Zimmerman (1986) explain DeAngelo's definition by suggesting the first part 
of the definition refers to the quality of the audit, the competence of the auditor and the 
audit’s feedback (amount of input), while the second part refers to the independence of 




Conversely, Watts and Zimmerman mention that any lack of competence or 
independence of the auditor has the potential to impair the AQ.  Beattie et al. (1999) state 
that there are two types of factors that can influence the audit quality (by independent 
auditor)s. The factors are regulatory and economic factors.  The economic factors include 
the provision of non-audit services, the level of laxity of the regulatory framework, 
independence of the auditor during the audit, and competition with independent external 
auditors (audit market). The regulatory factors are those factors which enhance the 
independence of auditors. These factors are linked with auditing and accounting 
standards. The Cadbury Report (1992) suggested that the existence of the AC facilitates 
strong enforcement of standards and controls and encourages independent auditors to 
have high AQ.  
 
Palmrose (1988) describes the AQ as a degree of assurances (i.e. the probability that 
financial reports include a few errors or misstatements).  The foundations of this 
definition refers to the failure of audits (when auditors fail to provide a clean audit report 
on financial statements). The failures of audits can be categorized as very low AQ, which 
can lead to different results such as auditor business risks (i.e., regulatory sanctions, level 
of litigation, earnings restatement, and, impaired reputation) (Francis, 2004). 
 
The Institute of Chartered Accountants of England and Wales (ICAEW) (2002) 
recommend a definition of AQ that  describes AQ as the auditor’s performance that 
delivers appropriate professional opinions, objectively, and evidence,  enabling financial 
statements to have high AQ. As long as the auditors act to support the opinion of the 
independent audit through sufficient evidence, the regulator expects that they provide 










The ability of the auditor (known as technical qualities) to detect and report any material 
errors during the audit process is often included in definitions of AQ.  Duff (2004) 
recommends that AQ is composed of two items; the first item is technical quality and the 
second item is technical service, as both of them measure the level of the customer’s 
expectations and the customer’s satisfaction. Technical service is composed of non-audit 
services, responsiveness, empathy and client service, while technical quality comprises  
experience, reputation, capability, independence, and expertise.   
 
DeAngelo (1981) and Watt and Zimmerman (1986) defined AQ as the auditors’ 
competence to prevent or detect errors and objectivity (in fact mind and appearance) of 
auditors in reporting such errors. The terms “auditor quality” and “AQ” are supposed to 
be synonymous, and this is in line with Clarkson and Simunic’s (1994) recommendation 









Figure 2.1: (Source: Wooten 2003) - Model of Audit Quality 
 
 
To summarize, AQ can be defined as the ability of the auditor to support appropriate 
opinions of the audit which result in a financial report free from error or any material 
misstatement. Since AQ is affected by three main parties (regulators, clients, and audit 





Wooten (2003) explained the factors available in (Figure 2.1) at Table No. 2.1 (Audit 
quality model) as the following: 
 





Detecting material misstatements affects the efficiency of the audit 
team to perform the audit, which in turn affects the resource 
management and quality control systems of the audit firm. Many 
studies have used firm size as an alternative to these audit team and 
audit firm factors, and their results are arguable. 
Firm size: The most commonly studied factor was the size of the audit firm. 
Researchers identified large firms as the Big 4 or (their precursors). 
The results showed that large firms receive larger AFs than smaller 
firms. Even after controlling risk of audit, the size of the client, and 
the complexity of the audit, there is an additional premium on the 
basis of auditor identity. Attempts to determine whether this premium 
is attributable to higher AQ have been mostly not successful.   
 
DeAngelo (1981) theorized that the audit in a large company is 
performed better because they have a high reputation at stake. In 
addition, because large companies have more resources at their 
disposal, they can attract more highly-skilled employees. Others have 
theorized that large auditors attract premium fees due to their greater 
wealth, which reduces the exposure of clients in litigation (Lennox, 
1999). Others have theorized that there is no real difference to the AQ, 
but the perception is that large companies are well known, and gain a 
reputation for high quality. Interestingly, the AICPA had maintained 
that AQ is an independent audit of the size of the firm. On the whole, 
the evidence is mixed, but it appears that there is some relationship 
between quality and size. What is not clear is whether this difference 




Researchers have turned to expert panels to recognize the 
characteristics at the level of the firms. Firms that are able to allocate 
sufficient resources to training and hiring the best staff and then give 
them a methodology for a sophisticated audit are likely to excel in the 




Experts link higher quality with company a capable to find staff who 
are up to date professionally and technically. This dimension is linked 
with the training and hiring of people. If companies can attract the best 
employees, they have the ability to become more efficient auditors. 
Similarly, companies that provide training enable their employees to 








Experts also link high quality with a company that has strong controls in 
place during the audit process. GAAS requires the company to require 
auditors to plan for their own audits adequately and maintain a quality 
control system. There is a lot of leeway, however, in determining how 
prescriptive and formal systems need to be. Companies that have a quality 
control system that is more rigorous and systematic audit processes are less 
likely to have any material errors discovered during their audit procedures.  
 
Various studies have supported the concept that a strong methodology of 
audit is linked to higher quality. Carcello et al. (1995) found that the audit 
approach is more organized.  
 
GAAS requires auditors to have operations in place for continuation and 
acceptance of customers. Research indicates that the Big 6 (now big 4) 
were less likely to accept risky customers (Raghunandan and Rama, 1999). 
 
Research indicates that companies participating in a peer review process 
are likely to report financial disclosures correctly (Krishnan and Schauer, 
2000). Companies which closely monitor the results of the process of audit 
are linked with higher levels of quality.   
 
Malone and Roberts (1996) found that the stronger quality control systems 
practiced by auditors, the less likely they engaged in poor AQ behaviors, 
such as improper signing off on the audit. steps. Thus, a strong system of 

























conduct of the 

















When auditing and accounting experts were surveyed, they 
suggested that the factors of the audit team were more important than 
company-wide factors in determining AQ. The company which 
employs well qualified people, implements strong control  processes 
and has experience in the industry will likely field a higher level of 
quality audit team.  
 
Experts reported that the director and partner attention to 
engagement is linked with AQ. GAAS requires that the audit be 
supervised properly. The availability during fieldwork of an 
experienced auditor provides reliable responses to the questions of 
the team. 
 
GAAS reports that the audit must be implemented and planned to 
have reasonable assurances of detecting errors properly. Companies 
that have the processes and staff in place to ensure proper 
performance and planning perform better.  
 
Expert panels also identify the integrity of the assignment of 
individuals as a factor in detecting errors. Employees that show a 
high level of professionalism are likely to carry out auditing 
functions properly and would not sign off on uncompleted steps of 





Experts informed that experience with a particular customer leads to 
a higher level of quality audit. Employees on repeat audits are likely 
to get a better understanding of how the particular weaknesses and 
strengths in the systems of customer’s accounting and processes of 
customer’s business work. They have the ability to identify areas 
where most of the errors and risks of the prior years have occurred  
and then allocate more time to these areas. 
 
Work on several customers within the same industry allows 
employees to become an expert in the processes and procedures of 
that industry. By understanding common issues, risks, and 
weaknesses faced by a particular industry, the auditor can be more 

























The ability to properly report material errors depends on independence. If 
the auditor becomes a victim of emotional, financial or personal pressure, 
then the auditor’s independence has been compromised and there is a 
greater chance that the AQ result will be poor.  Tenure and audit pricing 
factors, and providing other services, are theorized to influence not only 
independence, but also the ability of the audit team to detect financial 
statement errors.  
 
 In order to avoid the loss of AFs in the future (and hence profitability for a 
particular customer), auditors may face pressure to overlook deficiencies of 
certain accounting reports. It is easier for the customer to change the 
auditors than for the auditor to get new business; so, there are some 
incentives for the auditor to comply to keep the customer. Researchers also 
tested whether the pricing pressure (low-balling) affects AQ. Clearly, if the 
company is receiving lower fees, then it can only restore profitability by 
reducing the amount of audit work, thus reducing the ability of the auditor 
to detect errors. If the auditor expects the customer to be their primary 
income stream in the future, questions arise about the financial 
independence of the auditor. Thus, the issue becomes a combination of 
pricing and tenure where the auditor should hold on to the customer in 






Tenure is related to both independence and factors of the audit team. Audit 
failure seems to be more common with both long and short tenures. After 
the auditors accept a new customer, some time is required to obtain an 
understanding of the customer and this leaves the auditor liable for the loss 
of any material errors. As tenure increases, the auditors obtain a more 
comprehensive understanding of the customers’ risks and the auditor can 
adjust the process for the detection of errors and procedures of audit. 
 
Conversely, customers with long tenure have been linked with low AQ. 
Long associations have too much dependence on management 
representations, less rigorous audit procedures, and potential to breed 
complacency (Shockley, 1982; Deis and Giroux, 1992). The auditor can 
become very comfortable and not adjust the procedures of audit and 
customer to reflect associated risks and changing business. The auditor 











Researchers suggest that additional services provided to audit customers 
may affect the pricing. It is very likely that when the company provides 
both consulting and auditing services, some type of fee savings is given to 
the customer. The company may lose its independence if it becomes 
economically enslaved to the customer through receiving high fees 
unrelated to the audit. In addition, the client can be placed in a position of 
auditing their own work if the additional services relate to maintaining or 
installing the function of accounting.   
 
Until the SEC began requiring the disclosure of fees in February 2001, 
researchers were not able to collect very mch data on the amount of AFs in 
respect to non AFs. One initial study of 4,200 firms gives a preliminary 
indication that high consulting fees negatively reduce AQ and influence 
auditor independence (Elstein, 2001). It seems that companies that provide 
non audit services are more likely to give the customer flexibility in 
adjusting and recording the discretionary reserves that could be used to 
manipulate earnings in the future. 
 
Lastly, some auditors have claimed that there is already a positive 
relationship between AQ and providing extra services. They claim that 
providing extra services allows them to obtain a better understanding of the 
client's business processes. 
In Brief: Wooten (2003) states that the independence of the audit, the judgment of 
the audit, audit of the teams and the firms are the main contributors to AQ. 
An audit team and the audit firm factors (such as professionalism, audit 
planning, supervision, industry expertise, audit processes, and human 
resources) directly contribute to the auditors’ competence and auditors’ skill 
for finding errors and misstatements. The factors of the provision of NAS, 
AFs, and audit tenure not only impair the independent audit, but they also 


















In addition, the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) (2008) identified 5 key drivers of 
AQ: (1) A culture of audit firms, (2) Skills and personal AQ staff and partners, (3) factors 
beyond the control of the auditors which affect AQ, (4) reliability and usefulness of the 
audit reports, (5) the effectiveness of the process of the audit, (Table No.2.2 provides 
more details about the key drivers).  The FRC (2008) provided recommendations which 
may help to improve AQ; the recommendations are the mechanisms of governance roles 
such as ACs and regulatory demands. An effective AC is able to enhance AQ through the 
communications with the auditors and through participation during the time of audit. 
 
Table 2.2 : Detailed outline of the key drivers 
Driver Indicators 
1- The culture within an audit 
firm 
The culture of an audit firm is likely to provide a 
positive contribution to AQ where the leadership of an 
audit firm: 
 
a. Creates an environment where achieving high 
quality is valued, invested in and rewarded. 
b. Emphasizes the importance of ‘doing the right 
thing’ in the public interest and the effect of 
doing so on the reputation of both the firm and 
individual auditors. 
c. Ensures partners and staff have sufficient time 
and resources to deal with difficult issues as 
they arise. 
d. Ensures financial considerations do not drive 
actions and decisions having a negative effect 
on AQ. 
e. Promotes the merits of consultation on difficult 
issues and supporting partners in the exercise of 
their personal judgment. 
f. Ensures robust systems for client acceptance and 
continuation. 
g. Fosters appraisal and reward systems for 
partners and staff that promote the personal 
characteristics essential to quality auditing. 
h. Ensures AQ is monitored within firms and 
across international networks and appropriate 








2- The skills and personal 
qualities of audit partners and 
staff 
The skills and personal qualities of audit partners and 
staff are likely to make a positive contribution to AQ 
where: 
 
a. Partners and staff understand their clients’ 
business and adhere to the principles underlying 
auditing and ethical standards. 
b. Partners and staff exhibit professional 
skepticism in their work and are robust in 
dealing with issues identified during the audit. 
c. Staff performing detailed ‘on-site’ audit work 
have sufficient experience and are appropriately 
supervised by partners and managers. 
d. Partners and managers provide junior staff with 
appropriate ‘mentoring’ and ‘on the job’ 
training. 
e. Sufficient training is given to audit personnel in 
audit, accounting and industry specialist issues. 
3- The effectiveness of the 
audit process 
An audit process is likely to provide a positive 
contribution to AQ where: 
a. The audit methodology and tools applied to the 
audit are well structured. 
o Encourage partners and managers to be actively 
involved in audit planning. 
o Provide a framework and procedures to obtain 
sufficient appropriate audit evidence effectively 
and efficiently. 
o Require appropriate audit documentation. 
o Provide for compliance with auditing standards 
without inhibiting the exercise of judgment. 
o Ensure there is effective review of audit work. 
o AQ control procedures are effective, understood 
and applied. 
b. High quality technical support is available when 
the audit team requires it or encounters a 
situation it is not familiar with. 
c. The objectives of ethical standards are achieved, 
providing confidence in the integrity, objectivity 
and independence of the auditor. 
d. The collection of sufficient audit evidence is not 





4- The reliability and 
usefulness of 
audit reporting 
Audit reporting is likely to provide a positive 
contribution to AQ where: 
a. Audit reports are written in a manner that 
conveys clearly and unambiguously the 
auditor’s opinion on the financial statements and 
that addresses the needs of users of financial 
statements in the context of applicable law and 
regulations. 
b. Auditors properly conclude as to the truth and 
fairness of the financial statements. 
c. Communications with the AC include 
discussions about: 
o The scope of the audit. 
o The threats to auditor objectivity. 
o The key risks identified and judgments made in 
reaching the audit opinion. 
o The qualitative aspects of the entity’s 
accounting and reporting and potential ways of 
improving financial reporting.  
5- Factors outside the control 
of auditors 
Factors outside the control of auditors which are likely 
to make a positive contribution to AQ include: 
a. An approach to CG within the reporting entity 
that attaches importance to corporate and 
financial reporting and to the audit process. 
b. ACs that are active, professional and robust in 
dealing with issues identified during the audit. 
c. Shareholders that support auditors, where 
appropriate, thereby increasing the likelihood 
that directors and management will comply with 
their obligations in relation to the preparation of 
reliable financial statements. 
d. Reporting deadlines that allow the opportunity 
to carry out an audit without undue reliance on 
work performed before the end of the reporting 
period. 
e. Appropriate agreed arrangements for any 
limitation of liability. 
f. An audit regulatory environment that focuses on 
the drivers of AQ. 
 





2.2  A proper approach for measuring AQ  
 
According to Wooten (2003), Niemi (2004), and Jensen and Payne (2005), the 
measurement of AQ is problematic and complex. In other words, the problematic and 
complex occur when the results of AQ is not immediately or directly observable. AQ 
control procedures attempt to maintain high levels of control over the process of audit, 
but the failure of the audit usually becomes known in the business failure context. When 
large companys have experiences with the failure of the audit, the business industry will 
know. It is impossible to know the number of poor AQ that simply go unpublicized and 
undetected. The company may conduct a poor AQ, but without the knowledge of the field 
work and planning, there can be no evidence if financial statements are not materially 
misstated. Similarly, if the implementation of poor AQ material misstatement is ignored, 
they may have no negative repercussions. 
 
Since AQ is not observed, researchers look at AQ indicators or surrogates, such as expert 
opinions, to determine the outputs and inputs of the AQ. Other researchers use a more 
objective source of outputs to determine the AQ. If the firm gets very good ratings on the 
peer reviews, rarely has it to re-issue audit opinions, and has a low rate of litigation, then 
one can conclude that it performs high AQ. However, Francis (2004), Bailey and 
Grambling (2005), and PCAOB (2008) has recognized many possible measurements to 
measure the AQ in the academic research literature and in academic practice.  These 
measurements have an indirect and a direct link with AQ, they are seen as perceptions, 
factors, behaviors as positive or negative (attitude), and indicators as specified in the 
section (2.1). 
 
The possible measurements to measure the AQ is dependent upon the auditor during the 
process of the audit, which accept to complete the engagement of the auditing (Bailey 
and Grambling, 2005; PCAOB, 2008). These measures are linked with the compliance to 
procedures and auditing standards, and documentation or evidence of auditing (copies of 
all documents the auditor has sighted during the audit). The measurements are classified 
as input and output based measures.  
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Billy and Grambling (2005) recommend that the policies, processes and procedures of the 
audit (inputs) are related to the system of quality control of the firm of the audit.  
 
These contain (1) how the firms of the audit assist and emphasize the desirable qualities 
(such as Auditor independence and objectivity, and professional's ethics of the auditor), 
(2) audit methodologies (such as audit procedures and policies), (3) Internal control (such 
as the audit firm’s internal review), and (4) Human resources (such as independence and 
competence of the staff).  Moreover, with regard to human resources, Bailey and 
Grambling (2005) recommend that the ability of auditors, auditors’ skills and their 
competencies must be seen in a broader context, which exceeds the technical accounting 
and auditing skills. They dispute that the degree of professional skepticism of auditors 
might impact their professionalism when performing the audit. Therefore, the 
independence feature is desirable for each of the members of the team of the audit and the 
auditor when it comes to achieve the highest AQ.   
 
In short, Bailey and Grambling (2005) argue that “If the AQ is defined in term of inputs, 
so inputs can be identified as the “right” people, the “right” will be applying the ‘“right” 
procedures and “right” tools in the “right” organizational culture that includes the proper 
internal control”. The measurement of the output is related to the professional opinions 
(independent audit), and whether that opinion of the independent audit reflects the 
“management's assertions” and that involve the issuance of the financial statements 
through the opinion of the independent audit process and the restatements (Bailey and 
Grambling, 2005).  
   
Another recommendation made by Bailey and Grambling (2005), PCAOB (2008) defined 
the measurements of the input as process and procedures that been taken into account to 
reach a given opinion of audit (for example, the experience levels of audit staff and audit 
partners, annual staff retention, and audit procedures used in the detection of fraud). The 
measurement of output refers to the process of auditing as results or evidences produced 
from the auditor. These results, for example, can be measured by the numbers of 




Generally, the possibility measurements to measure the outputs and inputs which are 
made by Bailey and Grambling (2005), PCAOB (2008) are limited to the factors in 
relation to the auditor during the process of the audit, which was accepted to complete the 
engagement of the auditing.  
 
Those factors of AQ are behind the process of auditing itself. The users (audit clients) 
idea about the AQ is to demand one of an alternative measurement for measuring the AQ 
(such as, industry-specialist auditor, non-audit services fees, and AFs). Specifically, users 
reckon AQ on the basis of the reputation of the auditors. Khurana and Raman (2006) state 
that the users (audit clients) idea about the AQ is significant because it enhances the 
companies’ confidence with the information provided in the financial report and it 
reflects the public's trust. Recognizing the importance of these, in the current research the 
measurements to measure the AQ will be on users (audit clients) idea. 
 
Although many of the measurements to measure the AQ were used in existing studies, 
this research acknowledges the limitations of these measurements. For example, in 
respect to the measurements to measure the input, how can we make sure the consistency 
of the input has not decreased during the auditing (audit process)?, Perhaps, information 
about the key drivers of AQ, such as auditors’ independence, experience, capability, 
reputation and education are difficult to find and obtain to the public. By using the 
measurements to measure the output, the results of the audit are not necessarily 
noticeable only after it has been conducting work because the information of AQ usually 
appears during a certain period of time during which it identifies material misstatements 
in the financial statement or restatement or business failure (PCAOB, 2008). The 
measures, for example the size of the company of audit which the AQ measures may not 
accurately reflect the reputation of the auditor. While some of the existing factors are 
believed to compromise the independent auditor, for instance audit tenure and non-audit 
services, it was also a dispute that these same factors can enhance the ability of the 
auditors and their knowledge.  Most of the studies identify that, to some extent, some 
measures (such as specialist auditors of the industry) have proved the existence of a 
strong relationship with the highest AQ.  
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From the existing studies, no empirical literature has been found to assist some measures 
as the best indicators of AQ, this does not necessarily mean that these measures are 
insignificant; they might be complemented by qualitative research on the AQ. 
 
In this thesis, three measures of AQ will be employed based on auditor independence 
opinion and auditor reputation, namely, non-audit services fees, AFs, and specialist 
auditors of the industry. These measures have been widely used in the previous studies in 
the field of auditing study, and each of measures is now reviewed. 
 
2.2.1 NAS fees 
 
The central arguments about non-audit services is concerned generally with the 
independent auditor and whether the combined services that are provided by auditing 
(such as services of non-audit services and auditing) are enhancing or reducing the 
independent auditor. On the other hand, it is a question of whether the combined services 
of non-audit services and audit are able to decrease or increase in the AQ. Beattie and 
Fearnley (2002) argue that there is no formal literature of independent auditor currently 
existing, and point out that most of the definitions of independent auditor mainly 
highlight the significance of integrity and objectivity of the auditor. Various researchers 
recommend that the combined services (such as services of non-audit services and 
auditing) may create potential benefits (Goldman and Barlev, 1974; Simunic, 1984; 
Wallman, 1996; Beck et al., 1988a; Arrunada, 1999a; 1999b; 2000). 
 
These studies state that the joint provision of non-audit services and audit enhances the 
auditor’s independence through the auditor’s economic power and economies of scale. 
Economies of scale can be defined as reducing the costs (savings) that occur when the 
services such as (services of non-audit services and auditing) are combined and made by 
the same auditors. They can be classified into two main types of economies of scale, 






The Knowledge spillovers are obtained from the process of the transformation that has 
happened when both services use similar professional qualifications and / or information 
(Arrunada, 1999a; 1999b). For instance, when the auditor is planning for conducting the 
audit service, relevant information on the competency in information technology and the 
client's system of internal controls are both necessary to do the work. The qualifications 
and information are necessary for the auditor’s job when the auditors are conducting 
auditing and giving advice on clients’ financial information system. As referred to in 
Wallman (1996), the valuable information is obtained in both ways, when the auditors 
conduct auditing they will know more about the business of the client and this kind of 
information is important for the auditors when they do non-audit services. 
 
The “contractual economies” is the second type of economies of scale, which occur from  
maintaining the reputation of the auditor and /or from better use of assets (for example,  
size), which have already developed when assurance and contracting quality in auditing 
or non-audit services. In addition, these contractual advantages are known as the label 
“one-stop shopping”, which provides the supplier of / and the client for such services 
(Arrunada, 1999a).  On the other hand, auditors and clients can help to lower the fees of 
the marketing for those services. Also, clients are assured that AQ is maintained to the 
highest level. Furthermore, the identification of the cost saving is beneficial to non-audit 
services, Goldman and Barlev (1974) and Nichols and Price (1976) produce a more 
complex view of auditor and client interactions. 
 
They recommend that models of the economic power supply the independent auditor with 
a potential power to resist the conflicts between client and auditor. Goldman and Barlev 
(1974) recommend that the provision of non-routine services of audit (such as non audit 
services) can lead to a more independent auditor because the value of the auditor to and 







In spite of the positive impact of the non-audit services, their joint supply continues to be 
disputable and they are viewed with doubt because of the potential to compromise the 
independent auditor (Panel on Audit Effectiveness, 2000; SEC, 2000; Beattie and 
Fearnley, 2002) and the auditor’s economic dependence on clients will be occur (Beck et 
al. 1988a, 1988b; Simunic, 1984). The previous consistent evidence indicates that the 
investor and user may believe that non audit services impair independent auditors, Wines, 
1994; Sharma and Sidhu, 2001; Firth, 2002; Frankel et al. 2002; Raghunandan, 2003; 
Larcker and Richardson, 2004) and this goes beyond the positive impact of non-audit 
services and reflects the decline in AQ. 
 
The first debate against the joint supply provided from the audit (such as non-audit 
service fees) is a possibility that they will make the auditors financially dependent on 
their clients, and therefore they are less willing to stand up to client’s pressure for fear of 
losing their business. As indicated by Simunic (1984) and Beck et al. (1988a), the joint 
supply of non-audit services and audit produce indirect effects to the existence of 
knowledge spillovers that create cost savings which lead to reduced marginal audit fees. 
For the purpose of keeping their clients, auditors will continue to have strong incentives 
to keep their clients happy, and therefore they lose their objectivity. The second dispute 
relates to the provision of non-audit services and maintains that they may reduce the 
independent auditor because of conflicts of interest with the parties, which arise during 
auditing. For instance, they may make auditing to their work, taking management 
decisions or representing the client’s management in the event of litigation, and thus 
become very close to the client’s management (Panel on Audit Effectiveness, 2000; SEC, 
2000; Beattie and Fearnley, 2002). 
  
Generally, empirical studies provide conflicting results about the relationship between the 
independent auditors and non-audit services. Hartley and Ross (1972) argue that the non-
audit services are small issue to an independent auditor. Some researches indicate that the 
non-audit services have a small effect on the independent auditor (Craswell, 1999; Ryan, 
2001) and a small number of researches recommend that the non-audit services provide 
significant advantages (Lai and Krishnan, 2009). 
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Several empirical researches find no significant association between and non-audit and 
independent auditor services (Barkess and Simnett, 1994; Craswell, 1999; DeFond et al., 
2002; Chung and Kallapur, 2003; Ashbaugh et al., 2003), while other researches give 
evidence that the joint supply of non-audit services impair independent auditors (Wines, 
1994; Sharma and Sidhu, 2001; Frankel et al. 2002; Firth, 2002; Raghunandan, 2003; 
Larcker and Richadson, 2004). In the present study, the regulatory concern that non-audit 
services may impair the independent auditor, indicating the highest supply of non-audit 
services is indicated as a decline in AQ.  
 
 2.2.2 Audit fees 
 
The connection between AQ and AFs is recommended by the signaling hypothesis or 
reputation hypothesis (Lindberg, 2001). Capital models of reputation recommend that 
sellers use their resources for the purpose of building a reputation because buyers choose 
the sellers on the basis of their reputation (Klein and Leffler, 1981; Rogerson, 1983; 
Shapiro, 1983; Allen, 1984). 
 
There are various discussions for the AFs theory as proxy for AQ. Various researchers 
recommend that the highest AFs are linked with the highest AQ, and this led to 
reimbursement for high prices of the capital’s reputation (Big Size), specialist auditors 
for the industry, as well as increased efforts of auditors (Simunic, 1980; Palmrose, 1986a; 
Craswell et al., 1995; Ferguson and Stokes, 2002). 
 
Craswell et al. (1995) state that the development of the reputation of the industry 
specialization consumes a higher cost and auditors’ brand name therefore leading to 
higher AFs. The evidence recommends that the clients are willing to pay more (premium 
fee) for the auditors, who have good reputations in order to produce better AQ service, 
The auditors show the brand name to influence the Big 8/6/4 premium fee that is justified 
for high reputation capital, and thus move the differentiation of high quality compared 




Palmrose (1986a) argued that the auditors of Big 8 charge more fees (high AFs) for two 
purposes: they show (1) monopoly pricing (only those audit firms in an industry 
producing the services) or (2) higher AQ. After replacing the variable of the AFs for 
hours of auditing (working hours), the result supports that the Big 8 auditors are 
consistent with the providers of higher AQ. She suggest that “the big 8 appointment is a 
quality alternative, in that increased hours by big 8 auditors (hours of auditing) will 
reflect the main productive activities (acquisition of evidence) to provide higher levels of 
assurance (high level of quality) to the audits’ customers”. Together with the brand name 
of the auditors, previous research supports more evidence on the association between 
specialist auditors in the industry and AFs (fee premiums). Craswell et al. (1995) and 
Ferguson and Stokes (2002) state that the specialist auditors in the industry get more 
audit charges (fee premiums) over the brand name of non-specialist auditors in the 
industry,  which shows a high AQ differentiation between them.    
 
In another study, Wolinsky (1983) demonstrates that the price may be an indication of the 
differences in the levels of quality. Although sellers are potentially able to produce 
different and high levels of quality, the products of high quality are more costly. 
DeAngelo (1981) states that the large audit firms supply higher quality audits or auditors 
that get more audit fees have more resources for investment compared with the smaller 
audit firms. Thus, they contribute more to enhance the quality of their work 
 
Elitzur and Falk (1996) indicate that the planned level of the AQ have positive 
association with AFs. They examine the AFs and planned AQ in a multi-period model. 
Usually, higher AFs might make auditors raise the AQ. Hoitash et al. (2007) also agreed 









In recent researches concerning CG, the evidence indicates that less AFs can also be 
linked with a perceived higher AQ. This is due to the independent auditor taking into 
consideration that companies tied up by a strong internal control environment are 
expected to reduce the  risk of audit and hence reduce the effort of the auditing and AFs 
through the effective internal CG mechanism (Tsui et al., 2001; Griffin et al., 2008; Boo 
and Sharma, 2008;Krishnan and Visvanathan, 2009). Cohen et al., (2002) state that the 
effectiveness of the internal mechanism of the CG is likely to contribute to higher AQ by 
reducing the risk and enhances the perceived integrity of financial reports. Yeoh and Jubb 
(2001) recommend that if the internal mechanism of the CG and auditor share a common 
factor it contributes to higher AQ (Independence from management). Griffin et al. (2008) 
show evidence that the request of the internal mechanism of the CG and auditing services 
are jointly determined by two compensatory relations. In the first relationship, it could be 
an increase in AFs because of the demand for the effectiveness of the CG.  
 
The second relationship is linked with the reduction of the AFs, because the benefit of the 
auditing (by auditors) from strong CG thereby reduces the cost of the audit and audit risk. 
Both of the relationships help to have higher AQ. Consistent with this, Tsui et al. (2001) 
and Krishnan and Visvanathan (2009) recommend that those companies that separate the 
double role of the AC, chief executive officer and the chairman equipped with financial 
knowledge (expertise), and seen by the independent auditors to have a strong internal 
control environment reduces the audit effort and limitation risk, leading to lower AFs. 
 
In addition to the empirical statement on the association between the AFs and AQ  
discussed above, many of the reports of the regulators emphasize the significance of 
identifying AFs and how they might impact the work of AQ (The Cohen Commission, 
AICPA 1978; Treadway Commission 1987; Cadbury Report 1992; Advisory Panel on 







For instance, Cohen Commission (AICPA, 1978) recommends that the audit companies 
are required to recognize, control the AFs and other problems related to the audit 
resources (such as time, employees, and partnerships to participate in an audit) as these 
factors are likely to reduce the value of the AQ because of the high competition in the 
market of the audit. LIKEWISE, the regulatory body in the United Kingdom also pulls 
attention towards the AFs factor and how it can affect the AQ. As assumed by the 
ICAEW (2002) “The AQ is performed only if it is the cornerstone of the company's 
strategy in general. Every single strategic decision that has been made by the company 
will eventually affect the quality, counting the policy of the company's on the AFs”. In 
short, ICAEW claims that the policy of the auditing companies on AFs is one of the 
components that might impact the AQ. 
 
In opposition to the advantage of using AFs as a proxy for AQ, the current research 
highlighted a constraint that AFs are a defective measure of the AQ. The AF is not 
exactly accurate as an indicator of appropriate effort of auditing as a measure of auditing 
effort is the number of hours of auditing (working hours). However, Deis and Giroux 
(1996) give some empirical statements that the hours of auditing and AFs are linked to 
the AQ in their analysis of three significant components: hours of auditing, AFs and AQ. 
Thus, it appears reasonable that more hours of auditing will lead to a high level of AQ 
and high level of AFs. Furthermore, to take into account the high level of AFs as a proxy 
for a high level of AQ is consistent with reputation hypothesis or signaling.  
 
2.2.3 Industry-specialist auditors 
 
The theoretical foundation for the use of industry specialist auditors comes from the 
reputation capital hypothesis as it applies to the big size auditors. Economic theories of 
product differentiation recommend that sellers spend their resources to build the 







In the audit market, there are two levels of reputation development. The first level 
requires audit firms to invest in their brand name reputation in order to differentiate the 
quality of their products. The second level requires big size auditors to differentiate the 
quality of their products amongst them. Due to the unique and complex features of 
certain industries, buyers demand industry-specialist auditors in order to deal with 
reporting requirements and specific accounting rules (Craswell et al., 1995). Such 
demands encourage the big size auditors to invest resources in a specific industry in order 
to obtain industry specific competency and knowledge.  
 
Evidence suggests that specific training; knowledge and task specific experience can 
increase the auditor’s competence (Ashton, 1991; Bonner and Lewis, 1990) and results in 
auditors seizing increasing numbers of audit clients established in specific industries. The 
auditor market share rises as the number of their audit clients increases. The largest share 
of the auditor’s market is more likely clients imagining that the auditor will provide a 
higher AQ. This idea is consistent with studies showing that the firm’s market shares 
indicate the quality of their own product (Smallwood and Conlisk, 1979; Shockley and 
Holt, 1983; Caminal and Vives, 1996). 
 
The competency and industry specific knowledge that is possessed by the auditor 
represents the main element of their AQ. Taylor (2000) and Low (2004) argue that the 
auditor’s knowledge of a clients’ specific industry affects the audit-planning decisions 
and level of audit risk assessment. When the auditors have a better understanding and a 
higher knowledge of the clients’ industries they are able to assess appropriate levels of 
audit risk and plan their own audit strategies, and this can help them to anticipate the 
possibility of misstatements. 
 
The evidence also suggested that possession of industry specialist knowledge improves 
the performance of the auditor. Owhoso et al. (2002) examine the effectiveness of 
industry-specialist auditors in the detection of errors during the audit review process for 




Their findings recommend that the experience of the auditors in a specific industry 
enables them to detect error more effectively than the non-specialist auditors. Auditors 
without specific industry experience perform below the nominal benchmark for detection 
of error. Similarly, Bedard and Biggs (1991) show that the auditors who have greater 
experience in manufacturing are the best in detecting errors than the auditors who have 
less experience in manufacturing. 
 
Dunn and Mayhew (2004) found a positive relationship between disclosure quality and 
industry-specialist auditors. Their findings recommend that the auditors with industry 
specific knowledge are more able to help their clients in the development of industry 
specific disclosure strategies. O’Keefe at al. (1994) found that industry-specialist auditors 
are linked with the highest compliance with Generally Accepted Auditing Standards 
(GAAS) than non-specialist auditors. Carcello and Nagy (2004) report a negative 
relationship between the incidences of fraudulent financial reporting and industry-
specialist auditors and this shows that industry-specialist auditors are less likely to be 
linked with financial fraud.   
 
Various studies have linked the industry-specialist auditors with EM (Balsam et al., 2003; 
Krishnan, 2003a).These studies suggest that customers of industry-specialist auditors 
have lower discretionary accruals than the customers of non-specialist auditors. The 
findings recommend that the industry-specialist auditors are more likely to constrain EM 
and opportunistic behavior of management. 
 
In other studies, regarding the market reaction, Knechel et al. (2007) state that when 
firms switch from a Big 4 non-specialist to a Big 4 specialist auditor, those firms face a 
significant positive abnormal return. Subsequently, the markets react negatively when 
firms switch from a Big 4 specialist to a Big 4 non-specialist.  These results indicate that 






Beside the empirical evidence and theoretical justification for the connection between 
AQ and industry-specialist auditors, regulators and authoritative guidance have also 
emphasized the importance of the auditor being able to understand the client’s industry 
setting before starting the auditing work (Knechel et al., 2007). For example, the UK 
Auditing Standard, ISA 300: Planning an audit of financial statement (APB, 2004), 
claims that the auditor needs to establish an understanding of the setting of the customer’s 
industry before planning their audit strategies.  
 
In brief, most of the previous studies indicate that the auditor's industry knowledge is a 
crucial element in the effectiveness and efficiency of audits processes, and that it 
increases the AQ services. The use of the industry-specialist auditor not only improves 
the auditing quality work, but is also seen to be of value to market participants. 
 
2.3 Effectiveness of boards of directors 
 
Fama and Jensen (1983) indicate that the BoDs is a high-level control system in the 
organization because of the power to make decisions taken by senior management. 
Evidence suggests that many of the characteristics of the board may affect their 
effectiveness in their supervisory role. These characteristics are: size, meeting frequency, 
financial expertise, and composition of independent non-executive directors.  
 
2.3.1 Board of directors size 
 
Board size is believed to be an essential aspect of effective decision making (UK CG, 
2010). Vafeas (2005) indicates that the size of the committee and the performance of the 
directors have a nonlinear relationship. Both too large and too small a size of board is 
likely to make it ineffective. Lipton and Lorsch (1992) recommend that the size of the 
board must not be more than 8 or 9 directors. Jensen (1993) argue that when the board 
has more than 7 or 8 members, it is less effective due to the problems of coordination, 






Although the average BoDs sizes are relatively big, prior studies present that smaller 
BoDs are more effective as directors can better communicate on them, and they are easier 
to manage. These factors enhance a more conversational  resource. For example, studies 
of corporate performance and size of the board have shown that the smaller boards are 
linked with higher values in the market. Yermack (1996) examined 452 large U.S.A firms 
in the period between 1984 and 1991 and he documents a negative relationship between 
the firm value and board size. Eisenberg et al. (1998) also provides a similar conclusion 
on firm value and size of the board in a sample of mid and small-size firms.  
 
In studies related to the formativeness of earning, Vafeas (2000) claims that the market 
participants viewed the information content of the earnings as higher in firms with a 
smaller board (with minimum of 5 members). This is probably due to the likelihood of 
them accepting personal responsibility as a liability and the commitment of each 
individual member. For comparison, the larger board, the responsibility of monitoring is 
divided between the members and less responsibility is carried by each member (Vafeas, 
2000).  
 
With regard to the studies of AQ, Abbott et al. (2004) indicate that firms that have an 
experience of a smaller size of board have a lower restatements incidence as smaller 
boards help to have effective communication, and there is less likelihood of the 
interruption of communications. This indicates that when the members of the board 
communicate effectively, they lessen the occurrence of misunderstanding and resulting 
errors, and they are more sensitive to issues that may affect the confidence of the 













2.3.2 Independent board of directors 
 
NED are connected with responsibility for monitoring managers and thus reducing 
agency costs that arise from the separation of ownership and control in the management 
of the company day after day (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Brennan and 
McDermott, 2004). The U.K CG Code (2012) highlights that one of the main 
responsibilities of non-executive directors is “satisfy themselves on the integrity of 
financial information and that financial controls and systems of risk management are 
robust and defensible”.  
 
Therefore, higher sizes of independent NED on BoD are expected to motivate monitoring 
functions more effectively, which then leads to financial statements being more reliable. 
Also it has been found that the independent directors can develop their reputations in 
making the decision (Fama and Jensen, 1983) and provide an impartial management 
assessment of actions (Vance, 1983).  
 
Prior studies indicate that an independent board is an effective monitoring mechanism. 
Beasley’s (1996) study indicates that the largest rate of independent directors on the 
boards results in a negative impact on the financial statement re fraud. O’Sullivan (2000) 
and Carcello et al. (2002) document a positive relationship between the AQ and the 
proportion of non-executive directors on the board. This indicates that the independent 
board members demand more in-depth audit effort by the auditor, which leads to higher 
AQ. Similarly, a stream of literature on independent boards and EM indicate that firms 
that have a higher proportion of independent members of the Board faced a lower 
incidence of EM (Klein, 2002; Xie et al., 2003; Davidson et al., 2005; Peasnell et al., 










2.3.3 Board of directors expertise 
 
The experience and knowledge of the BoD are important elements in confirming that the 
effectiveness of the supervision functions regarding the board. Carcello et al. (2002) 
suggests that the members of the BoD with experience of a higher number of positions 
are more demanding of high AQ work. Moreover, Chtourou et al. (2001) argue that 
directors with experience are less likely to be connected with EM. The conclusion of both 
studies show that the levels of highest board expertise lead to a higher incentive towards 
monitoring.  
  
Furthermore, when the BoD has financial literacy they can understand the issues relating 
to the financial statements. Xie et al. (2003) found that the EM is less occurring in firms 
that are controlled by the BoD who has the background of financial and corporate. 
Similarly, Agrawal and Chadha (2005) argue that the likelihood of an earnings 
restatement is lower in the firms that BoDs are financially literate. Evidence from the 
independence auditor literature indicates that BoD with expertise in the financial arena 
tends to reduce the purchase of non-audit services from auditors because they believe that 
the provision of non-audit services compromises the independence of the audit (Lee, 
2008).    
 
In brief, all of these studies acknowledge that the BoDs who have specific experience and 
knowledge are useful in supervising the management. Since this thesis examines the EM 
and AQ, the financial knowledge and accounting are beneficial to the BoDs for a better 
understanding of the issues and financial statements related to financial reporting. 
 
2.3.4 Board of directors meetings 
 
One of the director duties is to attend the meeting so that they can vote on major 
decisions (Ronen and Yaari, 2008). Conger et al. (1998) indicate that more frequent BoD 
meetings improve the BoD’s effectiveness. The board meetings are the main dimension 
of the BoD operations (Vafeas, 1999) and an indication of the efforts made by the 
directors (Ronen and Yaari, 2008).  
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Active BoDs that meet more often are more likely to perform their duties properly in 
accordance with the interests of shareholders (Vafeas, 1999), because more time in the 
meeting can be devoted to controlling issues such as conflicts of interest, monitoring 
management and EM (Habbash, 2010), and to put more effort into monitoring the 
integrity of financial reporting and to improve the AQ. A study was conducted by Xie et 
al. (2003), employing a sample of 282 observations, point out that the board that meets 
frequently  may have time to look at issues such as EM. Their results conclude that the 
EM is significantly negatively associated with the number of the meetings of the board. 
Moreover, Vafeas (1999) found a positive relationship between the performance and 
board meetings. 
 
However, most of the studies found an insignificant relationship between EM and board 
meetings. For instance, Ebrahim (2007) and Habbash (2010), who used a different period 
and sample found that the number of meetings may not restrict EM practices.  Habbash 
(2010) gives his finding by indicating that the frequent meetings may not always be a 
characteristic of the active BoDs.  
 
Carcello et al. (2002) and Krishnan and Visvanathan, (2009) indicate that the frequent 
BoD meetings lead to higher AFs, and this is consistent with the proposition that when 
the directors meet more often, they suggest a wider audit effort from the auditor, which 
improves the process of the audit. 
 
In addition, Chen et al., (2006) examine 169 firms under Chinese Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC) enforcement actions between periods of (1999-2003). They indicate 
that the higher frequency of BoD meetings reduce the likelihood of fraud because the 
frequent meetings allow the directors to recognize and resolve the problems, especially 









2.4 Effectiveness of audit committees 
 
AC is one of the committees that will have been set by the BoDs, of which the main 
responsibility is with financial reporting. Aside from the benefit that is obtained from the 
establishment of the AC, previous studies indicate that meeting frequency of ACs, size, 
composition and expertise may affect tier effectiveness of monitoring (DeZoort et al., 
2002; Walker, 2004). 
 
2.4.1 Size of audit committee  
 
The size of the AC varies and it depends on the needs of the company and the extent of 
the responsibilities delegated to the committee. According to the Bahrain CG Code: “The 
board must establish an AC of at least 3 members a majority of which should be 
independent including the chairman”. It seems that the size of the AC is also one of the 
important characteristics that relate to the effectiveness of the AC.  
  
Consistent with the argument for an effective committee size , too small a committee size 
may mean that the insufficient number of directors are unable to perform their work in 
the committee, and therefore the effectiveness of monitoring is reduced (Vafeas, 2005). 
This is probably due to the individual director being unable to perform their duties as 
efficiently as the committee's functions are spread across a small number of directors. In 
addition to this, when the committee is too big, the performance of the directors may 
decline due to coordination problems and the process, and therefore this is defined as 
another reason for the weaker monitoring (Jensen, 1993; Vafeas, 2005). 
 
Average ideal size of the AC is between three and four members (Vafeas, 2005; Xie et 
al., 2003; Abbott et al., 2004). Evidence of committee audit size indicates that firms that 
have larger ACs are more effective in monitoring management. Yang and Krishnan 
(2005) examined the relationship between quarterly management of earnings and size of 
the AC in 896 U.S.A firms in the years (1996-2000). They found that the management of 




This may indicate that the presence of inadequate numbers of members of AC increases 
the ability function of the AC in terms of monitoring the integrity of financial reports. . In 
another study, Chen and Zhou (2007) found that firms with larger AC are more worried 
about the reputations of auditors and tend to assign the Big 4 auditors.  In brief, the larger 
size of AC, the more effective they are in the monitoring of financial reporting. 
 
2.4.2 Independent audit committee 
 
The agency theory indicates that the independence (director) has fundamental qualities 
that contribute to the function of an effective monitoring committee (Fama and Jensen, 
1983) and that the empirical evidence of the independence of the AC is consistent with 
this proposal. Various studies suggest that the independent AC are probably to be linked 
with avoidance of the fraudulent financial reporting (Abbott et al., 2000; Abbott et al., 
2004) and more probably to be linked with lower EM (Klein, 2002; Xie et al., 2003; 
Bedard et al., 2004; Davidson et al., 2005), and lower earnings restatement occurrence 
(Agrawal and Chadha, 2005). Independent AC is expected to provide judgment, equitable 
assessment and to be able to effectively monitor the management.  
 
In addition, Carcello and Neal (2000) provide evidence of the relationship between the 
disclosure choices of firms in financial distress and independent AC. They suggest that 
firms that have a higher number of independent ACs are less likely to receive initial 
going concern opinion of audit from the auditors. Moreover, Carcello and Neal (2003) 
indicate that the independent ACs are more effective in protecting the auditors from 
dismissal following the issuance of the audit report. 
 
In a study regarding the AQ, Abbott and Parker (2000) and Chen et al. (2005) indicate 
that the presence of a higher number of independent NED on ACs increases the tendency 
to assign auditors with industry specialism. In brief, all of these suggest that independent 






2.4.3 Audit committee expertise 
 
According to the U.K CG Code (2012), “The board should satisfy itself that at least 1 of 
the AC members has financial experience” (C.3.1). DeZoort (1998) argues that the 
experience of AC members in the auditing and accounting is necessary to obtain a 
sufficient understanding of the oversight tasks. He proposes the following: 
 
“Audit and evaluation of internal control experience makes the difference 
in the members of the ACs’ performance on the internal control oversight 
task. It is important, the members of the AC with the experience made 
internal control provisions more like those of experts (such as practicing 
auditors) without experience”. 
 
In other words, the experimental evidence and regulatory concern indicates that the 
presence of knowledge and appropriate experience, particularly in the auditing and 
accounting, is likely to improve the ACs’ judgment and performance. The experimental 
evidence of archival studies also indicates that the financial expertise of the AC improves 
the ability of monitoring and results in an increase in the FRQ of firms. Krishnan and 
Visvanathan (2008) examine the interdependence between the financial expertise of ACs 
and the FRQ, measured by the level of accounting conservatism, in a sample of 929 
U.S.A firms from (2000-2002). They argue that, with experience in financial accounting, 
ACs can assess the efficiency of the appropriateness and nature of the accounting, 
constrain the aggressive policies of accounting, and provide incentives to avoid the risk 
of litigation. Their findings indicate that the ACs with accounting financial expertise 
increased the overall supervision function of the AC, and thus they were more likely to 
promote the preservation of accounting for ACs with non-financial or non-accounting 









Similarly, DeFond et al. (2005) found that participants of the market react positively to 
the appointment of the expertise in financial accounting AC, but observed no reaction to 
the non-accounting financial expertise ACs. This is due to the fact that the appointment 
of the members of the committee with financial accounting expertise improves the 
function of supervision of the committees and thus provides a reliable signal to investors 
that firms are looking to the highest FRQ.  
 
In addition, DeFond et al. (2005) suggest that the positive reaction of the market is 
focused on the firms that are relatively strong in the CG. Previous studies conclude that 
the financial expertise with AC complements the strong environment for CG by 
improving the ability of the BoD to increase the value of their firms and protect the 
interests of shareholders. 
 
It has been indicated that the financial expertise of the AC is linked with the higher FRQ 
(Carcello et al., 2002; Abbott et al., 2003a) and less the likelihood of opportunistic 
earnings (Xie et al., 2003; Bedard et al., 2004). The reason for this is experience and the 
knowledge of finance that improves the ability and the function of the supervision of the 
AC to facilitate the effectiveness of the process of the financial reporting. Overall, the 
empirical evidence supports the assumption that the AC with financial expertise has 
improved the function of their effective monitoring. 
 
2.4.4 Audit committee meeting 
 
Various studies indicated that firms that have the larger number of meetings of the AC 
has less financial re-statement (Abbott et al., 2004), are less probably to be authorized for 
accounting aggressively and fraud (Abbott et al., 2000; Beasley et al., 2001) and are 
connected with a lower incidence of management of earnings (Xie et al.,2003). These 
studies indicated that ACs who meet often during the fiscal year related to effective 
monitoring. The more they meet the more efficiently they discharge their supervision 
duties. Therefore, the high number of meetings of the AC, the more their monitoring 
function is improved.  
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 In another study, Krishnan and Visvanathan, (2009) found the existence of a positive 
relationship between the AFs and meetings of the AC, suggesting that firms that have the 
higher number of AC meetings demanded more collateral and a higher AQ from their 
auditors. In order to provide more safeguards and higher AQ, the auditors may need to 
carry out additional work of audit in terms of increased levels of audit testing and    
expanding the scope of the audit, which results in both a higher AQ and higher AFs. 
Therefore, the high number of meetings of the AC, the more their function of supervision 
is improved.  
 
2.5 Earnings management  
 
According to Fields et al. (2001) and Watt and Zimmerman (1990), EM can derive from 
the flexibility of accounting choices that are made by GAAP. The GAAP allows 
managers to provide assumptions and estimates according to their own business 
environment and to select the appropriate reporting procedures. Furthermore, with the 
alternative on offer, the manager may select the reporting procedures that can benefit and 
increase the wealth of all contracting parties (Watt and Zimmerman, 1990). As a result, 
accounting choices may create the EM problem. Such a problem, for instance, investors, 
cause shareholders and debt holders to be unable to distinguish the true economic value 
of the firm because the reports do not accurately reflect the actual performance of the 
firm. 
 
Schipper (1989) defined the EM “management disclosure in the sense of purposeful 
intervention in the external reporting process, in order to get some private gains to 
managers or shareholders”. Healy and Wahlen (1999) argue that EM occurs when 
managers use their judgment in the preparation of financial statements with the intention 
of non-reporting on actual economic performance of the firm or in order to obtain the 
benefit of the (adjusted figure). Consistent with this description and definition of the 






Managers of the firms engage in opportunistic earnings for several reasons, such as to 
obtain bonus-based compensation (Healy, 1985; Holthausen et al., 1995; Gaver at al., 
1995), the avoidance of debt contract violation (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Sweeney, 
1994), prevention of decreases of the earnings and losses (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; 
Barth et al., 1999), and compensation for political or regulatory costs (Jones, 1991; 
Cahan, 1992; Han and Wang, 1998).   
 
Agency theory suggests that one way to control the behavior of the agent is through their 
compensation contracts, enabling the interests between the agent and the principal to be 
perfectly aligned (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Such contracts, for instance, can be 
formed between managers and shareholders or as debt covenants between lenders and 
managers. Since compensation debt covenants and contracts usually connect to a number 
of accounts, such contracts create incentives for managers to manipulating earnings (Watt 
and Zimmerman, 1978). 
 
Healy (1985) assumes that managers are more likely to select income increase accruals 
when their bonus plans are not binding and income decreasing accruals when their bonus 
plans in the minimum or maximum levels are binding. She argues that when the earnings 
cannot achieve the target of earnings and are very low within the procedures of the 
accounting, the incentives for managers to accelerate write offs, this approach is known 
as (taking a bath) or further reduce current earnings in terms of the deferring revenue. 
These actions, however, do not necessarily affect the current bonus awards, but may help 
to achieve the goal of future earnings. In contrast, Gaver et al. (1995) found the managers 
choose income increase accruals when earnings before discretionary accruals fall below 
the lower bound (the bonus plans), and vice versa. They argue that their results are more 
compatible with the hypothesis of smoothing of income that states that managers 
manipulate earnings in order to ensure current earnings reach expected or normal 






Holthausen et al. (1995) found similar results to Healy (1985), and he argues that the 
results of Healy may be sensitive to the particular model used to estimate the accruals of 
discretion and  found no evidence that connected the income decreasing accruals with 
lower boundary. In brief, these studies concluded that the scheme of plans of bonus 
incentives for managers to manipulate earnings in order to maximize their bonus award. 
 
Sweeney (1994) examined a sample of firms before violation of accounting based 
restrictions in debt agreements. She finds that when managers of firms in technical 
default are approaching a violation of the covenant they are more likely to report 
increasing accounting changes in order to compensate for the debt constraints. DeFond 
and Jiambalvo (1994) provide similar results and conclude that the debt covenants 
affected the decisions of the manager’s accounting during the year of the violation and in 
the previous year.  
 
In general, the stakeholders and participants of the market seem to reward the firms that 
have higher incomes or are positive more than firms with less incomes or are negative, 
and therefore the managers who manipulate firm earnings need to meet these 
expectations.  Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) give evidence for the managers who 
manipulate firm earnings to avoid losses and decreases of incomes. Specifically, the 
results on the distributions frequency in incomes showed that there are unusually higher 
frequencies of small increases in incomes and small positive and low frequencies of small 
decreases in incomes and small loss incomes are unusual. Barth et al. (1999) suggests that 
firms with increasing earnings patterns are likely to have high income multiples (higher 
earnings coefficient). 
  
Studies related to the political cost or regulatory, Cahan (1992) found that the company’s 
managers under antitrust violations reported income decreasing accruals during the years 
of investigation. Similarly, Jones (1991) indicates that managers are liable to report on 
income decreasing accruals during the year of application for import relief in order to get 





Han and Wang (1998) examine the opportunistic earnings in 2 separate groups of firms: 
firms of petroleum refining, gas and oil industry, during the Persian Gulf crisis in 1990.  
Their finding indicates that the firms of petroleum refining used the income decreasing 
accruals to reduce the possibility of adverse political actions. 
 
In brief, the above motivations have been reviewed and may reflect the opportunistic 
behavior on the management’s part. This evidence indicates that the managers of the 
firms use their discretion to manipulate reported earnings, and therefore monitor the roles 
of the BoDs, the external auditors and the AC in order to restrict behavior to manipulate 
earnings. 
 
2.6 Accruals based earnings management  
 
There are many potential instruments used by managers to manipulate EM. This includes 
flexibility in the method of accounting, accrual accounting and income smoothing. 
Among other things, the management are more in favor toward the accounting of accrual, 
due to the low cost and difficulty to monitor (Young, 1999). 
 
Accruals can be divided into two elements: the non-discretionary accruals and 
discretionary accruals. Discretionary accruals are also known as managed accruals or 
abnormal accrual, which always relate to manipulated earnings. While the non-
discretionary accruals refer to normal accruals or non-managed accruals. These terms are 
used interchangeably in studies of EM (Kang and Sivaramakrishnan, 1995). 
 
McNichols (2000) identified three key measures of discretionary accruals in the previous 
literature. These include the specific accruals model, frequency distribution approach and 
the aggregate accruals model. Various models are introduced with respect to the 
aggregate accruals such as DeAngelo’s (1986) model, Healy’s (1985) model, Jones’s 
(1991) model, the modified Jones’s model from Dechow et al. (1995), and the 






The main differences between the models are how the researcher divides the non-
discretionary accruals component from the total accruals and their ability to 
accommodate changes in the economic conditions of the firm. The DeAngelo (1986) and 
Healy (1985) model supposed that non-discretionary accruals are constant, and considers 
these restrictions to be unrealistic because the accounting accruals change in response to 
economic conditions (Kaplan, 1985). As an alternative, Jones' (1991) model, Dechow et 
al. (1995) modified Jones’ model and the performance adjusted discretionary accrual by 
Kothari et al. (2005) controls the various forms of non-discretionary accruals by taking 
into account the changes in total revenue, receivables and assets as well as performance 
of the firm (such as return on assets). In fact, Jones (1991) and his modified models are 
identified in the literature as the most effective models for detecting EM (Dechow et al., 
1995; Young, 1999).  
 
Regarding specific accruals, discretionary accruals are an estimate based on single 
accruals. Examples of specific accruals models include the provision of residual for bad 
debts (McNichols and Wilson, 1988), casualty insurers and loss reserve property (Petroni, 
1992), tax expenses (Philips et al., 2003) and provisions for loan losses (Wahlen, 1994; 
Collins et al., 1995; Beaver and Angel, 1996). McNichols and Wilson (1988) argue that 
when specific accruals are a small part of the discretionary component, they may fail to 
reflect the EM in cases where there is manipulation of other discretionary components. 
Therefore, stated differently, the aggregate accruals models lead to a more 
comprehensive research design to grab the discretionary components. 
 
The frequency distribution approach focuses on the earnings behavior where there is a 
specific intent (for example, avoid earning decreases or losses) or certain thresholds (for 
example, to support the recent performance, report positive profits, and meet the 






This approach has been developed by Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and Degeorge et al. 
(1999), respectively. McNichols (2002) argues that the distribution approach provides 
specific forecasts and related to which firms will manage earnings rather than simply 
measuring the size of managers’ opportunistic earnings. In other words, the approach of 
frequency distribution cannot conclude EM activities, which are the main concern of this 
thesis. 
 
In brief, the research designs of EM are different and the advantage of each approach 
relatively depends on the research question. According to McNichols (2000), if the aim 
of the research is to examine the magnitude of EM, the aggregate approach is more 
suitable because specified accruals are relevant to tests for associations between 
hypothesized factors and specific accruals require a researcher to model every accrual 
component according to the hypothesized factors. In addition, the results of the specific 
accruals are difficult to generalize when specific accruals are not sensitive enough. On 
the other hand, the frequency distribution approach can’t be used to determine the 
magnitude or level of opportunistic earnings. The aim of this thesis is to study the 
relationship between ACs, effective boards, and AQ in constraining EM. Thus, the 
magnitude of earnings or activity levels of management towards opportunistic earnings 
are critical component of the investigation. Thus, for the purposes of this thesis, the 
aggregate approach is more convenient when compared with the frequency distribution 
approach and the specific accruals approach. There are three models of aggregate 
accruals that will be used: a cross sectional Jones (1991) model, a modified cross 
sectional Jones model and the model of performance adjusted discretionary accruals. 









2.7 The relationship between the AC, BoDs, and AQ  
The following section reviews previous studies that examined the relationship between 
effective boards and AC to different proxies of AQ (Example. engagement with litigation 
against auditors, auditor tenure, AFs, non-audit service fees, restatements, industry-
specialist auditors, big size auditors, fraud, and the appropriateness of continuity audit 
opinion). These studies indicate that many of the characteristics of boards and ACs, 
reviewed in Section 2.3 and 2.4, are associated with effective monitoring which enhances 
the overall FRQ, especially the AQ services. Various studies indicate that the ACs and 
boards of directors may influence the choice of an external auditor (Knapp, 1991; 
Beasley and Petroni, 2001; Abbott and Parker, 2000; Chen et al., 2005). The selection 
criteria that are used are based on the auditors’ abilities and skills in enhancing the 
process of audit. Knapp (1991) examines the conduct of members of the AC and their 
choice of external auditors. He argues that ACs seem more likely to choose Big 8 
auditors than non Big 8 auditors because Big 8 auditors tend to report any misstatements 
of material that they discover during their audit work. Moreover, he points out that the 
members of the AC believe that during the early years of the audit engagement there is a 
gradual improvement in the AQ due to the impact of a learning curve.   However, 
members of AC also tend to recognize that during the subsequent years of the client and 
auditor relationship the AQ may gradually decrease because that relationship could 
weaken the independence of the auditors. 
 
Abbott and Parker (2000), Beasley and Petroni (2001) and Chen et al. (2005) examine 
more specific characteristics of ACs and boards regarding the choice of industry-
specialist auditors. As far as the current study is concerned, these are the only studies in 
this area that are based on samples of the United States and Australia. Industry-specialist 
auditors are more requested because they are more reliable than the auditors of non-
specialists to detect errors (Bedard and Biggs, 1991; Wright and Aright, 1997), and 
frauds (Johnson et al., 1991; Carcello and Nagy, 2004). Abbott and Parker (2000) 
examined the proportion of independent non-executive directors on ACs and boards as 




They point out that the ACs with only independent non-executive directors which meet at 
least twice a year are more likely to hire industry-specialist auditors. They also report 
insignificant relationships between the proportion of independent non-executive directors 
on the boards and recruitment of industry-specialist auditors. Using a more specific 
sample, Beasley and Petroni (2001) argue that the property liability insurers which have a 
higher proportion of non-executive directors on their boards tend to use industry-
specialist auditors. Chen et al. (2005) examine the characteristics of the ACs and boards 
of the top 500 Australian companies. They indicate that the AC with a higher percentage 
of NED is more likely to hire industry-specialist auditors. However, they do not find a 
statistically significant relationship between the meetings and the experience of the AC 
and hiring industry-specialist auditors. 
 
Abbott et al. (2004) argue that the financial restatement may indicate inefficiency of 
financial reports because it indicates that the auditors have failed to identify errors in 
previous financial statements. Such inefficiency can be considered as being indicative of 
a lower quality of both financial reporting and auditing (Kinney et al., 2004). Abbott et 
al. (2004) indicate that AC with independent members that are active and have financial 
experiences are more efficient in monitoring the financial reporting process and this leads 
to fewer incidents of financial restatement. Consistent with this evidence, Agrawal and 
Chadha (2005) found that the ACs or boards with independent directors who have 
financial expertise are also linked with a lower incidence of restated earnings.  
 
With regard to fraud, Beasley (1996) suggests that a higher proportion and smaller size of 
boards of non-executive directors improved the function of the boards in monitoring the 
behavior of the top managements, especially in the prevention of financial statement 
fraud. However, her finding on the establishment of the AC is not significantly related 
with the fraud incident, this contradicts McMullen’s finding. McMullen (1996) mentions 
that the establishment of the AC encourages the higher FRQ for fewer lawsuits for fraud, 





With a similar area of study under the SEC samples enforcement, Dechow et al. (1996) 
argue that where the BoD is dominated by management, exercising the functions of its 
dual role, the CEO is also the founder of the firm; they are more likely to engage in less 
earnings manipulation representative of outside block holders and no AC.  
 
Using more of the variables of the AC, Abbott et al. (2000) suggest that ACs composed 
of solely independent non-executive directors that meet at least twice a year encounter 
fewer fraudulent financial statements. This result supports the effective role of the 
independent non-executive directors as a key to monitoring auditing process and financial 
reporting. Chen et al. (2006) examine the relationship between the characteristics of the 
BoDs and financial fraud in China. They found that firms with BoDs which consist of a 
higher proportion of independent non-executive directors, and that have a higher 
frequency of meetings, are less likely to commit fraud. However their result to the size of 
the board is insignificant related with the incidence of fraud.  
  
Carcello and Neal (2000) examined the association between the likelihood of going 
concern opinion of audit and AC composition in 223 United States companies that 
experienced financial distress during 1994. They indicate that the higher number of 
directors of affiliated (Grey directors) of the AC, the lower probability of auditors in the 
issuance of going concern audit reports. This means that the predomination of affiliated 
directors in ACs are able to influence the decision of auditors to issue an audit opinion 
(i.e. instead of issuing a report amendment, the auditor issues an unmodified report) and 
the exclusion of auditors in the event of their refusal to issue a clean reports. They also 
suggest that ACs with greater independence, equipped with lower stockholding and 
financial expertise are more effective in maintaining the auditor against dismissal after 











Previous studies on the relationship between ACs and boards of directors to AFs can be 
viewed from different perspectives. The demand based perspective suggests that the AC 
and effective BoDs demand greater assurance and higher quality audit from the external 
auditors in order to protect their own interests (Carcello et al., 2000). Specifically, 
Carcello et al. (2002) argue that the BoDs may seek to buy the differential higher AQ to 
obtain enhanced assurances in order to protect their “Capital of reputation, promote the 
interests of shareholders and avoid legal liability”. From this perspective, it is shown the 
higher AQ is indicated by higher AFs, which are consistent with the time of audit and 
extensive audit effort that are set by the auditors during the performance of their services. 
 
In line with the agency theory in respect to the vigilance oversight function of non-
executive directors, O’Sullivan (2000) argues that the firms which have a higher 
percentage of non-executive directors on the boards are more likely to carry higher AFs. 
In a similar vein, Carcello et al. (2002) examine the relationship between the meetings 
and composition of the board, and directorship, and the level of AFs. Their findings 
indicate that firms that have a higher percentage of independent non-executive directors, 
board meetings more frequent and higher number of multiple directorships tend to 
demand higher levels of assurance and a higher AQ. 
 
They inferred the demand for different levels of AQ through the selection of auditors 
sized because the size of auditors refers to different levels of quality (DeAngelo, 1981). 
Carcello et al., (2002) claim that the higher level of assurance can be measured by the 
audit effort; “works of additional audit” that are beyond the auditors’ cost minimizing 
level may result in a higher level of assurance.  
 
In their analysis of additional, Carcello et al. (2002) replace characteristics of the board 
with the characteristics of AC (i.e. meetings, expertise and composition). Their results 
show that the independence of the AC and the AC expertise are positively associated with 






They examined further by integrating all the characteristics of the AC and the board 
found that the results of the BoDs has not changed, but that none of the characteristics of 
AC are significantly  associated to AFs. This may suggest that, when the board is present, 
the function of the AC may reduce as there is an increase in monitoring by the board. One 
of the limitations specified in Carcello et al. is that they did not consider a problem of 
endogeneity of their analysis. 
  
They also report that the total number of independent non-executive directors on the 
board and the total number of meetings of the board are positively associated with AFs. 
In another study, Krishnan and Visvanathan (2009) examine the boards’ characteristics 
and ACs and their relation to AFs for 801 firms in the Standard & Poor's 500 Index (S&P 
500) between years (2000-2002). They found that the firms that have more regular board 
meetings and a larger size of the board are associated with higher AFs. They also suggest 
a positive relationship between the meetings of AC and AFs. 
 
As an alternative to a demand based perspective, a supply based perspective is based on 
the auditor’s opinion. If auditors believe that their client is surrounded by strong CG, this 
may indicate that the firm has effective internal control and this may reduce AFs and 
reduce the auditor's risk assessment. 
 
In order to understand how the auditor's assess the overall audit risk, the current study 
will first explain the audit risk model.  SAS 300: Audit Risk Assessments and 
Accounting and Internal Control Systems (APB 1995), defined audit risk as “the risk that 
the auditors give an inappropriate audit opinion of the financial statements”. Similarly, 
the International Standard of Auditing (ISA) - (UK and Ireland) 200: Overall Objective of 
the Independent Auditor and the Conduct of an Audit in Accordance International 
Standards on Auditing (UK and Ireland), (APB, 2009) describes the audit risk as “the 
risk that the auditor expresses an inappropriate opinion when the financial statements 







Audit risk models contain elements of inherent risks and control risks and the risk of 
detection. The inherent risk is the risk that is associated with the misstatement and error 
that occur in the entity, class of transaction level and account balance. Control risk is the 
risk that the internal control system and accounting of the entity is unable to detect or 
prevent errors in a timely manner.  Detection risk is the risk of substantive procedures the 
auditor fails to detect, errors and misstatements. Both the control risk and the inherent 
risk will determine the detection risk. If the auditor assesses the control risk and inherent 
risk to be low, then the level of detection risk may be higher, leading to lower level of 
substantive procedures. In brief, the assessment of control and inherent risks are central 
in determining overall audit procedures. 
  
In respect to the internal control system of the client, control environment and auditors 
assess the control procedures. The control environment is determined by the overall 
“Awareness, attitude and actions" of a BODs and management regarding internal control 
and its importance for their organization, while the control procedures relate to the 
procedures and policies that have been established (APB 1995).  
 
By holding strong control procedures and the inherent risk constant, it is possible for the 
positive control environment (strong AC and BoDs) to reduce both the audit risk and the 
control risk. Cohen et al., (2002) point out: 
 
In the case where a client’s governance structure has effectively 
implemented a strong monitoring as well as a strong strategic perspective, 
there is the potential for both a more efficient (e.g., less extent of tests of 
details) and a more effective (greater assurance of the integrity of the 
financial statements) 
 
This may suggest that strong CG promotes an effective internal control environment. 
Effective internal control then, leads to a less objective test by external audit and results 







Various studies have indicated a negative relationship between the AC and the boards’ 
characteristics with AFs (Tsui et al., 2001; Boo and Sharma, 2008; Krishnan and 
Visvanathan, 2009). Tsui et al. (2001) examine the roles of CEO duality and AFs by 
using 650 observations of Hong Kong firms. Their findings indicate that firms separating 
the roles of CEO and chairman tend to be lower AFs, pointing out that effective 
monitoring mechanisms are in place and that reduce the risk control and audit efforts.  
Drawing on the Tsui et al. (2001) framework, Krishnan and Visvanathan (2009) also 
indicate similar findings on the AC expertise and roles of CEO duality. As well as 
suggesting that the supervisory role is served more effectively by separately functioning 
chairmen and CEOs, they also claim that the auditors value the AC and financial 
expertise. The financial expertise of the AC reduces the risk of control of the firm, which 
in turn is reflected in lower AFs and less audit testing. Their findings on the experiences 
of the AC are incompatible with the study carried out by Abbott et al. (2003b), which 
indicate the existence of a positive relationship between AC expertise and AFs. They 
argue that Abbott et al. (2003b) use a broad definition of the expertise of the AC, which 
includes both the non-accounting and accounting financial expertise. They defined the 
financial accounting expertise on each of the directors as experience as certified public 
accountants, chief financial officers, financial controllers or auditors. The trend of this 
changing was sensitive to such differences in the definitions of financial expertise. 
 
Previous discussions assumed that supply based and demand based perspectives are 
mutually exclusive. However, there is also the possibility that both perspectives can 
coexist and they are not mutually exclusive (Krishnan and Visvanathan, 2009). For 
instance, when the demands of the AC result in a higher AQ, it increases both audit 










Simultaneously, the increase of the effectiveness may also correspond to a strong internal 
control which is reflected in the assessment of auditor to audit risk (Krishnan and 
Visvanathan, 2009). Boo and Sharma (2008) claim that, from the demand based 
perspective, the link between the AFs in regulated companies and CG (i.e. utilities 
companies and financial) is weaker because regulators share their monitoring and 
supervision the roles with the external auditor. Thus, they demand less extensive audit 
work in the presence of regulatory oversight. From the supply based perspective, auditors 
believe that when regulators have additional supervisory roles, their presence may reduce 
audit risk, therefore there is less need for audit testing, resulting in lower AFs.  They also 
found that the presence of boards of multiple directorships or ACs relates positively to 
the AFs by encouraging more effort to audit, in order to protect the capital reputation, and 
tends to result in higher AFs (in the presence of the regulators). Moreover, they claim that 
the auditors believe higher audit risk due to time constraints of directors who serve on 
multiple boards and this also enhances the need for additional audit work. Goddard and 
Masters (2000) investigated two sets of UK data from 1994-1995. Their results show that 
in 1994, firms with ACs have higher AFs, but data from 1995 reveals that there is no 
significant difference in the level of AFs between companies, with or without ACs. This 
contradictory result may be due to improvements in internal controls and accounting 
systems that have been introduced by the regulators. Similarly, O’Sullivan (1999) also 
considers that there is no evidence that the AC and BOD’s attributes affect the level of 
AFs.  He explains that these findings may be of importance due to the effect of 
monitoring functions offset by increased audit efforts. 
 
With regard to non-audit services fees,  a very limited number of studies have 
investigated the relationship between the BoDs and the non-audit services or AC 
effectiveness. Even now there are only four studies that investigated these issues, namely: 
Abbott et al. (2003b), Lee and Mande (2005), Lee (2008), Adelopo (2010) and Zaman et 






All of these are based largely on U.S.A firms. Abbott et al. (2003a) examined 538 firms 
that filed with the SEC between 5 February 2001 and 15 March 2001. Using the ratio of 
non-audit services fees to the total AFs, they indicate that firms that have ACs that are 
solely independent, which meets at least 4 times a year is likely to limit the amount of 
non-audit services that are purchased and, from their point of view, higher levels of non-
audit services could potentially impair the AQ. In their further analysis, they found that 
the AC expertise is important with the ratio of non-audit services fees. Lee and Mande 
(2005) extend the Abbott et al. (2003b) study by modeling the non-audit services 
functions simultaneously and audit. They indicate that firms with solely independent 
members of the committee who meet at least 4 times a year to have a lower rate of non-
audit services purchase. However, when they model the fees of non-audit services 
simultaneously, none of the characteristics of AC are significant. Lee (2008) in 
conjunction investigates the characteristics of AC and BoD along with the changes in the 
ratios of non-audit services fees (changes in the total non-audit services fees to total 
AFs). He claims that the effective AC (composed of solely independent members whom 
at least one third have financial expertise) and BoDs (at least half of whom are 
independent and more than the sample average of whom are financial experts) are likely 
to reduce the non-audit services purchased in order to strengthen the independence of 
auditors.  
 
However, these three studies do not consider the characteristics of the size of the 
financial expertise or committees of the members of the board. Adelopo (2010) examines 
a more comprehensive range of board and AC characteristics (with the exception of 
financial expertise to the boards of directors) using the simultaneous equation of the non-
audit services fees and audit from the FTSE 350 in the periods of two years 2005-2006. 
He found that the frequency of meetings of the AC and the levels of independence on the 
board are positively associated with both non-audit services fees and AFs. In addition, the 
results indicate that firms with larger sizes of the board are likely to have higher non-





Recently, Zaman et al. (2011) examined the relationship between the CG quality, non-
audit services fees and AFs. The non-audit services fees and AFs are measured by a 
natural log of non-audit services fees and AFs, respectively. They found that large firms 
with effective AC are likely to purchase more non-audit services because of the 
complexity of its operations. Their study, however, does not control the size of the board 
and the financial literacy of the members of the board.  
 
Overall, the studies of the effects of the different characteristics of ACs and boards do 
show a significant impact on the AQ. Most of these studies, however, are conducted by 
United States based researchers and the results cannot be generalized because there are 
different institutional settings, auditor incentives and legal environments in other 
countries. By taking advantage of three measurements of AQ (non-audit services fees 
AFs and the engagement of industry-specialist auditors), which is part of this thesis, it 
deals with the relationship between the characteristics of ACs and boards (such as the 
size, composition, meeting frequency and financial expertise) to the AQ. As far as the 
current study is concerned, there is no previous study that examines the relationship 
between industry-specialist auditors and CG in the Kingdom of Bahrain. Previous studies 
that relate to non-audit services fees and AFs to CG levels in the United Kingdom are 
limited to the study of several characteristics of AC and board (Collier and Gregory, 
1996; O’Sullivan, 1999, 2000; O’Sullivan and Diacon, 2002; Adelopo, 2010; Zaman et 
al., 2011). None of these studies examine the financial expertise of the members of the 
board, which has been suggested by the United States studies to improve the FRQ (Xie et 
al., 2003; Agrawal and Chadha, 2005). These potential gaps demand further investigation 












Consistent with the theoretical and evidence bases for measuring audit that are provided 
under section 2.2.2 to 2.2.3, this study considers higher AFs (O’Sullivan, 2000; Carcello 
et al., 2002; Abbott et al., 2003b), lower non audit services fees (Wines, 1994; Sharma 
and Sidhu, 2001; Frankel et al. 2002; Firth, 2002; Raghunandan, 2003; Larcker and 
Richardson, 2004), and the engagement of industry-specialist auditors  (Bedard and 
Biggs, 1991; O’Keefe at al., 1994; Owhoso et al., 2002; Carcello and Nagy, 2004) to be 
associated with a higher AQ. 
 
Based on the proposals of the agency theory, regarding the monitoring roles, and 
evidence of the previous literature, the current study assumes that the board of directors 
with smaller size, more regular meetings, more financial experience and more 
independent are defined as an effective board. Similarly, the AC with more members, 
which is solely independent, which owns financial expertise and that meets frequently, is 
also described as being effective. It is claimed that the ACs and BoDs with these 
characteristics require a higher AQ in order to maintain their capital reputation, to avoid 
legal exposure and promotion of the interests of shareholders.  
 
The following show the constructing causal models and summaries of the hypotheses 
stated in a form that uses the non-audit services fees, AFs, and the engagement of 
industry-specialist auditors as proxies for AQ:  
 
H1: There is a positive relationship between the size of the board and non-audit services 







Figure 2.2: The relationship between the size of the board Non-Audit Services fees. 
 

















Figure 2.3: The relationship between the size of the board and AFs. 
 






Figure 2.4: The relationship between the independent board and AFs. 
 
H4: There is a negative relationship between the size of the board and the engagement of 






















executive directors H3 









H5: There is a positive relationship between the independent board and engagement of 





Figure 2.6: The relationship between the independent board and engagement of industry-
specialist auditor. 
 
H6: There is a negative relationship between the independent board and non-audit 






Figure 2.7: The relationship between the independent board and non-audit service fees. 
 
H7: There is a negative relationship between the financial expertise of the board and non-


































H8: There is a positive relationship between the financial expertise of the board and AFs 





Figure 2.9: The relationship between the financial expertise of the board and AFs. 
 
H9: There is a positive relationship between the frequency of the meeting of the board 







Figure 2.10: The relationship between the frequency of the meeting of the board and AFs. 
 
H10: There is a positive relationship between the financial expertise of the board and the 





Figure 2.11: The relationship between the financial expertise of the board and the 

























H11: There is a negative relationship between the meeting frequency of the board and 








Figure 2.12: The relationship between the meeting frequency of the board and non-audit 
services fees. 
 
H12: There is a positive relationship between the size of the AC and AFs (See Figure 

































H13: There is a positive relationship between the meeting frequency of the board and the 







Figure 2.14: The relationship between the meeting frequency of the board and the 
engagements of industry-specialist auditor. 
H14: There is a positive relationship between the size of the AC and the engagement of 







Figure 2.15: The relationship between the size of the AC and the engagement of industry-
specialist auditor. 
H15: There is a negative relationship between the size of the AC and non-audit services 







Figure 2.16: The relationship between the size of the AC and non-audit services fees. 
 























H16: There is a negative relationship between the solely independent AC and non-audit 





Figure 2.17: The relationship between the solely independent AC and non-audit services 
fees. 
H17: There is a positive relationship between the solely independent AC and AFs (See 





Figure 2.18: The relationship between the solely independent AC and AFs. 
 
H18: There is a positive relationship between the financial expertise of the AC and AFs 



































H19: There is a positive relationship between the solely independent AC and the 









H20: There is a positive relationship between the financial expertise of the AC and the 






Figure 2.21: The relationship between the financial expertise of the AC and the 
engagement of industry-specialist auditor. 
 
H21: There is a negative relationship between the financial expertise of the AC and non-
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H22: There is a negative relationship between the frequency of the meeting of the AC 








Figure 2.23: The relationship between frequency of the meeting of the AC and non-audit 
services fees. 
 
H23: There is a positive relationship between the frequency of a meeting of the AC and 







Figure 2.24: The relationship between the frequency of a meeting of the AC and AFs. 
H24: There is a positive relationship between frequency of the meeting of the AC and the 










Figure 2.25: The relationship between the frequency of the meeting of the AC and the 
























2.8 The relationship between the AC, BoDs, and AQ in constraining EM 
 
An abundance of studies has examined the monitoring roles of the BoD, AQ and AC and 
their effectiveness in constraining opportunistic earnings. These studies indicate that the 
effect of board, higher quality auditor and AC extend their monitoring functions to limit 
the behavior of EM. The following are some key papers in this area. 
 
As far as the current study is concerned, there are only six relevant studies that have been 
done in the United Kingdom. These studies are Ferguson et al. (2004), Peasnell et al. 
(2000; 2005), Antle et al. (2006), Kwon et al. (2007), Sun et al. (2010), Habbash (2010), 
and Habbash et al. (2010). Peasnell et al. (2000) examine the relationship between the 
board size and the proportion of non-executive directors on the board with the incidence 
of EM in United Kingdom firms in pre and post-Cadbury periods.    
 
They found no significant relationship between the number of non-executive directors in 
the board and EM in periods of pre-Cadbury, but the results for the periods post-Cadbury 
indicate that there are fewer incidences of income accruals due in order to avoid earnings 
decline or earnings losses when the firms’ board is comprised of a higher proportion of 
non-executive directors. The size of the board is insignificantly associated with EM in pre 
and post-Cadbury periods.  
 
Peasnell et al. (2005) examine the effect of the proportion of non-executive directors on 
the boards, the establishment of ACs and CEO duality on the likelihood of EM occurring. 
Their examinations are conducted using data from the United Kingdom of the periods 
1993-1996 and they use discretionary accruals as a proxy for EM. They found that the 
firms that have higher percentages of non-executive directors on the board are associated 
with a lower incidence of income increasing discretionary accruals, especially when pre-
managed earnings are under zero or are less than prior reported earnings. However, there 
is no evidence to suggest that size of board, CEO duality or the presence of an AC have 
any effect on the incidence of earnings manipulation. Both studies of Peasnell et al.’s, do 




Ferguson et al. (2004) provide evidence of the United Kingdom data for the periods from 
1996-1998.  They examine the firms’ likelihood of being associated with the activities of 
EM (firms being criticized by financial analysts or investors or investigated by the 
opportunistic accounting treatment, and Financial Reporting Review Panel because of 
alleged accounting irregularities and the firms that restate their previous financial 
statements or make modifications under Financial Reporting Council (FRC)  No. 12) and 
the absolute value of the entitlements of their discretionary accruals (using the modified 
Jones’ model) and their relationship to non-audit services. Non-audit services is measured 
by the ratio of non-audit services fees to total fees, natural log of percentile rank of non-
audit services fees and non-audit services fees by the office of the practice. They found 
that the non-audit services fees linked positively to EM.  
 
This suggests that the growing economic interdependence between the auditor-client may 
make auditors less likely to restrict the opportunistic behavior of EM, and thus reduce the 
FRQ. In addition, they also found that none of the characteristics of CG (i.e. the 
percentage of non-executive directors on boards and roles of CEO duality) are 
significantly related to EM.  
 
Kwon et al. (2007) provide evidence of an international framework using data from 28 
countries, including the United Kingdom from 1993-2003. Specifically, they examine 
how it affects the legal system in the countries industry specialist-auditors to constrain 
EM. They indicate that the use of industry-specialist auditors is  negatively associated 
with the discretionary accruals and positively associated to the earnings response 
coefficient and that the benefit from the use of industry-specialist auditors increases as 
industry becomes stronger than the legal system of a country. 
 
Antle et al. (2006) provide evidence from the United Kingdom and the U.S.A. They 
examine the non-audit services fees and AFs data from the United Kingdom from 1994-





They found that the highest non-audit services fee decreased discretionary accruals, 
which indicates that there is an effect with the knowledge resulting from the joint 
provision of non-audit services and audit. Specifically, they are working in the natural log 
of non-audit services fees as measured auditor independence and the Jones’ (1991) model 
to detect EM. With respect to EM and AFs, they found a positive relationship between 
EM and AFs. They argue that the higher AFs could lead to a bias in the auditor-client 
relationship, thus lead the auditor to allow opportunistic earnings behavior. However, this 
study did not include the characteristics of the AC and the board, which are also believed 
to affect the quality of reported earnings. Habbash et al. (2010) examine the commitment 
of non-executive directors (i.e. meetings, composition, and directors fees) and chairman 
independence, using a sample of 227 United Kingdom FTSE 350 firms for the financial 
year 2005 and 2006. In addition, they also control the number of meeting of the board in 
their EM model. They found that the chairmans’ independence and non-executive 
directors’ commitment are important to constrain the opportunistic earnings. Sun et al. 
(2010) examine the relationship between the effects of the interaction between CG 
mechanisms, corporate environmental disclosure, and EM (i.e. meetings of AC and board 
size) on the relationship between corporate environmental disclosure and earnings.  
 
They found no important evidence of the corporate environmental disclosure to be 
associated with lower earnings manipulation, but indicate that the AC diligence affects 
the relationship between corporate environmental disclosure and earnings.  
 
Both studies, however, do not fully incorporate other characteristics of effective AC and 
board in their model specification. 
 
Habbash (2010) examined more comprehensive characteristics of CG and the AQ or, 
including the non-audit services fees, AFs, number of meetings, levels of financial 
expertise, size, proportion of independent members, and the industry-specialist auditors 





AFs are measured using the natural log of AFs and AFs ratio to the total fees, while a 
non-audit services fee is defined as the natural log of non-audit services fees and AFs 
ratio to the total fees. The measurement on the use of industry-specialist auditors is based 
on the market share of AFs and the number of audit clients in a particular industry. The 
analyses are conducted using two separate models of EM. In the first model, he examines 
the impact of the characteristics of the BoD on EM. The results indicate a negative 
relationship to the size and independence of boards of EM.  In the second model, he 
examines the impact of the external auditor variables on opportunistic earnings and the 
characteristics of AC.  He found that the ACs consisting of a higher proportion of 
independent members and equipped with financial expertise are more likely to constrain 
EM. Moreover, the results indicate that firms that pay lower non-audit services fees and 
higher AFs that have employed industry-specialist auditors are more likely to limit 
earnings manipulation behavior.   
 
Although Habbash (2010) examines a relatively similar AC, auditor quality variables, 
and Board characteristics that are being investigated in this thesis, he does not include 
both the characteristics of audit committee and board in a single model. Previous studies 
indicate that the effectiveness of the AC is associated with the composition of the entire 
board. Thus the joint monitoring roles of ACs and boards are likely to strengthen the 
firm’s CG overall (Menon and William, 1994; Collier and Gregory, 1999; Cohen et al., 
2002; Boo and Sharma, 2008). In addition, the separation of tests on the characteristics of 
the AC from those of BoD characteristics may result in incomplete analysis of EM.  
 
In a similar vein, Klein (2002) examines the influence of ACs and independent boards on 
EM using data from 692 U.S.A firms in the period between years 1992-1993. She 
indicates that the independent ACs and independent boards are effective in constraining 
opportunistic earnings. Xie et al. (2003) examine more characteristics of AC and board 
including the frequency of board meeting, the size of the board, AC size, CEO duality 
level, the independence of board members, level of expertise, AC expertise, AC meeting 




They employ Jones’ model and Teoh et al.’s (1998) model for detecting EM. They  found 
that the firms with ACs and boards with more independent members, who are equipped 
with financial expertise or corporate, and who have experience have lower discretionary 
accruals levels and frequent meetings. 
 
Bedard et al. (2004) examine the relationship between the characteristics of the AC (for 
example, independence, size and expertise and number of meetings) and EM in a sample 
of 300 U.S.A firms, which consists of two subsamples: 200 firms with EM aggression 
(100 firms with the largest positive and 100 firms with the largest negative discretionary 
accruals) and firms that have lower discretionary accruals levels around zero (50 negative 
and 50 positive). They found that the financial expertise and the existence of solely 
independent ACs are negatively associated to the likelihood of aggressive EM. This is 
consistent with the arguments that these characteristics improve their supervision 
function in monitoring EM. The size and the ACs' meeting frequency are not 
significantly linked to aggressive EM. 
 
Vafeas (2005) analyzed data from 252 U.S.A firms in between years 1994-2000 to 
examine many of the BoDs and characteristics of AC on the quality of reported earnings. 
The poor earnings quality is surrogated by the negative earnings avoidance and small 
earning increases. The evidence suggests that small earnings increases linked to the AC 
with the insiders’ directors. While the results from the negative earnings avoidance model 
indicate no significant relationship between the possibility of avoiding the negative 
earnings audit committee and board characteristics.  
 
Chtourou et al. (2001) examine the impact of the board and AC characteristics (such as 
the AC meeting frequency, AC expertise, size of the board, the independence of the 
board, board expertise, CEO duality, the presence of independent nomination committees 
or solely independent ACs, and the presence of multiple directorships and director’s 





Their results indicate that ACs that contain a higher percentage of independent members, 
solely independent and meets at least twice a year indicate the lower incidence of 
income-increasing accruals, while ACs with financial expertise reduce the incidence of 
income decreasing accruals. In addition, the results also indicate the possibility of 
income-increasing accruals when a higher proportion of independent members and the 
less possibility of income decreasing accruals when the board members are equipped with 
board experience. However, no evidence indicates that the employment of a Big 6 auditor 
constrains EM activities.  
 
In contrast to Chtourou et al.’s study, a Big 6 impact auditors on EM, Becker et al. (1998) 
indicate that the firms with Big 6 auditors are more likely to report lower discretionary 
accruals of the firms with non Big 6 auditors, and this is consistent with the claim that  
Big 6 auditors provide higher AQ and thus are more likely to constrain opportunistic 
earnings. Francis et al. (1999) suggests that firms that have a greater tendency to accruals 
are more likely to hire Big 6 auditors as a credible signal to outsiders that they are less 
likely to manipulate earnings. They also say that although the results suggest that firms 
with Big 6 auditors have relatively higher levels of total accruals, they are less likely to 
be connected with higher discretionary accruals.  
 
Krishnan (2003b) examines the pricing of discretionary accruals of firms audited by Big 
6 versus non Big 6 auditors. He suggests that the relationship between discretionary 
accruals and stock returns are stronger for firms that are audited by Big 6 auditors 
compared with those who use non Big 6 auditors. This supports the argument that Big 6 
auditors improve the credibility of the reported accruals. He also suggests that the link 
between future profitability and discretionary accruals is greater for firms with Big 6 
auditors which indicates that the Big 6 auditors enhance the capacity of discretionary 
accruals to predict future profitability. Kim et al. (2003) investigate the selection of Big 6 
auditors and the direction of discretionary accruals. They indicate that Big 6 auditors are 
more effective in constraining income-increasing accruals, but less effective in 




With respect to EM and specialist auditors, Krishnan (2003a) examines 4,422 U.S.A 
firms, audited by Big 6 auditors, in the period between years 1989-1998. The use of 
industry-specialist auditors is measured using the portfolio shares approache and market 
share. The cross sectional Jones model is worked for detecting EM. He indicates that 
firms with industry-specialist auditors are more efficient in reducing opportunistic 
earnings than the firms with non-pecialist auditors. Balsam et al. (2003) investigate 
19,091 U.S.A firms in the fiscal year ends for 1991-1999. They indicate that the 
discretionary accruals levels are lower and that earnings response coefficients are higher 
for the firms with industry-specialist auditors and vice-versa. 
 
Frankel et al. (2002) examined data from 3,074 proxy statements files with the SEC 
between 5 of June, 2001 till 15 of June, 2001. They employ three measures of auditor 
independence: the ratio of non-audit services fees to total fees, and percentile rank for 
non-audit services fees and AFs disaggregated by auditor; percentile rank of the total by 
auditor and audit. The EM level is estimated using a tendency to just meet or beat 
earnings benchmarks, and the cross sectional modified Jones model is used to estimate 
the discretionary accruals levels. They found that firms with a higher percentile rank of 
non-audit services fees and a higher ratio of non-audit services fees report higher 
discretionary accruals and are more likely to meet or beat earnings benchmarks and 
report higher discretionary accruals. These results are a strong alternative EM measure 
such as performance matched discretionary accruals, discretionary working capital 
accruals, discretionary total accruals, and also being applicable to the samples of income 
increasing and income decreasing discretionary accruals. 
 
In addition to their fundamental analysis of non-audit services fees, Frankel et al. (2002) 
also found that firms that have the higher AFs (measured by the rank AF percentile) are 
likely to have lower EM. This result supports the claim that the higher AFs may possibly 





It seems that the efforts of the higher auditor may compensate for the illegal behavior, 
including the manipulation of earnings, because the management is more concerned that 
such action may be discovered by the auditors. In agreement with this proposition, 
Caramanis and Lennox (2007) found that audit hours were negatively linked to income 
increasing discretionary accruals to meet earnings benchmarks. They conclude that the 
effort of low audit increases the likelihood of a manager manipulating reported earnings. 
 
Ashbaugh et al. (2003) replicated Frankel et al.’s (2002) study using similar tests and 
databases. Specifically, they measured the auditor independence by using (1) the natural 
log of the sum of audit and non-audit services fees, (2) the natural log of non-audit 
services fees, (3) the ratio of non-audit services fees to total fee, and (4) the natural log of 
AFs. EM is measured using models of performance adjusted discretionary accruals (using 
a technique of portfolio and adding Return on Assets (ROA) variable in the discretionary 
accrual regression) and the earnings benchmark. Their findings are relatively similar to 
those reported in the study of Frankel et al.’s, but they found no evidence that associated 
income increasing discretionary accruals with the ratio of non-audit services fees when 
performance adjusted measures are employed.  
 
In other studies, Chung and Kallapur (2003) examined a sample of 1,871 U.S.A firms 
audited by Big 5 auditors. They measured auditor independence as a ratio of the total fees 
(non-audit services fees and audit) to the U.S firm’s revenues audit. The discretionary 
accruals are using Jones model. Their results fail to find any significant relationship 
between discretionary accruals and non-audit services fees. In a similar vein, Ruddock et 
al. (2006) investigated the relationship between the earnings conservatism.  They also 
found no evidence that non-audit services higher levels are associated with reduced 
conservatism.  
 
Larcker and Richardson (2004) provided conflicting results on the relationship between 
EM and non-audit services fees. In line with Frankel et al. (2002) found a positive 




Using other non-audit services fees measurements; they found that firms that have higher 
levels of non-audit services fees and audit are likely to have lower EM. In their study, the 
auditor independence is measured using the non-audit services ratio to total fees, the non-
audit services fees, the sum of audit and non-audit services fees and the abnormal fees 
measurement. The cross sectional Jones and modified Jones models are used for 
detecting EM. They conclude that the monitoring auditor’s roles rely on the firm’s CG 
structures. 
  
Based on a test of the 434 listed Australian firms, Davidson et al. (2005) claim that the 
strength of internal governance mechanisms (such as the AC, BoDs, the external auditor 
and internal audit) forms the practice of EM. They found that the presence of an 
independent board, an independent AC and CEO duality are negatively and significantly 
related to reduced EM levels. However, there is no evidence that the AC meeting 
frequency, AC size, internal audit, and use of a Big 5 auditor are associated with the EM 
level. 
 
Osma and Noguer (2007) document evidence from Spain on the effectiveness of 
monitoring in the board and its committees in relation to EM. Specifically, they 
investigate the existence of institutional directors, independent boards, and boards of 
independent with independent ACs and financial expertise and independent nomination 
committees. Their findings indicate that the institutional directors are negatively 
associated to EM and that there is no evidence to support that boards and committees are 
associated with manipulation of earnings. This contrasts with the previous evidence 
documented in the Australia, United Kingdom and United States. These results indicate 
that institutional directors are more effective in constraining EM practices than boards 











Park and Shin (2004) examine the practice of EM and the monitoring board’s roles in 
Canada. As with Osma and Noguer (2007), the results indicate that financial 
intermediaries and institutional directors play a significant role in constraining earnings 
manipulation and that there is no significant evidence that external directors and their 
tenures are linked with the incidence of EM. 
 
Overall, the results on the relationships auditor variables to constraining EM and of the 
characteristics of CG suggest mixed findings. Failure to control the auditor variables or 
variables of CG in a single model to explain conflicting results in previous studies as a 
result of the analysis is incomplete, earnings quality determinants and the monitoring role 
of auditors, which vary depending on the strength of the client’s CG (Larcker and 
Richardson (2004). Therefore, in this thesis, the investigation of the EM and 
characteristics of CG will incorporate auditor variables in order to avoid this 
misspecification. The evidence suggests that that the effective board, higher auditor 
quality and AC associated with a greater extent of monitoring functions, and are therefore 
susceptible to constrain opportunistic earnings.  
 
In conjunction with the evidence from the previous arguments and literature developed 
under section 2.3 and 2.4 regarding the effectiveness of ACs and boards, the existing 
study hypothesis that the boards of directors that are smaller in size, have more frequent 
board meetings, possess financial expertise and have more independent members, as well 
as ACs which are larger in size, solely independent, equipped to meet frequently and with 











These characteristics of AC and board are expected to constrain opportunistic earnings. 
In other words, this study tested the following causal hypotheses:  
 
H24: There is a positive relationship between frequency of the meeting of the AC and the 











Figure 2.26: The relationship between the frequency of the meeting of the AC and the 
engagement of industry-specialist auditor. 
H25: There is a negative relationship between the independent board and EM (See  





Figure 2.27: The relationship between the independent board and EM. 







Figure 2.28: The relationship between the board’s size and EM. 























H27: There is a negative relationship between the board’s meeting frequency and EM 







Figure 2.29: The relationship between the boards’ meeting frequency and EM. 
H28: There is a negative relationship between the board’s financial expertise and EM 






Figure 2.30: The relationship between the board’s financial expertise and EM. 
 
H29: There is a negative relationship between the solely independent AC and EM (See 








































Figure 2.32: The relationship between the AC’s size and EM. 
H31: There is a negative relationship between the AC’s meeting frequency and EM (See 







Figure 2.33: The relationship between the AC’s meeting frequency and EM. 
 
H32: There is a negative relationship between the AC’s financial expertise and EM (See 

































Similarly, in line with the theoretical proposition and the review of evidence of 
differentiation of auditors’ quality, this study showed that the effectiveness of audit 
services varies among auditors. In this thesis, the higher auditor’s quality is associated 
with the engagement of industry-specialist auditors, lower non-audit services fees, and 
higher AFs. These expectations lead to the following causal hypotheses:  
 
H33: There is a positive relationship between the non-audit services fees and EM (See 




Figure 2.35: The relationship between the non-audit services fees and EM. 
H34: There is a negative relationship between the industry-specialist auditor and EM (See 






Figure 2.36: The relationship between the industry-specialist auditor and EM. 






























2.9 The Summary 
 
In this thesis AQ is defined as technical capacity to detect errors and objectivity in the 
coverage of errors detected. Previous literature recognizes several proxies to measure the 
AQ including the use of industry-specialist auditors, non-audit services fees, and AFs. In 
line with the reputation hypothesis or signaling, the engagement of industry-specialist 
auditors and higher AFs are associated with higher AQ. While, the lower non-audit 
services was considered as lower AQ due to the skepticism from the investors and 
regulators that higher non-audit services can compromise the independence of the 
auditor. Evidence from previous studies suggests that BoDs, which are smaller in size, 
have more independent directors, equipped with financial expertise and meeting more 
often are effective in their supervisory role. Similarly, sole independents, with more 
financial expertise ACs with more members and whom are more active are suggested to 
have a higher oversight function. Therefore, in line with the previous empirical evidence 
and agency theory proposition the hypothesis of this study shows that these 
characteristics of ACs and boards are associated with a higher AQ. With regard to the 
EM, this thesis views EM as opportunistic earnings. This study showed that the firms 
with effective characteristics of AC, board and higher quality auditors are less likely to 
allow EM, due to opportunistic earnings, cause uncertainty about the firm’s economic 


















Table 2.3: provides a brief of the key literature relating to AQ, AC, BoDs, and EM studies 
Author(s) Sample Country 
Audit quality related proxy 




Audit committee and 
board of director’s 
characteristics/ 







315 firms for year 
1991 FTSE 
(Financial Times All 
Share Index) 
 
U.K Audit fees 
Audit committee – 
establishment 






146 large firms in 
year 1995 
 
U.K Audit fees 
Board of director – 
composition, duality roles, 
and tenure 
 
Audit committee – 
composition, and size 
 
There is no evidence that the AC or BoD 





402 large firms in 
year 1992 
 
U.K Audit fees 
Board of director – 
composition and ownership 
 
Firms with a higher percentage of non-
executive directors on board are more 
likely to incur higher AFs, indicating a 
high quality audit. He also argues that 
there is a negative relationship between 
the AFs and executive ownership. 
 
Tsui et al. 
(2001) 
 







Board of director – duality 
roles 
 
Firms that separate the functions of 
chairman and CEO roles are more likely 
to have lower AFs, pointing out the 
effective monitoring mechanisms in 
place, thus reducing the risk of control 











117 insurance firms 
in year 1992 
 
U.K Audit fees 
Board of director – 
composition, ownership, and 
duality 
 




The presence of the AC has a positive 
relationship with AFs but the 
composition of AC as well as the 
characteristics of board has no significant 





258 firms from 
Fortune 1000 for 
financial year ended 
in the period between 
April 1992 and 
 
U.S.A Audit fees 
Board of director – 
composition, expertise, and 
meeting 
 
Audit committee – 
composition, expertise, and 
meeting 
 
Firms with the higher percentage of 
independent non-executive directors on 
BoDs, higher board meeting frequencies 
and more expertise (multiple 
directorships) are likely to have higher 
AFs. When they replace the attributes of 
the board with the attributes of the AC 
(i.e. meeting frequency, expertise and 
composition), the results show a positive 
relationship of AC expertise and AC 
independence to AFs. The AC meeting 
frequency was not significantly related 
with AFs.  However, once they analyze 
AC and board attributes together, the 
results for the BoDs remain has not 
changed but none of the AC attributes are 





469 firms with total 
assets exceeding US 
$ 1bilion in the 
financial year 2001 
 
U.S.A Audit fees 
Board of director/ Audit 
committee – composition, 
expertise, meeting, and size 
 
Associations of the AC independence/ 
board and AC size/ board to AFs are 
weaker for regulated firms than for non-







Table No.2.3: (Continued)  
Abbott et al. 
(2003b) 
492 non regulated 
firms and audited by 
Big-5 auditors that 
filed proxy statement 
with (SEC) in the 
period between 5 
February 2001 and 30 
June 2001. 
 
U.S.A Audit fees 




Audit committee – 
composition, expertise, and 
meeting 
 
Higher AFs associated with: 
1. Higher board meeting frequency 
2. Higher percentage of independent non-
executive directors on board  
3. At least one member of AC equipped 
with accounting or financial expertise 
4. Solely independent non-executive 
directors in AC 
The board’s expertise and AC meeting 







469 firms with total 
assets exceeding US 
$ 1bilion in the 
financial year 2001 
 
U.S.A Audit fees 
Board of director/ Audit 
committee – composition, 
expertise, meeting, and size 
 
Associations of the AC independence/ 
board and AC size/ board to AFs are 
weaker for regulated firms than for non-








801 listed on the 
(S&P 500) between 
years 2000 -2002, 
audited by Big 5 
auditors. 
 
U.S.A Audit fees 
Board of director – size, 
composition, meeting, 
duality roles, voting control, 
and ownership 
 
Audit committee – 
composition, expertise, and 
meetings 
 
Firms with AC and separated dual roles 
functions equipped with financial 
expertise are perceived by auditors to 
have a strong environment of internal 
control, which reduces the risk control 
and audit efforts and lead to lower AFs. 
AC meetings and board have a positive 
relationship with AFs. 
 
Abbott et al. 
(2003a) 
 
538 firms that filed 
with SEC between 5 




Non audit fees (ratio non audit 
fees to total fees) 
 
Board of director – 
ownership structure 
 
Audit committee – 
composition, meeting 
 
Firms that have ACs composed of solely 
independent non-executive directors and 
meet at least four times a year are likely 









780 firms for 
financial year 2000, 
S&P Super 1500 
 
U.S.A Non audit fees 
Audit committee – 
composition, expertise, and 
meeting 
 
ACs composed of solely independent 
non-executive directors and that meet at 
least four times a year are likely to limit 
the purchase of NAS. However, once 
they a model of the NAS endogenously, 
such relationships are insignificant. 
 
Lee (2008) 
631 firms for 
financial year 2000 - 




Changes in non-audit 
fees ratio 
Board of director – expertise 
 
Audit committee –  
composition, and expertise 
 
Expertise and independence of BoDs and 






500 firms listed on 







Board of director – 
composition, and ownership 
 
Audit committee – 
composition, and meetings 
 
Firms with ACs that are meet twice a 
year and solely comprised of 
independent non-executive directors are 
more likely to employ industry-specialist 
auditors.  The percentage of non-
executive directors on boards is not 
significantly related to the engagement 







681 property liability 
insurers during years 





Board of director – 
composition 
 
The higher percentages of non-executive 
directors with the insurers are more 











Table No.2.3: (Continued)  
Chen et al. 
(2005) 
 
500 top firms listed 






Board of director –multiple 
directorships 
 
Audit committee – 
composition, expertise, and 
meetings 
 
Firms that have a higher percentage of 
non-executives on their ACs are more 
likely to employ industry specialist 
auditors. The AC expertise and a number 
of meetings are not significantly 
associated to the engagement of 
industry-specialist auditors. The results 
for board directorships are mixed. 
 
Dechow et al. 
(1996) 
 
92 firms that subject 









Board of director – 
composition, ownership, and 
duality roles 
 
Audit committee – 
establishment 
 
Where a firm’s BoDs is dominated by 
the members practice dual role functions, 
management, the CEO is also the 
founder of the firm, there are fewer 
representatives of outside block holders 
and there is no formation of AC there is 





692 firms-years listed 
on the S&P 500 





absolute value of 
discretionary accruals 
 
Board of director – 
composition, and ownership 
Audit committee – 
composition 
 
Higher percentages of independent non-
executive directors on board and on AC 
are associated with lower EM. However, 
there is no significant relationship 
between EM and solely independent 
non-executive directors. 
 
Xie at al 
(2003) 
 
282 firms-years listed 
on the S&P 500 for 3 





current discretionary accruals 
 
Board of director – 
composition, duality roles, 




meeting, and size 
 
EM is less likely to occur in firms whose 
AC and board are equipped with a 
financial and corporate background and 
have a higher percentage of independent 
non-executive directors as well as higher 









692 firms-years listed 
on the S&P 500 





absolute value of discretionary 
accruals 
 
Board of director – 
composition, and ownership 
Audit committee – 
composition 
 
Higher percentages of independent non-
executive directors on board and on AC 
are associated with lower EM. However, 
there is no significant relationship 
between EM and solely independent non-
executive directors. 
 
Xie at al 
(2003) 
 
282 firms-years listed 
on the S&P 500 for 3 




Earnings management: current 
discretionary accruals 
 
Board of director – 
composition, duality roles, 




meeting, and size 
 
EM is less likely to occur in firms whose 
AC and board are equipped with a 
financial and corporate background and 
have a higher percentage of independent 
non-executive directors as well as higher 





















Audit committee – 
composition, expertise, 
meeting, and size 
 
 
Firms with solely independent AC that 
which also equipped with financial 
expertise are less likely to have 
aggressive EM. There is no significant 
relationship of the number of meeting 





539 firm-years from 






Board of director – 
composition, and ownership 
 
There is no significant relationship 
between the EM and the number of non-
executive directors on board. However, 
the representatives of active institutional 



















Board of director – 
composition, ownership, 
duality roles, and size 
 
Audit committee – 
establishment 
 
Firms with a higher percentage of non-
executive directors on board are 
associated with lower income increasing 
EM. 
However, there is no evidence that the 
existence of an AC affects the extent of 






434 listed Australian 
firms for financial 




absolute value of discretionary 
accruals 
 
Board of director – 
composition, duality roles 
 
Audit committee – 
composition, meeting, and  
size 
 
Firms with a majority of independent 
non-executive directors on solely 
independent AC and with boards are 







during year 1994 
 
U.S.A 
Modified audit report 
 
Audit committee – 
composition, and size 
 
The higher the percentage of independent 
non-executive directors on AC is the 
lower the likelihood of the firms to 
receive a going concern audit opinion. 
The AC size is not correlated with the 







159 matched pair of 
public firms that 
restated earnings in 
years 2000 and 2001 
 
U.S.A 
Restatement of earnings 
 
Board of director – 
composition, expertise, 
ownership, and duality roles 
 
Audit committee – 
composition, and expertise 
 
The likelihood of earnings restatement is 
lower in the companies whose AC or 
board has financial expertise with 
independent non-executive directors, but 
it is higher in companies in which the 










219 of firms consist 
of firms that 
associates to the 
earnings restatement, 
litigation, illegal acts, 
SEC actions and 






restatement, SEC actions, 
Litigation, Auditor turnover, 
and Illegal Acts 
 
Audit committee – 
establishment 
 
The existence of an AC is associated 
with fewer quarterly earnings 
restatements, fewer SEC enforcement 
actions, fewer lawsuits for fraud, fewer 
auditor turnovers and fewer illegal acts 




150 firms: Matched 
pair of 75 non fraud 
and 75 frauds firms 




Non fraud and fraud firms: 
coded 1 if the firm is alleged 
to have fraudulent financial 
statement, 0 otherwise 
 
Board of director – 
composition, ownership, and 
duality roles 
 
Non fraud firms are likely to experience 
lower fraudulent financial reporting 
levels when the board has higher 
percentage of independent non-executive 
directors as compared with fraud firms. 
The composition of board rather than the 
presence of AC are more important in 
reducing fraudulent financial reporting.  
 
Abbott et al. 
(2004) 
 
1. 44 fraud firms 
under the SEC 
sanctions 
2. match-paired of 88 
restatement sample 
firms for 2 years 
between 1991 - 1999 
 
U.S.A 
1. Non fraud and Fraud firms 
2. Restatement 
 
Board of director – 
composition, ownership, 
duality roles, and size 
 
Audit committee –  size, 
composition, expertise, and 
meeting 
 
Firms with ACs that are meeting 
frequently, solely independent, and that 
possess at least one member with 
financial expertise are less likely to 
experience restatement. A larger board 
size is associated to a higher likelihood 
of restatements. Independence and AC 
expertise are negatively related to the 
incidence of fraud.  
 
Chen et al. 
(2006) 
 









non fraud firms and Fraud: 
coded 1 if the firm is subject 
to an enforcement action 
statement, 0 otherwise 
 
Board of director – 
composition, duality roles, 
chairman tenure, meetings, 
ownership and, size 
 
Firms with the lower percentage of non-
executive directors on board, shorter 
chairman tenures, and lower board 
meeting frequencies are associated with 










156 firms: 78 firms 
subject to SEC 
sanction matched 




Sanctioned and no sanctioned 
firms: coded 1 if the firm is 
alleged to have SEC sanction, 
0 otherwise 
 
Board of director – 
composition, ownership, and 
duality roles 
 
Audit committee – 
composition, and meeting 
 
The firms with ACs that are comprised 
of solely independent members and that 
meet twice a year are less likely to be 
sanctioned for aggressive accounting and 
fraud. Having a CEO who also chairs the 
board is associated with a higher 



















This chapter produces the theoretical framework for this study. The main discussion is of 
the agency theory that focuses on the relationship between principals and agents and the 
conflict that arises between them due to the different goals. In part to reduce the conflict 
of agencies, the monitoring role of AC, BoDs and the external audits are demanded.  
Various hypotheses related to the demand for different levels of AQ and audits are also 
discussed in this chapter. The association between the ACs, BoDs, financial reporting, 
and external auditors are highlighted. Finally, the summary is presented in the last 
section. 
 
3.1 Corporate Governance 
 
So far, the existing studies have indicated that there is no single definition for corporate 
governance (CG) (Waring and Pierce 2005; Tierney 2006; Solomon, 2007). However, it 
has been discussed in various definitions of CG in previous studies (Cadbury Report, 
1992; Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Turnbull, 1997; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). For 
example, Cadbury Report (1992) defined the CG as: 
 
 “A system by which companies are directed and controlled”  
 
The previous definition emphasizes the roles of the major players in the organization, 
which is composed of BoDs, shareholders and the auditor. As stated in the Cadbury 
Report (1992): 
 
“The shareholders’ role in governance is to appoint the directors and the 
auditors and to satisfy themselves that an appropriate governance system 






The function of the directors is associated with how the firm is governed, while the main 
role of the auditors is to provide the shareholders service and supervision as a check and 
balance on financial statements. 
 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) define the CG as the process that: 
 
“Deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure 
themselves of getting a return on their investment”. 
 
They indicate that the legal protection of the rights of the investor and the concentrated 
ownership helps control the management discretion so that financiers are able to get 
returns on their investments. Consistent with the recommendations of the Cadbury Report 
(1992), which emphasizes how the firms are controlled and directed, Denis (2001) and 
Denis and McConnell (2003) expand on this definition: 
 
“CG encompasses the set of institutional and market mechanisms that 
induce self-interested managers (and controllers) to maximize the value of 
the residual cash flows of the firm on behalf of its shareholders (the 
owners)”. 
 (Denis 2001)  
 
“CG encompasses the set of mechanisms – both institutional and market-
based – that induce the self-interested controllers of a company (those that 
made the decisions on how the company will be operated) to make 
decisions that maximize the value of the company to its owners (the 
suppliers of capital)”. 
 (Denis and McConnell 2003) 
 
Alternatively, Solomon (2007) considered the concerns of stakeholders in the definition 
of CG which is seen as:  
 
“a system of checks and balances, both internal and external to companies, 
which ensures that companies discharge their accountability to all their 








These different explanations and definitions of CG existed due to different theoretical 
frameworks and through the views of the authors of CG from different points of view For 
instance, the CG’s definitions, that are outlined through Denis (2001) Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997) and Cadbury (1992) appeared to agree that CG is associated with the control and 
ownership, which aims to maximize wealth of the shareholder. On the other hand, the 
definition of Solomon (2007) is in line with the theory of stakeholder, which believes in 
addition in shareholder-wealth-maximizing, the issues of the environment and social are 
importance to the company. The theory of stakeholder is recognizes that individuals, both 
outside and inside a firm (customers, suppliers, employees, governments, publics or other 
groups or individuals) may influence or be influenced by the firm’s actions. The other 
groups or individuals are indicated to stakeholders (Freeman, 1984). The firms are 
responsible for implementing actions that not only benefit them, but that benefit society 
as a whole.  
 
Given that the present study examines the impact of the roles of the AC and BoDs on 
reporting quality (the AQ and EM), for the purpose of the study, CG is considered as a 
system of balance and check mechanisms to ensure that the interests of the shareholders 
are protected. This view can be expressed appropriately in the agency theory.  In 
addition, this study is focused on the relation to the FRQ rather than on the impact of the 
firm on the factors of the environmental and social; therefore, theory of the stakeholder 
seems to deviate from the aim of this study.  
 
3.2 Agency Theory  
 
The idea of the agency theory has been addressed by Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
through the introduction of the concept of agency cost. They apply the agency cost 
concept to explain issues associated with the control in a large corporation and separation 







The ultimate element in the theory of the agency is the conflict of interests between the 
principals-agents. The principal (shareholder) assigns the power of the decision-maker to 
the agent (manager) who, as an agent, carries out their duties on behalf of the principal 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Divergent and conflicting interests lead to information 
asymmetries between the two parties. The presence of information asymmetry leads to 
two major agency problems, namely, the problems of the adverse selection and moral 
hazard. 
 
Moral hazard problems are associated with the problem of hidden actions when an agents 
incentive is to follow self-interested behavior. They arise when the principals are not able 
to observe the actions that are carried out by the agents. Formally, an agent is expected to 
maximize the wealth of the principal through their decisions and actions. However, the 
agents tend to follow their own interests. By contrast, adverse selection problems 
associated with hidden information, where the agent has more information from the 
principal. Both problems may create, for instance, the EM phenomenon, which, in turn, 
may cause investors, shareholders and debt holders to be unable to distinguish the true 
economic value of a firm. 
 
According to the agency theory, since managers (agents) are inspired by external 
motivations (Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003), the principals have to identify ways to 
motivate the agents and to ensure that they act in the best interest of the principals. Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) indicate that the cost of the agency can be an alternative way to 
reduce the conflict of agency and they define the cost of the agency as consisting of the 
cost of bonding, cost of monitoring, and the residual loss. Costs of monitoring are the 
costs that are linked with the appointment of the appropriate agents, such as external 
auditors, and with the mechanisms that control the behavior of agents, such as the roles 
played by the BoDs. The cost of bonding is the cost associated with contracting in order 








These costs include those related to the agent's compensation system. The residual loss is 
the loss of the agency that is associated with an imbalance between monitoring and the 
costs of bonding or, in other words, the decline in the principals' welfare that arises from 
an imperfect alignment of interests between principals and agents (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). 
 
In this thesis, the monitoring roles of the auditor and board are studied as mechanisms 
that reduce conflicts of agency, a board of directors acting on behalf of shareholders and 
representing the interests of shareholders through overseeing the managerial functions. 
Zahra and Pearce (1989) argue that the agency theory is the most comprehensive theory 
that explains the BoDs’ functions which highlights the importance of their role 
controlling. Consistent with this idea, Hung (1998) also states that the agency theory is a 
convincing theory to explain the supervisory role of the boards. 
  
Besides the monitoring role of the BoDs, Solomon (2007) argue that the external audit 
represents another crucial element of the internal control system of the firm, and that it 
provides a check and balance system that helps shareholders to control and monitor the 
activities of the managements. As the Cadbury Report (1992) indicated:  
   
“The annual audit is one of the cornerstones of CG. Given the separation 
of ownership from management, the directors are required to report on 
their stewardship by means of the annual report and financial statements 
sent to the shareholders. The audit provides an external and objective 
check on the way in which the financial statements have been prepared and 
presented, and it is an essential part of the checks and balances required”. 
 
Therefore, it can be argued that agency theory is essential for this study because it 
recognizes the monitoring roles of the external audit and BoD as mechanisms to control 
the behavior of management. The following sections explain the characteristics of the AC 







3.2.1 Monitoring role of the AC and BoDs  
 
Fama and Jensen (1983) indicate that BoDs are the process of decision making in any 
organization, and that they have the legal authority to control entire compensation 
decisions that are made  through the top management. Fama and Jensen also indicate that, 
in the process of decision making, the implementation and initiation must be separated 
from the monitoring and ratification of decisions to ensure that monitoring functions are 
more efficient. In other words, the agency theory indicates that, in order to ensure that 
functions of effective monitoring are in place, the members of the BoD must include 
external members such as (NEDs), who represent the BoD as independent from 
management.   
 
Vance (1983) adds that the independent NEDs provide non-biased evaluation that is 
“stockholder oriented” which identifies best practice “balance and check” on actions of 
the management. The NEDs are also important because they have a significant 
knowledge such as (technology, corporate law, and capital market) which will enable 
them to complete the information from the inside, and play the role of arbitrator in any 
dispute that may arise between insiders (Fama and Jensen, 1983).  In brief, the 
independent NEDs are best in management control, because of the “complimentary 
knowledge” and “independent” characteristics.  
  
The proposition of independent NED in the agency theory is contradictory to the 
principle of stewardship theory. Stewardship theory proposes that the manager is playing 
the role as a steward and that their efforts assist the interest of their principals (Davis et 
al., 1997; Donaldson & Davis, 1991). The managers are enthused through the intrinsic 
gratification and non-financial motivations resulting from the challenge of working in 
different environments (Donaldson & Davis, 1991). Donaldson and Davis (1991) argued 
that the executive manager far “from being an opportunistic shirker essentially wants to 
do a good job, to be a good steward of the assets of the corporate”. With the aim to 
maximizing the potential of executive managers, the suitable approach is to establish an 
empowering structure (Donaldson & Davis, 1991). 
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Managers must be given clear instructions and a higher position in the hierarchy of the 
organization where they will have the authority and autonomy in decision-making, and 
they will be able to use their full capabilities in achieving the objectives of the 
organization.  From the point of the shareholders’ view, the executive directors (known 
as dominant insiders) on boards are preferred more than NED. This is because they have 
the best existing processes of awareness and knowledge, they presume a more 
responsible attitude for the organization, and they have more technical expertise (Muth & 
Donaldson, 1998). Therefore, shareholders can expect more in return from them than 
from NED who are supposed to have an attitude of self-serving and to be less familiar 
about the organization.  
 
Although the theory of the stewardship identifies that executive directors are more 
beneficial than NED, this study believes that the theory of the agency is supporting the 
monitoring role of the BoDs, as more appropriate for explaining the AQ and EM 
variations. Agency theory identifies the independence of NED as a monitoring system, 
which is necessary to the promotion of high quality of audit and financial reporting. Hung 
(1998) proposed that the task of the executive is concentrated on the “role of strategic” 
instead of the “role of monitoring”. In real systems, the stewards or agents are determined 
to pursue their own interests rather than the others. 
 
In addition to having an independent NED on the AC and in the board, empirical 
evidence also proposed that the committee size, specific experience, high frequency of 
meetings and knowledge may strengthen both the AC and BoD’s  monitoring functions 
(Abbott et al. 2003b, Abbott et al. 2004; Carcello et al. 2002; Chen and Zhou, 2007; 
Dezoort, 1998; Krishnan and Lee 2009; Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Menon and Williams, 








Zahra and Pearce (1989) claimed that the efficiency of a BoD function is dependent on 
the (1) BoDs meeting, (2) type of membership and the board size, (3) the directors' 
attributes (4)  the establishment of the appropriate committees such as their skills and 
competence, (such as communication between firm’s directors, documentation and 
agenda). Moreover, Walker (2004,) reported that:  
 
“The performance of ACs necessarily depends on the people involved, their 
knowledge, skills, critical capacities, skepticism and determination 
 
The empirical evidence for each of these characteristics was discussed in Chapter 2. 
 
3.2.2 The role of external audit 
 
Watts and Zimmerman (1983) describe that since the 13
th
 century, the functions of the 
audit have been observed to provide some form of assurance that the financial 
information provided by the management accurately represents the financial position of 
the firms. Consistent with the agency theory, the audit function is seen as a mechanism to 
mitigate uncertainty about the levels of information asymmetry between shareholders, 
investors and management. As investors and shareholders have limited access to internal 
information from within the firm, the independent audit reports on the fairness and truth 
of the financial statements that are produced by management.  
   
As outlined in the International Standard on Auditing (ISA) (UK and Ireland) 200: The 
overall objective of the Independent Auditor and the Conduct of an Audit in the 
International Standards on Auditing compatibility (UK and Ireland): (ABP, 2009): 
 
“The purpose of an audit is to enhance the degree of confidence of 
intended users in the financial statements. This is achieved by the 
expression of an opinion by the auditor on whether the financial statements 
are prepared, in all material respects, in accordance with an applicable 
financial reporting framework……...As the basis for the auditor’s opinion, 
ISAs require the auditor to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the 
financial statements as a whole are free from material misstatement, 





Differences in the level of the information asymmetry and conflict are assumed to differ 
from firm to firm and perhaps demand different levels of AQ and of auditing (DeAngelo, 
1981; Watt and Zimmerman, 1986). The higher agency cost, the larger the information 
asymmetries gap and therefore the higher levels of AQ demanded. Section (3.3) will 
explain the relevant hypotheses in order to clarify why the management of the firm, 
including the shareholders and investors, AC, BoDs; demands audit services and different 
levels of AQ. 
 
3.3 Demand for the audit quality and external audit 
 
Many hypotheses have been used in the previous literature to explain the demand for 
audit services and various levels of AQ. Each of these hypotheses is now reviewed. It is 
important to emphasize that these hypotheses may appear to be related to one and another 
(Wallace, 1980; Willenborg, 1999; Menon and William; 1994). 
 
3.3.1 The monitoring hypothesis 
 
This hypothesis is based on the relationship of the agency. The agency theory indicates 
that the cost of the agency is a potential solution to the principal-agent conflicts and that 
it provides one of the answers to this problem through an independent audit (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). According to Wilson (1983), the monitoring role of audit reduces the 
adverse selection problems and moral hazard that arise from the problem of information 
asymmetries. As stated in Wilson (1983), in case of the problem of moral hazard, the 
managers responsible for protecting the assets of the firms may misuse the assets or fail 
to maintain them, in which case such actions are not directly observable by the potential 
investors and owner. In case of an adverse selection problem, such assets have their own 
values fixed. The managers have more information about these values and they are able 
to deal with the information to achieve their own personal gains. Therefore, the owners 
need to adopt an effective way to monitor the behavior of opportunistic managers and 
credibility of the information provided by the managers as well as consider how to 
improve investors’ opportunities to observe those assets.  
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One possibility to achieve this is by the independent audits. Auditors provide potential 
investors and managers with information and reliable verification on the value of assets. 
In other words, the independent audit provides guarantees for the potential investors and 
owners that the information provided by the managers is reliable. 
 
The independent audit can be generated through the agent (bonding cost) or the principal 
(monitoring cost). Humphrey (1997) claims that the agents can demand the independent 
audit because the principals normally tend to neglect monitoring activity as they are able 
to protect themselves from the risk of loss through paying lower wages to the agent 
(subject to the cost of the independent audit being less than the loss of wages that an 
agent could suffer without independent audit).   
 
The assumption is that the principals will pay more to the agents for the work that has 
been verified by the independent audit than those that have not been verified. As pointed 
out by Wallace (1980):  
 
“The stewardship (monitoring) hypothesis states that wherein one party 
(the agent) has delegated decision making power, the agent has an 
incentive to be checked if the benefits from such monitoring activities 
exceed the related costs”.   
 
According to Wallace (1980), an independent audit provides assurance that the financial 
reports that are provided through the management have been carefully prepared and they 
are free of material misstatement. Therefore, the market participants including potential 
investors can use the audited financial statements without any hesitation. Moreover, the 
independent audit also reduces financial statement fraud and illegal reports and improves 
the internal controls and operational efficiency of the firm (Wallace, 1980; Chow 1982). 
For example, when managers know that their financial reports will be checked by the 
auditors, fraud and illegal behavior can be minimized indirectly because they are 
concerned that these actions will be discovered by the auditors. In addition, when the 
auditors carry out the audit review or audit testing on the system of internal control of the 
firm, they will discover if some internal control procedures are missing or have not been 
implemented properly.  
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Therefore, auditors typically provide recommendations to improve the existing systems 
of internal control. Such recommendations and restrictions are able to improve the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the operation of the firm. In brief, these observations 
indicate that audit services not only provide a monitoring tool for the potential investors, 
owners and managers, but also for the organization as a whole, including its employees 
and creditors. 
 
3.3.2 The information hypothesis 
 
As mentioned previously, the higher the agency conflicts, the larger the information 
asymmetries and therefore the higher the AQ services that will be demanded. Wallace 
(1980) indicates that investors demand audited financial statements, because the quality 
of the financial information is improved by the independent audit. He further proposes 
that audited financial information is able to (1) improve decision making, (2) provide 
access to new information for investors and (3) reduce market-related (systematic) and 
firm-specific (unsystematic) risks. As stated in Wallace (1980), the risk-averse investor 
requires a higher rate of return to higher levels of risk or pays a higher risk premium to 
reduce levels of uncertainty or risk investment. It is assumed that the risk premium 
associated with the individual investor's assessment of the audit service; through the 
audit, uncertainty about the accuracy of financial information provided through the 
management can be reduced (Shakun, 1978). If the total of risk premium for each 
investor is mutually adjacent and exceeds the cost of audit, the financial information of 
audit is beneficial to all parties where all parties enjoy less uncertain information.  
 
According to Wallace (1980), some investors may also reduce the risk of their investment 
through the development of the portfolio of both unaudited investment opportunities and 
audited.  Any reduction in the risk premium that is linked to the audited information will 
be compensated through audit cost of the specific firm. However, it may cause the 
unaudited investment portfolio to increase in market variability, and hence audit costs can 




Furthermore, the barriers relating to the portfolio diversification can create a larger risk 
premium to offset the firm specific risk of unaudited financial information. In brief, it is 
through audits that investors reduce the firm specific risk and market related risk 
(Shakun, 1978; Wallace 1980).  
 
According to Wallace (1980), the monitoring hypothesis seems to overlap with the 
information hypothesis from the audited part of the audited information and this is 
valuable to the principals and agents, and is also applicable to the investors for their 
investment decisions.  However, he also points out that the monitoring hypothesis 
provides support for the practice of furnishing principals with the audited financial 
statements only within the period of the agreement of the contract (within a period of the 
relationship between the agent and principal). According to the hypothesis of the 
information, financial information determines market value.  Investors require financial 
information in order to make the rational investment decision although they are on the 
outside of a contract of principal and agent relationships. In other words, in order to make 
decisions of the investment, investors need financial information from firms on an 
ongoing basis and without time limits. 
   
3.3.3 The Signalling or reputation hypothesis 
 
Wallace (1980) suggests that “signalling is a kind of implicit guarantee”. In the agency 
relationship in which information asymmetry problems arise, it is supposed suppliers of 
the financial statements to be dishonest in reporting financial information. As such, users 
of financial statements are not able to distinguish between dishonest and honest 
information. In this case, the need for independent audits can be seen to result in the 
financial statement users receiving honest reports (Wallace, 1980). Therefore, audit 
services inform the market that the financial statements that are provided through the 
management are also free of material misstatement. Such assurance provides the 
investors’ confidence and other users of financial statement that the reported accounting 




Wallace (1980) pointed that “Specifically, the audit could indicate less error or noise in 
the financial report, greater fineness in the methods of reporting (including with GAAP), 
and unbiased performance measures”. 
  
Moreover, the signalling hypothesis provides an explanation for those who demand 
different levels of AQ. According to Moizer (1992), in a market where sellers are not 
able to build a good reputation, two major agency problems (adverse selection problems 
and moral hazard) collaborate in order to reduce the quality of the product. If buyers fail 
to distinguish between the different levels of AQ, they may see all audit services as being 
of average quality and will only be willing to pay for them at the same price.  
 
Audit providers do not, therefore, have any way to influence the buyer for their services 
in preference to any others. As a result, the problem of moral hazard arises because 
providers are likely to sell low-cost services and low quality in order to maximize their 
profits, and the profits that come, regardless of the quality of the provider of individual 
and quality services (Moizer, 1992). 
 
Simultaneously, the adverse selection problem could also arise because the market will 
probably be driven by low quality providers and good quality providers will be forced to 
desist from the market (Moizer, 1992). As a result of these impact trades of average 
quality services is that the market becomes smaller, and this leads to the possibility of the 
collapse of the market (Akerlof, 1970). The signalling framework provides a cure for the 
collapse of the market because it explains the ability of sellers to provide a signal to 
uninformed buyers about the quality of their services or products where there is a 
presumption that the seller knows the quality of their products and the buyer does not 
(Bar-Yosef and Livnat, 1984). 
 
Since the buyers are not able to determine the quality of the product early, several models 
of the (reputation) capital suggests that the seller needs to expend resources in order to 




For example, Klein and Leffler (1981) argues that higher quality sellers invest in non-
salvageable firm specific assets (such as advertising or marketing Investment) in order to 
prevent competitors from entering the market, and thus they provide direct value to 
buyers. Shapiro (1983) indicates that sellers can establish their reputation by charging at 
the beginning for a higher quality product at a minimum quality price that is equivalent to 
the cost of production because they are new members to the market. In the early period 
the sellers may suffer economic losses, but later they recover the premium of price, 
provided that they keep on producing the higher quality products. As pointed out by 
Shapiro (1983): 
 
“.... The premium for a high quality product represents only a fair rate of 
return on the investment in reputation. The typical time pattern of profits to 
a seller is given by an initial period of losses, i.e., investment in reputation, 
followed by a stream of profits…… The higher the quality produced, the 
larger are the initial losses (investment in reputation) and the subsequent 
profits (premiums for high quality items)”. 
 
Allen (1984) disagrees with the models suggested by Klein and Leffler (1981) and 
Shapiro (1983) by saying that investments in non-salvageable firm specific assets are not 
practical in some industries and sellers must probably not charge for a higher quality 
product at a minimum quality price and thus suffer losses in the initial period of 
investment. Allen (1984) claims that the sellers that produce a higher quality product 
should price it at a higher price, which can be above marginal cost.  
 
He argues that the: 
 
“Buyers reassure themselves about high quality of each firm’s output by 
verifying that the price charged and quantity produced are consistent with 
high quality’s being more profitable than low quality”.  
 
When the seller charges for high-quality products at a lower cost, it is perceived by the 
buyer that the seller has transferred the higher quality products to a lower quality product, 






Once the reputations of the sellers have been established, they are able then to indicate to 
the buyers that their products are endorsed with higher quality marks. Klein and Leffler 
(1981) indicates that firms that have established reputations are less likely to produce low 
quality products because once buyers realize that they have purchased such a product, 
this information will quickly be disseminated to other buyers. Once their reputation is 
damaged, the sellers may fail to secure an adequate return on their quality product (Klein 
and Leffler, 1981; Shapiro, 1982; 1983; Rogerson, 1983). 
 
With respect to the audit market, Moizer (1997) argues that the signalling hypothesis 
does not necessarily entail higher quality audit because it simply leads the users of the 
market to believe that the more expensive auditing firms offer a higher service quality. 
Consistent with this is (1981) DeAngelo assertion that since the AQ is unobservable and 
costly to measure, the market tends to use a good reputation, derived from the large 
auditors, as a sign of higher quality audit.  
 
As pointed out by Shapiro (1983): 
 
“The idea of reputation makes sense only in an imperfect information 
world. A firm has a good reputation if consumers believe its products to be 
of high quality. If product attributes were perfectly observable prior to 
purchase, then previous production of high quality items would not enter 
into consumers' evaluations of a firm's product quality. Instead, quality 
beliefs could be derived solely from inspection”. 
 
3.3.4 Insurance hypothesis 
 
The insurance hypothesis differs from the agency relationship hypothesis and applies 
when auditors are involved in litigation. It shows that auditors provide investors with  
protection in the event of an audit failure (Wallace, 1980; Stice, 1991; Menon and 
William, 1994). In other words, the legal system allows investors to recover their 
investment losses from the auditor if the audited financial statements are of a low quality 
or if there is  misrepresentation. The possibility of recovery of such claims increases if 




Wallace (1980) gives four explanations as to why managers choose auditors as insurance 
in preference to insurance companies. First of all, it is assumed that managers who are 
not guaranteed to be completely independent of their actions, without ratification by the 
auditor, can be involved in negligence or are committing fraud.  Secondly, improvements 
in accounting and auditing firms that employ legal staff, legal services and in-house 
counsels, indicate that they are more efficient compared with insurance companies. 
Thirdly, insurance companies use a cost benefit approach when deciding whether to enter 
into a legal defense or to take a decision on an out-of-court settlement. However, both the 
firms and the auditors that are involved in litigation consider the impact on their 
reputations and thus, they make sure that they protect their reputation. Fourthly, if 
investors suffer losses because of the audited financial statements, the courts are likely to 
hold the auditors responsible and to require them to bear the losses. The contributions of 
auditors for the investor's losses are viewed by the court as a socializing risk. As 
mentioned by Wallace (1980): 
 
“…auditors responsible for business failures, he spread the cost to the 
clients through higher fees and then to society through higher prices and 
lower returns on investment”. 
 
Many studies have empirically tested the insurance hypothesis. For example, Menon and 
Williams (1994) use the case study of Laventhol and Horwath (L&H: is one of the 
seventh largest public accounting firms in the U.S. They were declared bankrupt in 
November, 1990), and Menon and Williams (1994) examine the effect of L&H's clients’ 
stock price (1) when L&H filed their bankruptcy and (2) on the announcement that they 
replaced the auditor. They assume that when L&H filed for bankruptcy, they ceased their 
operations and their investors would no longer have access to recover their investment 
losses. Therefore, their clients’ stock prices were expected to decline.  When L&H’s 
clients reappointed a new auditor, they assumed that the investment losses of L&H were 
not transferable to the new auditor, since investors can claim only from them if they used 





If the insurance hypothesis is put to the L&H bankruptcy case, a new appointment would  
provide a significant reaction in stock prices. However, if the market realizes that the 
appointment of the new auditors can clarify the uncertainty of future monitoring, it may 
lead to a positive return. Their findings are consistent with the hypothesis of insurance. 
Price reaction to all the events supports the argument for the lack of expected insurance 
coverage.  Thus the disclosure of the L&H bankruptcy had a negative impact on the price 
of their stock, and the announcement of a replacement auditor did not provide any 
significant reaction.  
 
In addition to this, Baber et al (1995) indicates that such price reactions were driven by 
the monitoring function of L&H, and that the monitoring and insurance hypotheses are 
difficult to differentiate. They indicate that financially distressed auditors are more likely 
to conduct low audits quality because they are more concerned with having their 
independence and competence judged. For example, in order to keep their clients and 
reduce their audit cost, financially distressed auditors are less likely to report a 
misstatement or an error that they discover during audit work, or they may reduce audit 
testing in order to reduce the cost of auditing. They claim that if investors are aware and 
if they saw that L&H was independent and incompetent then such a perception has led to 
a fall in the stock prices.  However, Lai and Gul (2008) provide contradictory evidence to 
Baber et al. (1995). Using the probability of issuing a modification to the auditor's 
opinion, the provision of discretionary accruals and predictability of discretionary 
accruals for the earnings in the future as proxies for AQ, they indicate that the AQ of L & 
H was not substandard.   
  
In another study, O’Reilly et al. (2006) examine the interaction between the insurance 
and signalling hypotheses by studying audit opinion in an experimental setting. They 
argue that the audit opinion as a going concern (1) provides signals to the market that the 
firm is no longer feasible, thus affecting the stock price, (2) provides the auditor legal 
protection, although there is still a possibility that investors are able to recover part of the 




Their findings indicate that the going-concern audit opinion reduces analysts’ estimation 
of stock price because market participants consider the role of the auditors as a protector. 
In brief, the insurance hypothesis supports the view that the auditors, seen by investors as 
guarantors of investment and investors “appear to be willing to pay a premium for the 
right to recover the loss of investment potential of auditors through litigation” (Menon 
and William, 1994). 
 
As well as increasing the direct costs that the auditor needs to charge for investors to 
cover losses, such lawsuits also have an indirect impact on their reputation and perceived 
quality of the audit (Palmrose, 1991). The results of Chaney and Philipich (2002) are 
consistent with those of Menon and Williams (1994) and Baber et al. (1995). They 
investigate the impact of the failure of the Enron audit on Arthur Andersen's (A&A) 
reputation as one of the big five auditors. They examine A&A's clients’ stock prices in 
the three days after A&A admit they shredded a significant number of audit documents 
related to the engagement of Enron. Such an unexpected event resulted in a negative 
market reaction on A&A's clients’ stock prices, indicating that investors acted on the 
perceived low quality of the audit carried out by A&A. 
Similarly Hillison et al. (2004) examine clients' stock price reactions to Ernst & Young’s 
(EY) rumors of bankruptcy in late November and early December 1990.  The findings 
indicate that the hypothesis of insurance and the AQ explain the negative stock price 
reaction. Although the Big 4 auditors may provide a high quality audit, market 
participants still react according to published information. When market participants lose 
confidence in the credibility of audited financial statements, the effect is a reduction in 
the client’s stock price.  
 
Lennox (1999) has tested the reputation exposure and insurance hypothesis (under the 
signalling hypothesis) using United Kingdom data between the periods of 1987-1994. 
According to the hypothesis of a reputation, the big size auditors signal their AQ by 
assuming that they are more likely to lose their client specific rent when they offer low 





In order to avoid such a loss, they have an incentive to provide the highest quality audit 
(DeAngelo, 1981). The alternative to this argument is that big auditors or wealth auditors 
are associated with higher risks of litigation (Dye, 1993). Similarly, in order to prevent 
such claims of litigation (for example, because of low quality audit) from investors, the 
big auditors offer a higher AQ and are more credible. Lennox (1999) posits that the lower 
the quality of the audit conducted by the auditors, the higher the potential for such 
auditors to be sued (because they fail to report and detect misstatement or negligence). 
He claims that in the case of the big auditors that gain their quality from the capital of 
reputation, the litigation history of auditors provides an accurate indicator.  
 
However, the insurance hypothesis considers the litigation of the auditor to be a poor 
indicator because the auditors are likely to be sued if they are sufficiently conservative 
(Type 1 error), but they will not be sued if they are too conservative (Type 2 error). 
Therefore, although the big auditors provide a higher AQ than a smaller size auditor, 
there is a high likelihood that they will be sued when a type 1 error arises. Lennox’s 
results indicate that the large auditors are more likely to be sued because they are more 
afraid of potential litigation claims than of losing their client specific rent or capital of 
reputation. 
 
3.4 The association between AC, external auditor, BoDs, and FRQ 
 
There are two research questions that need to be discussed in this thesis. The first 
question is concerned with the relationship between the effective AC, BoDs, and auditor 
quality in constraining EM. Previous explanations gave reasons why these parties 
demand the highest quality audit, and why they are more likely to constrain EM, by 
reviewing the roles of ACs and boards of directors and their connection to the external 








The main goal of the BoDs is to obtain the success of the firm. They are responsible for 
reviewing or preparing the strategy, values, goals and mission of the firm, in order to 
align their interests with interests of the shareholders (United Kingdom CG Code, 2010; 
CG Code of Bahrain, 2010). They are also responsible for the fairness and transparency 
of the financial statements, as clearly stated in the Bahrain Commercial Companies Law 
2001. The Companies Law (2001) - article (195), requires the directors to assume 
responsibility for the individual administration and accounts of the firm.   
 
The Companies Law (2001) - article (361) (d)- states that the directors of a company 
must not approve the company accounts unless they are satisfied themselves that the 
company accounts provide a true and fair view and have been prepared according to the 
financial reporting framework. These company accounts are issued and approved by the 
directors of the firm, and are required to be externally audited as they are to be used by 
the public. As the highest point in the firm structure hierarchy, the BoDs are responsible 
for the activities of the firm, financial performance and strategies,  including the actions 
of sub-committees.   
 
Under the main BoD, there may be several sub-committees, one of which is the AC. The 
AC has a direct link with the services of the external audit and the firm’s financial 
performance. Wolnizer (1995) discusses in detail the tasks that the AC members are 
expected to do, from three perspectives: 
 
1. Auditing and auditors – The AC gives suggestions to external auditors, reviews 
the scale of non AFs and AFs, ensures auditor independence, reviews the audit 
plan, writes a letter of engagement, and allocates resources on the internal audit.  
With respect to AFs, Collier and Gregory (1996) argue that the AC is responsible 
for ensuring that the scope of the process of the audit is sufficient and that the AC 
is able to ensure that the reduction of AFs does not reach a level which would 




2. CG – The AC facilitates the relationship between the BoDs and the auditors, as 
well as reviews and complies with codes of conduct, corporate and ethical 
policies.  
 
3. Financial reporting and accounting – the AC reviews the policies of accounting, 
financial statements, and prevents or detects errors or fraud that could lead to a 
material misstatement in the financial statements. 
 
Through the implementation of these tasks (1-3), companies are expected to strengthen 
their credibility, increase the efficiency and effectiveness of internal control, improve the 
accountability of management personnel, and reduce any opportunistic behavior of 
management, increase objectivity and reliability of financial statements, as well as that of 
external and internal audits and enhance the BoDs’ function while helping them to meet 
their legal obligation (Wolnizer, 1995). The overall suggestion is that the activities of an 
AC can improve the system of CG and the FRQ of the firm. 
 
Similarly, Menon and Williams (1994) indicate 2 potential benefits that can be obtained 
through establishing the AC. Firstly, an independent AC may act as an independent party 
between the external and internal audit. The independent members of the AC help to 
provide an unbiased assessment between the external audit services and internal audit 
function, which in turn improves the FRQ of the firm (Imhoff, 2003). Secondly, the AC 
may enhance the efficiency and function of the BoD, particularly when the BoD has a 
large number of directors.  
 
Moreover, the Blue Ribbon Committee (BRC, 1999) also agrees that the formation of the 
AC can enhance confidence of investors about the current reported financial statements. 
They stated the following: 
 
“....the Committee believes ACs will be more effective in helping to ensure 
the transparency and integrity of financial reporting and, thereby, maintain 
the investor confidence that makes our securities markets the deepest and 




In addition to the important role of the AC and BoDs, Bailey and Grambling (2005) 
indicate that external audits work as a key determinant of FEQ. Power (1996) argues that 
the external audit adds credibility to the financial report. DeAngelo (1981) claims that 
auditors improve the quality of financial reports through their competency and 
independence. Moreover, Ruddock et al. (2006) argue that the quality of financial reports 
is improved when auditors are responding to aggressive earnings conservatism. 
 
Anderson et al. (2001) assumes that when a manager has a higher incentive to manage 
earnings, the auditor realizes that the manager is more aggressive, having a greater desire 
to look good in their financial statements and auditors also expect to agree with their 
financial statements. Therefore, auditors will limit EM when they see that managers 
manipulate financial statements. Furthermore, according to Krishnan (2003b), through 
constraining EM, the auditors are able to improve the information value of earnings. If 
the market realizes that the auditors are not able to limit opportunistic earnings, then the 
earnings’ information value would be diminished simultaneously. According to Sankar 
and Subramanyam (2001), the restriction imposed by GAAP, and by auditors, on the 
reporting earnings discretion may improve the content of earnings’ information. 
 
There are indirect and direct links between the role of the AC, the board and the external 
auditor. Under the direct relationship, the principal roles of an AC are to make a 
recommendation to the board in relation to the appointment of external auditor to review 
the AFs, audit engagement to monitor the external auditor independence and objectivity, 
as well as the effectiveness of the process of audit  (United Kingdom CG, 2010). As 
previously mentioned, with respect to the proposed AFs and the audit engagement, the 
AC is responsible for ensuring sure that the scope of the audit is sufficient and that the 
proposed AFs do not jeopardize the AQ work (Collier and Gregory, 1996). The reason 
for this is that auditors try to reduce the total cost of the audit and seek to achieve a 
balance between the expected future losses and costs of audit resources as a result of 






It is reasonable to expect that an effective BoDs first reviews the overall scope of an audit 
and the proposed AFs before agreeing to the proposal of the AC, since the BoDs is 
responsible for all their sub-committees’ actions. In respect to auditor independence, 
specifically the provision of NAS, official guidance requires an AC to review the 
engagement NAS and make sure that the relevant procedures are in place to ensure that  
the independence and objectivity of the auditors are not affected by the NAS. The AC is 
responsible for making the recommendations and reporting to the BoDs on any actions 
taken to ensure that the auditor's independence has been safeguarded (United Kingdom 
CG, 2010; CG Code of Bahrain, 2010). 
 
Indirectly, an effective AC and board may signal to the auditor and management that they 
exercise a higher and more vigilant oversight function. For exampole, when management 
believe that the ACs and board are monitoring well, they may consider limiting 
voluntarily the purchase of NAS (Abbott et al., 2003a) and will limit their own 
opportunistic earning behavior through employing higher quality auditors. Similarly, 
auditors may see that an effective AC and board are associated with having a function of 
higher monitoring and they are therefore likely to be more demanding about having a 
higher quality audit (Carcello et al., 2002). 
   
Why do the ACs and boards of directors demand different levels of AQ? Why do they 
constrain EM? Similarly, why do external auditors limit opportunistic EM? The answers 
to these questions lie in the effects on the shareholder interests, legal exposure, and 
reputation capital (Carcello et al., 2002). 
 
The reputation hypothesis assumes that vigilant directors make costly investments to 
establish their reputation as effective monitors and, in return for being good monitors, 
they could be rewarded with an additional directorship in another firm (Fama, 1980; 
Fama and Jensen, 1983). Evidence indicates that when directors suffer a damaged 





For instance, Gilson (1990) argues that the extyernal directors of firms in financial 
distress hold significantly fewer seats on other boards following their departure, possibly 
due to the legal exposure and influence of reputation.  In another study, Fich and 
Shivdasani (2007) examine the impact of reputation for external directors of firms that 
are involved in financial fraud. They found that the outside directors lose about 50 
percent of their directorships in other firms when one of the firms in which they serve is 
involved in financial fraud lawsuits. This finding suggests that sued directors on a board 
are seen as weak monitors, which may increase the likelihood of financial misconduct 
that occurs. Moreover, they also found that the reduction in directorships may be driven 
by an external directors’ desire to reduce their future legal exposure. 
 
The hypothesis of reputation is also applicable to auditors. A highly reputable auditor has 
an incentive not to produce low quality audits because, once their clients discover they 
provide low quality audits, their reputation will be damaged and they will be not be able 
to secure their clients and they will lose quasi rents (DeAngelo, 1981). 
 
Wilson and Grimlund (1990) provide evidence of the consequences that auditors may 
suffer in case of damage to their reputations. They examine the impact of Securities 
Exchange (SEC) disciplinary actions on audit firms and their findings indicate that 
auditors tend to lose market share, and they have difficulty retaining clients. In general, 
auditors are likely to constrain EM due to the possibility of being sued or subjected to 
regulatory actions. These may be due to negligence in determining misleading 
information in audited financial statements. Evidence indicates that auditor litigation has 
a positive relationship with EM (Lys and Watts, 1994; Heninger, 2001) and failure to 
perform their role effectively or neglect their duties may increase the potential of the 
auditors for future legal exposure (Lennox, 1999).  
  
As well as considering the capital of reputation and legal exposure, the AC and BoDs 
demand a higher quality audit in order to promote the interests of shareholders (Carcello 




Various studies have indicated that investors believe that the provision of NAS negatively 
affects auditor independence and undermines the audited financial statement.  Lavin 
(1976; 1977) and Firth (1980) examine financial analysts, perception of accountants and 
loan officers in the United Kingdom and United States, respectively.  
 
Their findings indicate that when auditor independence is considered to be impaired, 
borrowing decisions and investment will also be affected. These studies may indicate that 
investors avoid a firm if they realized that the audit of the financial statements has been 
impaired through the purchase of NAS. Therefore, the AC and BoDs monitor auditor 
independence (for example in terms of the levels of NAS) in order to gain the confidence 
of the investors and promote the interests of the shareholders. 
 
A higher quality auditor may be perceived by investors to be associated with a higher 
credibility of information, which in turn increases the value of the firm (Titman and 
Trueman, 1986; Datar et al., 1991). In fact investors assume that higher quality auditors 
are more sensitive to earnings surprises. For instance, existing studies show that the firms 
that engage or switch to big auditors have a higher earnings respond coefficient compared 
to smaller size auditors, and lower EM,  consistent with the view that big auditors provide 
more credible information to investors (Teoh and Wong, 1993; Becker et al., 1998). In 
another study, Khurana and Raman (2006) indicate that higher NAS fees and total fees 
received through auditors are viewed negatively through investors as higher fees could 
possibly compromise the AQ and auditors’ independence. These views express investor 
perception as a lower ex-ante cost of equity capital.  
 
Overall, the higher quality of reported earnings and higher quality audits are useful not 
only for investors and the users of financial statements, but they are also useful for 
auditors, ACs and boards of directors because they are able to reduce the risk of damaged 









3.5 The Conceptual Framework and Hypotheses Models 
 
In Chapter 2 (the literature review) two empirical studies with causal hypotheses were 
discussed.. This Chapter provides the conceptual framework and a number of hypotheses 
(See Figure 3.1). These hypotheses can be divided into two groups. The first group of 
hypotheses (H1-H24) relates to the effects of characteristics of Corporate Governance 
(board of directors and audit committee) to different proxies of Audit Quality (audit fees, 
non audit fees and auditors’ industry specialist), illustrated in Figures 3.2 and 3.3. The 
second group of hypotheses (H24-H35) relates to the efficiency of higher-quality auditors 
and Corporate Governance characteristics in constraining Earnings Management, 
illustrated in Figure (3.4). In the first group, the characteristics of Corporate Governance 
and the proxies of Audit Quality are represented as independent and dependent variables 
respectively, while in the second group; the proxies of Audit Quality and Earnings 
Management are independent and dependent variables respectively. All the 
measurements and descriptions are explained in Chapter 4. Agency theory also displays 
the relationship between principals and agent. To reduce the conflict of agency, the 
monitoring role of external audits, BoDs, and AC, are demanded. Various hypotheses 
relating to the demand for different levels of AQ and audits are discussed in Chapter 3. 
The current study thus attempts to bridge the gap by providing a basis for discerning the 














Figure 3.1: Conceptual framework describing the expected relationship between the Corporate 
Governance, the Audit Quality, and between Corporate Governance and Audit Quality in respect 




























Figure 3.2: Characteristics of the Board and proxies of the AQ conceptual framework (Group 1) 
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Figure 3.3: Characteristics of the Audit Committees and proxies of the AQ conceptual framework 
(Group 1) 
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Figure 3.4: Characteristics of the Board, characteristics of the Audit Committees and proxies of 
the AQ conceptual framework (Group 2+1) 
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3.6 The summary 
 
Agency theory assumes that agents and principals have conflicting interests, and thus are 
likely to contribute to the conflict of agency, which includes the phenomenon of EM. To 
align these interests, the theory of agency recognizes the monitoring roles of the AC, 
BoDs, and external auditing as playing a role in the mitigation of the principal-agent 
conflict. From the agency view there are various characteristics of ACs and boards (such 
as the composition, expertise, size and the activity levels) that contribute to the effective 
monitoring function. An independent audit is also acknowledged through agency theory 
as a control mechanism to reduce information asymmetry between  investors, 
shareholders and the management by encouraging fairness and honesty in financial 
statements. Various hypotheses have shown why shareholders or management demand 
different levels of AQ and auditing services. These hypotheses include the monitoring 
hypothesis, the hypothesis of information, signalling/reputation hypothesis and insurance 
hypothesis. By employing  constraining earnings manipulation and higher quality 
auditors, the AC and BoDs assume they are adding credibility to the financial statement 
and increasing the value of firms. At the same time, the AC and board are able to 
promote shareholders' interests, avoid legal exposure and secure their reputation capital. 
Similarly, higher quality auditors are less flexible towards opportunistic earnings because 
of the risk that wrongly reported earnings may incur damage to reputation, increase future 
legal exposure, decrease the value of the firm and disappoint shareholders. Furthermore, 
this chapter provides the conceptual framework and a number of hypotheses that are used 
















4.0 Introduction  
 
After highlighting the theoretical framework in the previous chapter, this chapter 
provides an overview of the methodology adopted in this thesis and the secondary data 
collection methods employed. As previously mentioned, the aim of the present study is to 
examine the relationship between the AC, BoD, and AQ in constraining EM. This thesis 
is organized as follows: Section 4.1 presents the methodology of the research related to 
the assumptions concerning the nature of the social sciences, and assumptions about the 
nature of society. Section 4.2 explains the research paradigms, while Section 4.3 presents 
methods of data collection, including the questionnaire survey and secondary data, and 
then summarizes the measurements and the definitions of the variable hypothesis 
(including the characteristics of the effect of the BoD and AC, proxies of the AQ and 
EM). Section 4.5 explains how the conceptual frameworkhas been designed. Section 4.5 
provides a brief summary of the chapter.  
 
4.1 Research Methodology 
 
It should be noted that the philosophy of research adopted by the researcher is an 
important stage which reflects the researcher’s ability to understand the phenomena and 
that he is capable of selecting the appropriate research tools. It is important that anyone 
who conducts research should be capable of engaging with the most important issues in 
her / his pursuit of knowledge and with “essential issues in social science”. That is: “how 
do we know what we know'', and following on from that, how do we get knowledge” 





Burrell and Morgan (1979) provide the classification of organizational research, 
producing their various philosophical stances and assumptions about the nature of the 
social sciences.  Similarly, Hopper and Powell (1985) present more explanations about 
several aspects of social sciences, which are composed of distinct elements about human 
nature, epistemology, ontology, and methodology.  
 
4.1.1 Assumptions about the Nature of Social Science 
 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) identified 4 assumptions about the nature of the social 
sciences: methodology, human nature, epistemology and ontology. These 4 assumptions 
have philosophical positions regarding the subjective-objective dimension. The 
subjective dimension consists of: nominalism, anti-positivism, voluntarism and the 
ideographic approach (qualitative), while realism, positivism, determinism and the 
nomothetic approach (quantitative) are subsumed in objectivist (See figure 4.1).  
 
The selection of appropriate research methodology cannot be considered in isolation from 
the previous assumptions that encourage the research in question (Ryan et al., 2007). 
Therefore, these dimensions will help the researcher to recognize the stance of the current 
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Source: Burrell and Morgan (1979). 
 
Figure 4.1: Assumptions Regarding the Nature of Social Science 
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4.1.2 Objectivism Vs Subjectivism  
 
Objectivism is an ontological position that claims that social phenomena and their 
meanings depend on an existence independent of social actors,  and categories that are 
often used in discourse have presences which are separate or independent from actors 
(Bryman, 2004). However, Bryman (2004) states that the social phenomena, subjectivism 
approach and their meanings are not independent, but are achieved by their social actors, 
which are not provided through social interaction but are in a constant state of revision. In 
other words, social phenomena are created through perceptions and consequent actions 
by social actors (Saunders et al. 2009).  Social entities are considered as social 
constructions that build up from actions and perceptions of social actors in accordance 
with the subjectivism approach, while the objective approach views social entities as 
objective entities that have external reality to social actors (Bryman, 2004). 
 
Figure 4.1 displays the term ontology and defines ontology as the nature of reality.  The 
world must either be considered external and objective to the researcher or socially 
constructed, understood only by looking at the perceptions of the human actors.  
Epistemology is concerned with the study of knowledge and what is being researched and 
what we accept as the researcher (Hussey and Hussey, 1997). Clearly, the main 
difference between the epistemology and ontology lies in the fact that the ontology 
focuses on understanding of ‘what is’ , while epistemology is the science of knowledge, 
is concerned with ‘what it means to know’ as well as help in the process of deciding 
‘what kinds of knowledge are adequate and legitimate’ (Gray, 2004). 
 
Epistemology branches into two perspectives: anti-positivism and positivism 
(interpretivism). Positivism refers to the philosophical position of natural scientists 
coping with the observation of  social reality, and that the end product of research using 
this approach can be law like generalizations similar to those produced through the 
scientists of the natural and physical (Saunders et al., 2009). The aim of the theory is to 
generate hypotheses that can be tested (Bryman, 2012). Hussey and Hussey (1997) 
describe  positivism as follows: “The researcher is independent from that which is being 
researched and research must be unbiased and value-free”.  
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In terms of the view of  the anti-positivist, the researcher usually adopts specific methods 
such as face-to-face interviews and participant-observation and does not seek for laws or 
underlying regularities in the field of social affairs as in science. In general, this view 
reflects reality and argues that generalization is not the fundamental issue (Saunders et 
al., 2009).  
 
The third assumption is human nature, regarding the nature of the social sciences, and is 
about the relationship between the environment and human beings.  In other words, it 
should be understood  if human activities produce assumptions of human nature and if 
human life is essentially the object or subject of inquiry (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). In 
general, there are two views of the role of human beings in social life.  The first view is 
look at human beings and their experience as related to products of the environment, 
while voluntarism looks at man as free-willed and independent to create his own 
environment (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). 
 
The fourth assumption is methodological; it is about the research process that determines 
the appropriate research paradigm and implications of the chosen methodology (Hussey 
and Hussey, 1997). The nomothetic approach is from the methodological assumption and 
is concerned with associations or causality, with the researcher investigating the topic and 
generally using a large sample, which includes the concept of intelligence and wanting to 
find a way to measure the intelligence of a specific aspect. Therefore, the researcher 
focuses on what he formulates and observes (Hussey and Hussey, 1997). Concerning the 
ideographic approach, the researcher examines a small sample, and uses different 
research methods in order to get different perceptions of analysis and phenomena, and 
looks to understand "what is happening" (Hussey and Hussey, 1997; Saunders et al., 
2009).   
 
In this research, objectivism in terms of the nature of the data that has been collected and 
analyzed is used, as in this research the secondary data will be via annual reports. 





4.1.3 ‘Positivist’ vs. ‘Interpretivist’ epistemological positions 
 
The difference between quantitative and qualitative research is often linked to certain 
epistemological positions. Qualitative methodology is usually coupled with the 
‘interpretative’ epistemology; while quantitative research is largely connected to the 
‘positivist’ epistemology. 
 
The epistemological stance of positivism values an empiricist, objective approach to 
science, which is based on knowledge of the systematic observation and experimentation 
(Walliman, 2006). In essence, the rigid perspective comes mainly from natural science 
research- despite the fact that positivist orientation can also occur in the social sciences, 
when the reality is supposed to be measurable, stable, and observed. 
 
‘Interpretivism’, on the other hand, challenges the adequacy of traditional science 
methods for investigating the nature of cultural and social phenomena. An interpretative 
viewpoint on science presumes that no single, observable reality exists; instead, reality is 
socially and relatively constructed. Since multiple interpretations may take place for the 
same event, research from this epistemological position is typically aimed at 
understanding and interpreting reasons, meanings, motives, and other subjective 
perceptions which are context bound and time bound (Carson et al., 2001). From the 
standpoint of interpretivist, therefore, social reality is not some "thing" that can be 
interpreted in various ways; “it is those interpretations” (Blaikie, 1991). 
 
Interpretivism is closely linked to the philosophical tradition of ‘phenomenology’, which 
is based on the idea that the social world is created by individuals in their interactions, 
actions, and the meanings they attach to these activities. The reality is thus a complex set 
of social meanings – " experiences of the people and ways of seeing the world" (Backer 






Usually, the phenomenological approach involves an in-depth interview of individuals, 
who have experience from the phenomenon of interest, the ‘essence’ of which is 
something individuals usually share with others who are living the same experience. 
Distinguishing the ‘essence’ is, thus, the main focus of phenomenological studies. By 
using qualitative interpretative analysis, it is possible to: 
 
“Describe, decode, translate, and otherwise come to terms with the 
meaning, not the frequency, of certain more or less naturally occurring 
phenomena in the social world” (Maanen, 1979). 
 
Examples of interpretative qualitative research methods include: ethnography (Becker, 
1970), Soft Systems Methodology (Checkland, 1981), empirical phenomenology (Wertz, 
1983; Giorgi, 1985), discourse analysis (Potter and Wetherell, 1987), hermeneutic-
interpretative research (Packer and Addison, 1989), consensual qualitative research (Hill 
et al., 1997), grounded theory (Strauss and Corbin, 1998), and interpretative 
phenomenological analysis (Smith et al., 1999).  
 
4.1.3 Assumptions about the Nature of Society 
 
Two different types of sociological approaches have been described by Lockwood (1956) 
and Dahrendorf (1959) who argue that one concentrates on the nature of the social 
equilibrium and order, while the other is interested in the problems of coercion, change, 
and  dispute in social structure. The differences between the two approaches are noted in 
Table 4.1 as presented by Burrell and Morgan (1979).   
 
Table No.4.1 : Two theories of society: ‘Order’  and ‘Conflict’ 
The  ‘Order’ or ‘Integrationist’ 
View of Social Emphasis 
The ‘Conflict’ and ‘Coercion’ 
View of Society Emphasis 
Stability Change 
Integration Conflict 
Functional co-ordination Disintegration 
Consensus Coercion 
  




Cohen (1968) considers dealing with conflict and order as entirely separate to be a 
mistake and he believes that theories must include the elements of conflict and order in 
their models. Furthermore, as the subjectivist movements were more significant, the 
debate concerning conflict and order has settled down to include only the effect of 
matters related to the methods of philosophy and the social sciences (Burrell and Morgan, 
1979).  
   
One of the pioneering studies that focused upon the order and conflict debate was Burrell 
and Morgan (1979) who claimed that this issue is problematic in that radical change and 
regulation are replacement notions that have 2 dimensions.   Firstly, the sociology of 
radical change is interested with interpretation of structural contradiction, radical change, 
modes of domination, and deep-seated structural conflict. Second,regulation is interested 
in the interpretation of society in terms that emphasize the underlying unity and 
cohesiveness. 
 
4.2 Research Paradigm 
 
The paradigm is a useful way to explain and understand the social phenomena on the 
basis of the ontological and epistemology positions (Saunders et al., 2009).  Furthermore, 
Corbetta and Patrick (2003) indicate how this paradigm is significant, and argues that any 
scientific research that has been performed without paradigm lacks selection criteria and 
orientation, so that all the techniques, problems and methods are equally legitimate. 
Similarly, Bryman (2004) verify that the paradigm means how the results of the study 
should be clarified and how it should be conducted.  
 
The study of Burrell and Morgan (1979) is considered a pioneering study in research 
methodology that made a great contribution through presenting its 4 paradigm models 
that helps researchers to clarify the assumptions for designing their research and provides 






Burrell and Morgan (1979) provide their 4 paradigm model (See figure 4.2) subjective–




The paradigms of the objectivist and subjectivist have been discussed in the research 
methodology section, where they produce the ontological stances. Radical change is 
concerned with providing a theme regarding the actions that should be taken in the affairs 
of the organization and gives suggestions for significant changes to their usual position. 
The aims of the regulation position are to portray current practice and how affairs of the 
organization are regulated and then make suggestions to improve in line with the current 
situation (Falgi, 2009).  
 
The radical humanist paradigm that represents the dimensions of radical change and 
subjectivist “ seeks to change, emancipate the status quo and potentiate and to overcome 
all barriers facing this emancipation (such as social constraints, compulsions, 
psychological, power, and ideology” (Falgi, 2009). Although, the radical structuralist 
paradigm, that takes a different ontological position, the aim is to focuses on the structure 
of the organization and seek for the fundamental change and then analyse organizational 
phenomena such as patterns of conflict and power relationships (Saunders et al, 2009).  




Burrell and Morgan (1994) reported that the interpretive paradigm refers to “everyday 
life is accorded the status of miraculous achievement”.  
 
This would not require the researcher to achieve change, but it will allow him to explain 
and understand what is going on (Iskander, 2008). Finally, the other objectivist 
dimension (functionalism) that has a view of regulation explains why notable 
organizational problems occur and provides recommendations contained in the current 
structure of the organizational situation (Saunders et al., 2009).  
 
4.2.1 Research Theoretical Approach 
 
This study will adopt the positivism approach because of its relevance to this type of 
research. Clarke (2004) gives a brief of the main methodologies for research on CG, 
namely data questionnaire surveys, interview, surveys and observation. Each method has 
its advantages and disadvantages. The main method that is suitable to the positivism 
approach is data base surveys based on analysis of published sources (Clark 1998) which 
will be used in the current study.  
  
The deductive approach tends to be favored more by the positivist researchers than 
interpretivist (Ticehurst and Veal 1999). The process of the deductive research involves 
the development of a hypothesis or theory to test the hypothesis. The inductive approach 
is used when the data is collected first, and developed the theory as a result of the data 
analysis. 
 
Positivism is linked with quantitative, experimental, scientific, and deductive frameworks 
where researchers seek particular quantifiable observations and therefore regular use 
experiments and statistics to test their hypotheses (Neuman, 1997). Therefore, the current 
study uses a deductive approach. It is an explanatory study. A prior study has been 
mostly conclusive in the role of external audit and CG in reducing EM which helps in 




Quantitative methods are often used, such as financial data analysis to determine the 
effectiveness of CG in empirical studies. In CG research, measures of the board 
composition such as AC independence and board independence- measured by the ratio of 
non-executive directors to total number of directors- is used in interpreting the effect of 
board composition on the extent of a company EM level. 
 
There is a dearth of research on CG, which uses a qualitative approach. This may be due 
to the limited information available on how BoDs really work due to the confidential 
nature of the process and the meetings of the BoDs, which in turns makes it difficult for 
researchers to capture information on how a corporate board may contribute to enhancing 
the quality of earnings. 
 
However, because of the difficulty of obtaining access to this information, the realist and 
interpretivist approaches have only been used in limited case studies and thus research 
tends to be on material that can be easily obtained from external sources such as media 
releases and published reports (Leblanc and Gillies 2005). 
 
The aim of this research is to empirically examine the relationship between the 
characteristics of Corporate Governance and Audit Quality in constraining Earnings 
Management in Bahraini listed companies. Therefore the research uses a quantitative 
approach where relationships between discretionary accruals and a set of independent 
non-financial and financial variables on listed companies were tested using analysis of 
data.  
 
The main purpose of this method is to identify the relationship between earnings 
management and the characteristics of Corporate Governance and Audit Quality 
variables. This approach enables the researcher to test the sample observations that make 






4.3 The conceptual framework of the research 
 
Based on a generic literature review, this research has designed an appropriate conceptual 
framework, developed a causal model and a number of hypotheses to test, in order to 
explain the relationship between the effectiveness of the characteristics of the AC, BoDs, 
and AQ in respect of constraining EM. In all, thirty five main hypotheses were tested, 
twenty four for the first study, and eleven for second study. The study covers the 
financial period between 2010 and 2013 from the listed companies in the Bahrain Bourse. 
 
4.4 Regression Analyses 
 
4.4.1 GLS regression analysis 
 
The regression diagnostic points out heteroscedastisty in this study.  There are several 
reasons for this situation of unequal variance, for example: skewness and outliers. In such 
a case of heteroscedasticity, it is preferable to give less weight to the observations coming 
from the population with the greatest variability than the weight given for observations of 
the populations with smaller variability. However, Ordinary least-squares do not make 
use of the information contained in the unequal variability of the dependent variable, 
because it assigns equal weight to each observation. Generalized least-squares is 
Ordinary least-squares on the transformed variables that meet the standard least-squares 
assumptions. As such, Generalized least-squares reduces the weighted sum of residual 
squares not minimizing an equally weighted or un-weighted as Ordinary least-squares 
(Gujarati, 2003). 
 
To take advantage of the benefits of data analysis for the panel in the present study, we 








4.4.2 Quantile Regression 
 
Koenker and Bassett (1978) identify the introduction of Quantile regression methods 
which provide a mechanism for estimating models for the function of the conditional 
median, and the full range of functions of conditional quantile. The methods of the 
Quantile regression seek to minimize the sum of the absolute residuals, not the sum of 
squared residuals as in classical linear regression. Unlike the M estimators and classical 
regression techniques that deal with variable means, Quantile regression concentrates on 
the median. Koenker and Hallock (2001) explain the following: 
 
“Just as lee can define the sample mean as the solution to the problem of 
minimizing a sum of squared residuals, we can define the median as the 
solution to the problem of minimizing a sum of absolute residuals. The 
symmetry of the piecewise linear absolute value function implies that the 
minimization of the sum of absolute residuals must equate the number of 
positive and negative residuals, thus ensuring that there are the same 
number of observations above and below the median”.  
 
The methods of the regression quantile offer, by supplementing the conditional mean 
with an entire collection of conditional quantiles, a much more complete statistical 
analysis of the stochastic relationships between the variables. Furthermore, they are more 
robust against possible outliers; heteroscedasticity; and skewed tails; and can be 
computed through traditional methods of linear programming. In addition, these methods 
provide a broader explanation of the influence of the independent variables on the 
dependent variable than traditional regression (Ordinary least-squares), which focuses on 
the mean (Koenker and Hallock, 2001; Buchinsky and Hahn, 1998): 
 
"The quantile regression results offer a much richer, more focused view of 
the applications than could be achieved by looking exclusively at 
conditional mean models. In particular, it provides a way to explore 
sources of heterogeneity in the response that are associated with the 







As such, this feature of the Quantile regression is likely to be particularly useful in the 
context of corporate governance and audit quality in the current study. Therefore, it was 
decided to use the Quantile regression in order to verify the results of Ordinary least-
squares, and Generalized least-squares. STATA provides the Quantile regression as one 
of the non-parametric analysis. 
 
4.5 Endogeneity and the 2SLS model 
 
As two-stage least-squares (2SLS) regression is not as common as the more often used 
Ordinary least-squares method, the methods and the concept relating to the 2SLS method 
are explained in more detail.  Recent studies (Jokipii et al., 2008 and Hay et al., 2008) 
have used the 2SLS regression model in order to reduce endogeneity of the variables 
(variable associated with the term error or another variable). As Larcker & Rusticus 
(2009) explain, the methods of the instrumental variable (IV) are commonly employed in 
accounting research (for example disclosure research, executive compensation, EM and 
CG) when the regressor variables are endogenous. In this study the characteristics of the 
AC, BoD and proxies of the AQ are likely to be associated with endogeneity, which is 
used as a dependent variable and as an independent variable in the regressions. There are 
also some additional tests was carried out, where the discretionary accruals and the AFs 
are seen as endogenous to further study the joint effect of the hypothesis variables. 
 
Hay et al. (2008) clarify the endogeneity problem related to the GC studies and compare 
different research directions: “Variables in order to control or governance, which is 
endogenous, namely BoD and audit committee”.  It is expected that there is a two-way 
relationship between control and external auditing. It has been argued in many 
‘substitution view’ papers (Simunic 1980, 1984) that the organization can choose to swap 
more or less the internal audit against external audit; and it has also been disputed that 
external auditing may have an influence on voluntarily forming an AC (Pincus et al., 
1989 and Eichenseher & Shields, 1985). In this thesis, the existence of BoD and AC are 
presumed endogenous in all of the two-stage least-squares (2SLS) models as Hay et al. 
(2008) suggest.  
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If there is a two-way relationship between the controls and auditors, the Ordinary least-
squares regression could lead to inconsistent and biased results and therefore two-stage 
least-squares (2SLS) method is used to mitigate the possible endogeneity problems.  
 
Chenhall & Moers (2007) describe the differences of the variables of endogenous in their 
paper: 
 
In general use, the distinction between the endogenous and exogenous variables may be 
that related to the origins of the variables to be either ‘outside’ or ‘inside’ the structural 
equation. A variable is endogenous if it is decided in the context of the model, while an 
exogenous variable is a variable that affects the values of the variables of endogenous, 
but whose values are determined outside the model. They further clarify this with an 
example of econometric (Chenhall & Moers, 2007): 
   
Y= β0+ β1 X1 +u  Equation.1 
 
Assume that the following equation applies: 
 
X1= 0+ 1 Z1 +v  Equation.2 
 
Equation (2) suggests that the X1 variable is endogenous, as it is the explained variable. 
The main question, however, is whether it is endogenous in equation (1). The variable X1 
is endogenous in equation (1) if it is associated with the structural error term, that is, 
Cov(X1, u) = 0. If X1 is associated with the structural error term, then X1 is determined 
inside the model (equation (1)), because the existence of such a relationship is either 
because to Cov(v, u) = 0 or because to Cov(Z1, u) = 0.  That is, (some) of the factors that 
affect X1also affect Y and as result equations (2) and (1) are parts of the same model. If 
X1 is not associated with the structural error term of equation (1), then it must hold that 
both Cov(v, u) ≠ 0 and  Cov(Z1, u) ≠ 0, and X1 is thus determined outside the model and 
not endogenous. In brief, the explained variable is, by definition, endogenous because it 
is always associated with the structural error term (Chenhall & Moers, 2007). 
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Larcker and Rusticus (2009) explain the usual method for using the two-stage least-
squares (2SLS) in their very insightful working paper on the subject: “In the typical 
application of two-stage least-squares (2SLS), the researcher selects a set of variables that 
are supposed to be exogenous and then used the two-stage least-squares (2SLS) or similar 
estimation methods to estimate the coefficients in the regression model. This solution of 
the standard textbook to endogeneity is suitable if the researcher can find instrumental 
variables that are associated with the endogenous regressor but uncorrelated with the 
error in the structural equation (Larcker & Rusticus, 2009). 
 
To address the issue of the endogeneity in this research, the two-stage least-squares 
(2SLS) method is used with appropriate instrumental variables in the first phase.  In the 
first phase the variables of the endogenous are regressed as the dependent variable with 
the variables included in the second phase and instrumental variables as independent 
variables employing the Ordinary least-squares method. In the second phase, the values 
expected of the endogenous variables from the first phase models enter as independent 
variables, with the other controlled variables, in the both the proxies of audit quality and 
EM models. 
 
As the variables of the endogenous are dichotomous in this research, one might claim, 
that the method used in the regression of the first phase should be a probit of logit method 
rather than of the proposed Ordinary least-squares. Estimating the first phase by 
employing the probit or logit is unnecessary, because in two-stage least-squares (2SLS) 
the consistency of the estimates in the second phase does not dependent on determining 
the correct functional form in the first phase (Kelejian, 1971).  Also, Heckman (1978) 
shows that the use of methods of logit or probit for the dummy variables in the first phase 
are not needed, but can be used, if the only purpose is to interpret the results of the 
second phase. “It is not necessary to obtain estimators consistent of parameters of 
reduced model equations in order to constantly estimate structural equations. Since the 





However, it is possible to use the results of the probit instrument in more efficient 
estimators although no proof of this assertion is offered (Heckman, 1978). Similarly, 
Angrist (2001) concludes in the same spirit, that “it is generally safer to use a linear first 
phase”. 
 
Larcker & Rusticus (2009) remind users of other instrumental variable methods and two-
stage least-squares (2SLS) to study and report the various statistics on the validity of the 
used instrumental variables to justify that the used method is solid statistically. They 
especially warned about the effect of using weak instruments, which are weakly linked 
with the regressor. This is common in these types of studies, where it is very difficult to 
find strong instrumental variables to reduce the endogeneity problem. However, if the 
instrument is only weakly associated with the regressor, instrumental variables methods 
can produce biased estimates when the instrumental variable is even slightly endogenous. 
In those cases, it is likely that estimates of the IV are more biased and more likely to 
provide the wrong statistical inference than simple Ordinary least-squares estimates that 
make no correcting for endogeneity (Larcker and Rusticus, 2009). 
 
In order to verify the appropriateness of the instrumental variables, a number of tests are 
used in the two-stage least-squares (2SLS) models as Larcker and Rusticus 
recommended. The interpretation and the calculation of this test (Durbin-Wu-Hausman 
endogeneity test) is presented in the next chapters as this test may not be as familiar as 
the Ordinary least-squares method. If these tests fail to support the use of the two-stage 
least-squares (2SLS) method, the Ordinary least-squares method is then used to study 
effects of the hypotheses.  
 
Furthermore, the common way to justify the use of two-stage least-squares (2SLS) 
instead of the results of the Ordinary least-squares is to perform the standard Durbin-Wu-






As Baum (2006) points out, the test is perhaps the best interpretation not as a test for the 
exogeneity or the endogeneity of regressors per se but rather as a test of the consequences 
of using different methods of estimating the same equation (Baum, 2006). The test 
statistic is distributed as chi-square where the degrees of freedom are the number of 
regressors being tested for endogeneity. The strong rejection of the null favor using the 
two-stage least-squares (2SLS) instead of Ordinary least-squares models is estimated.   
 
4.6 The Methods of Data Collection 
 
Existing studies have provided a limited insight into the mechanisms of CG, the role of 
external audit and constraining EM. Therefore, based on the objectives of the current 
research, this study adopts quantitative methodology to increase confidence in the 
findings that have been obtained. In other words, quantitative methods will be adopted in 
order to improve the quality of data and in an attempt to fill the gap in the literature. 
Particularly, quantitative methodology has allowed the current study to examine the 
theory with a sample size. To achieve this, the research will collect secondary data 
relating to the phenomenon of constraining EM and the role of external audit and the 
mechanisms of CG in the Kingdom of Bahrain. With regard to the quantitative approach, 
the aim of the data collection is to produce a better understanding of the different aspects 
of constraining EM in the Kingdom of Bahrain. 
 
4.6.1 Quantitative Methodology 
 
Quantitative methodology, based on the philosophy of positivism, is interested in 
measuring and counting views of the social world and its processes and structure; with  a 
theoretical background establishing standards of the social sciences approach over 
extended periods of time. (Sarantakos, 1994). This approach generally has a logical 
structure in theory that defines the problems to allow the researcher to manage sets of 




One type of method is a quantitative survey that is usually associated with the deductive 
approach and gives information on what people report or perceive (Neuman, 2000). The 
following section shows more details on the questionnaire survey and analysis of 
secondary data. 
 
4.6.1.1 Questionnaire survey 
 
Generally, questionnaires are used for descriptive or explanatory studies conducted using 
questionnaires on organizational practices and questionnaires on the opinion and attitude 
of people (Saunders et al., 2009). In other words, the questionnaire allows the study to 
define and identify variation in the different phenomena. 
 
The questionnaire technique is best when used in conjunction with other methods, such as 
in depth face-to-face interviews, to determine certain attitudes (Jankowicz, 2004; 
Saunders et al., 2009). There are 2 types of questionnaire (See figure 4.3): the two types 
include the interviewer-administrated and self-administrated (Saunders et al., 2009). The 
interviewer administrated questionnaire is divided into 2 types, including: structured 
interview and telephone questionnaire while a self-administrated questionnaire is divided 
into 3 types including: postal questionnaire, collection and delivery questionnaire, 





Figure 4.3:  Types of questionnaire 
 
Source: Saunders et al (2009) 
 
Despite the advantages mentioned before, the use of the self-administrated questionnaire 
has been criticized by some researchers, such as Sekamn (1992) and Neuman (2000) who 
say that it is not suitable to cover a wide geographical area, and cannot guarantee 
anonymity in some cases. Furthermore, this type of questionnaire survey gives little 
opportunity for the researcher to get more information when the respondents give 
uncompleted answers. Finally, pre-existing coded questions can bias results for the 
researcher.  
 
4.6.1.1.1 Secondary data analysis 
 
Secondary data are helpful not only to obtain information required for research, but also 
to provide a better explanation and understanding of the research issues (Ghauri and 
Gronhaug, 2010). There are several advantages to using secondary data such as saving 
time and money, although it is significant that the secondary data should be consistent 




















Secondary data can be gathered from financial or government reports, annual reports, and 
from a number of different sources. In terms of the quality of the data, a number of 
scholars, Ghauri and Gronhaug (2010) indicate that secondary data is a significant 
method and if they are able to answer the questions of the research, there is no need to 
gather the primary data.  
 
4.6.2 Sample of the firms and period of study 
 
The initial sample consists of the Bahrain Stock Exchange (now Bahrain Bourse) 192 
firm-year observations for the period 2010-2013. However, this study excluded 5 firms 
(20 firm-year observations) because they were suspended from operating which may 
affect the study’s results. Another 5 firms (20 firm-year observations) which were not 
audited by auditors of the Big 4 were also excluded (Chung and Kallapur, 2003; Craswell 
et al., 1995). After eliminations, the remaining sample is 152 firm year observations. The 
procedure of sample selection is summarized in Table 4.2. 
 
Table 4.2: The procedure of sample selection 
Description Process 2010 2011 2012 2013 Pooled 
The sample (Bahrain Bourse) 48 48 48 48 192 
Excluded:      
Suspended firms 5 5 5 5 20 
Unavailable annual report - - - - - 
Audited by Non-Big 4 5 5 5 5 20 
Missing data from Bahrain 
bourse, and Thomson One 
Banker 
- - - - - 
Final Samples:   38 38 38 38 152 
 
However, the sample of the current study is subject to the following criteria:  
 
1. The current study covers the period between fiscal years 2010 and 2013. The 
reasoning for using this as the study period is summarized in the following points: 
(a) the improvement of the  Kingdom of Bahrain’s environment commenced at 
the beginning of 2010. (b) The implementation of the CG mechanisms was 




2. The main purpose of the present study is to examine the effectiveness of the AC 
and BoD in terms of CG best practice, as outlined in the Kingdom of Bahrain CG 
Code (2010).  
  
3. These firms are been chosen because they provides activities of industrial, 
commercial broad range and account for a significant portion of the Kingdom of 
Bahrain economic output.  
 
4. The main sources of secondary data were collected from the Bahrain Stock 
Exchange (now Bahrain Bourse) website and Thomson one Banker.   
 
2 empirical investigations were conducted, each of which use different samples. First 
investigation examines the association between the AC, BoD, and AQ. The total sample 
analyzed via the 3 proxies of AQ is 152 firm year observations. The second empirical 
investigation examines the association between the AC, BoD, and AQ in constraining 
EM. In line with the arguments developed by Subramanyam (1996), and DeFond and 
Jiambalvo (1994), the second investigation’s sample was reduced from 152 to 148 
because of the performance of the firms and to provide an unbiased estimate of 
discretionary accruals. Table 4.3 and Table 4.4, Panel A and B, report the distribution of 




















Table 4.3 : Industry description and size of the sample for the first empirical analysis of 
the relationships between the AC, BoD, and AQ 
Panel A: The sample firms by industry 
ICB  Code Level of the Super sector N % 
1700 Basic Resources 8/1.52 5.26 
2300 Construction and Materials 4 2.63 
2700 Industrial Goods and  Services 4 2.63 
3500 Food  and Beverage 8 5.26 
5300 Retail 12 7.9 
5700 Travel and Leisure 16 10.52 
6500 Telecommunications 4 2.63 
8300 Banks 60 39.49 
8500 Insurance 12 7.9 
8600 Real Estate 8 5.26 
8700 Financial Services 16 10.52 
Total  152 100 
The sample observations for this study are from Bahrain Stock Exchange (now Bahrain 
Bourse), all the firms were audited by Big 4 auditors. 
 
Panel B: Distribution of sample firms by year 
Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 Pooled 
Sample size N % N % N % N % N % 


























Table 4.4 : Industry description and size of the sample for the second empirical analysis- 
the relationship between AC, external auditor, BoD and EM  
Panel A: The sample firms by industry 
ICB  Code Level of the Super sector N % 
1700 Basic Resources 8/1.48 5.41 
2300 Construction and Materials 4 2.70 
2700 Industrial Goods and  Services 4 2.70 
3500 Food  and Beverage 8 5.41 
5300 Retail 12 8.11 
5700 Travel and Leisure 16 10.81 
6500 Telecommunications 4 2.70 
8300 Banks 60-4=56 37.84 
8500 Insurance 12 8.10 
8600 Real Estate 8 5.41 
8700 Financial Services 16 10.81 
Total  148 100 
The total sample of 152 has been reduced to 148 firm year observations. 
 
 
Panel B: Distribution of sample firms by year 
Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 Pooled 
Sample size N % N % N % N % N % 
37 25 37 25 37 25 37 25 148 100 
 
 
4.6.3 Sources of data collection 
 
There are 3 main sources of data related to the current study, namely annual reports for 
the firms, Thomson One Banker web site and the last one by telephone. The other 
variables for which data were not available from these sources were collected from the 
annual reports for each firm; this refers especially to the variables related to the ACs and 
BoDs. 
 
4.6.3.1 The measurement of the hypothesis variables 
 
The variables in the current research will be described in this section. There are 3  
important variables that need to be considered: (1) the characteristics of the AC and the 




4.6.3.2 The BoD and AC variables 
 
The variables of the AC and BoD are linked to their effective monitoring characteristics 
(for example expertise, size, composition and meeting).  In the first and second empirical 
investigations, the variables of the AC and BoD are independent variables. These 
variables are gathered from the financial or government reports and annual reports of the 
firms, and each variable is included in the following sub-sections.  
 
4.6.3.2.1 Composition of the BoD (BRDNED) 
 
The composition of the BoD is described in terms of the total of the independent NEDs to 
the total size of the BoD. The NEDs can either be affiliated (or gray) NEDs or 
independent NEDs. However, the independent NEDs are believed to have better 
supervision compared to the affiliated (or gray) NEDs, because they have no relationship 
that would weaken their decision making judgment (Vance, 1983; Lawrence and 
Stapledon, 1999). This is consistent with the Principle-agent theory of agency (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976).  
 
The word “independent” is defined in the United Kingdom CG Code (2012), paragraph 
A.3.1 as: “The NEDs are not considered to be independent if the director”:   
 
1. Has close family ties with any of the firm's senior employees directors or 
advisers; 
2. Has receives/received an additional payments or remuneration from the firm apart 
from the fee of director, performance related pay scheme of the company or 
she/he is a member of the company’s pension scheme or participates in a share 
option;  
3. Has, or has had during the past 3 years, a business relationship with the company 
either directly, or as a senior employee or director, partner, shareholder of the 
body that has such a relationship with the firm. 
4. He has served on the BoD for more than 9 years from the date of the first election. 
5. Is or has been an employee of the firm or the group within the past 5 years; 
6. Represents an important shareholder; 
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7. She/he has significant links or holds cross directorships with other directors 
through involvement in other firms or bodies; 
 
The independent NEDs exclude the board’s chairman.  
 
4.6.3.2.2 The size of the BoDs’ (BRDSIZE) 
 
Lipton and Lorsch (1992) recommend that the size of the board must not be more than 8 
or 9 directors. Jensen (1993) argues that when the BoD has more than 7 or 8 members, it 
is less effective due to the problems of coordination, which subsequently contribute to 
weak supervision. However, the size of BoDs is decided by the total number of members 
on the BoDs, as contained in the firms’ annual report at the end of each financial year 
(Peasnell et al., 2000, 2005; Abbott et al., 2004). 
 
4.6.3.2.3 BoDs meeting (BRDMEET) 
 
Directors are responsible for attending meetings and responsible for making any 
decisions required in the meetings (Ronen and Yaari, 2008). Conger et al. (1998) indicate 
that more regular meetings in boards can improve the effectiveness of the board. The 
meetings are the main operations of the board (Vafeas, 1999) and a sign of the efforts that 
been made by the directors (Ronen and Yaari, 2008). Busy boards who meet more often 
probably manage their responsibilities in better way in accordance with the interests of 
the shareholders (Vafeas, 1999), because more of the meeting time can be allocated to 
controlling issues such as EM (Habbash, 2010), and more effort can be made in 
monitoring the integrity of financial reporting and improving the AQ. The meetings of 
the BoDs are measured by the total number of the meetings of the BoDs as contained in 
the firms’ annual report at the end of each financial year (Vafeas, 1999).  A study was 
conducted by Xie et al. (2003), employing a sample of 282 firm year observations, in 
which they point out that the board that meets frequently may have time to look at issues 
such as EM. Their results indicate that EM is negatively and significantly associated with 





4.6.3.2.4 BoDs expertise (BRDEXP) 
 
The expertise of the BoDs is measured by the total number of directors with the 
experience, knowledge, financial and accounting qualifications in relation to the total size 
of the BoD. Expert members with financial and accounting qualifications provide the 
other members of the board with the knowledge to understand financial statements, 
allowing them to assess accounting policies and the effectiveness of the management. 
Experience and financial and accounting qualifications including all kinds of formal 
education (for example a Bachelor's degree in accounting) and professional qualifications 
such as CIMA, CFA and ACCA), as well as work experience (as an auditor, chief 
financial officer, financial controller, and finance director). This variable definition is 
comparatively similar to Xie et al. (2003). 
 
4.6.3.2.5 Composition of the AC (ACIND) 
 
In the current study, the composition of AC is measured using dummy variables, taking 
the code as one if the AC is composed solely of independent directors and coded as zero 
if otherwise; it is in line with the recommendations contained in the United Kingdom CG 
Code (2012). The reason for having solely independent NEDs in the AC is to ensure 
higher objectivity and impartiality in the decision making process. The term 
“independence” is relatively similar as to that specified in Section 4.5.1.1. 
 
4.6.3.2.6 Size AC (ACSIZE) 
 
The size of AC is measured by the number of members of the AC at the end of the  
financial year, consistent with the definition of Yang and Krishnan (2005).  
 
 
4.6.3.2.7 Meetings of AC (ACMEET) 
 
According to Krishnan and Visvanathan (2009), the meetings of the AC are measured by  
the number of meetings per year. When the number of AC meetings is increased, the 





4.6.3.2.8 Expertise of AC (ACEXP) 
 
As with the expertise of BoDs, expertise of the AC is measured by the total number of  
directors with the experience, knowledge, financial and accounting qualifications, in 
relation to the total number of AC members. Financial and accounting expertise is 
extremely important to the members of the AC since they play a critical role in ensuring 
the integrity of the financial statements. The knowledge of financial and accounting may 
improve their ability to monitor and results in an increase in their understanding of the 
issues of the FRQ of firms, allowing them to assess the effectiveness of the accounting 
policies as per GAAP practices. Experience, knowledge, financial and accounting 
qualifications include all forms of formal education, work experience and professional 
education related to finance and accounting.   
 
4.6.3.3 Variables of AQ  
 
There are three AQ proxies that will be examined in the current study. In the first 
empirical investigation, the proxies of AQ are represented as dependent variables, while 
in the second; they are independent variables. The measurement and description of each 
proxy of AQ are explained below.  
 
4.6.3.3.1 Auditor’s independence  
 
The current study used four measures of auditor independence, the four measures are 
described as: (1) (FEERATIO 1) = the fee ratio of non-audit services fees to total fees; 
(2) (FEERATIO 2) = the fee ratio of non-audit services fees to AFs; (3) LN(NAF) = 
natural logarithm of the magnitude of non-audit services fees; and (4) LN(TOTALFEES) 
= natural logarithm of the sum of non-audit services and audit fees. The 
LN(TOTALFEES) and LN(NAF) are transformed to the natural logarithm for achieving 
a normal distribution of data.  The companies that reported zero NASFs are set to 1 
Bahraini Dinar to allow the transmission of the logarithm. The data of the AFs were taken 




The variables LN(TOTALFEES) and LN(NAF) are related to the auditor's fee 
dependence on the client. In addition to the AFs received by the auditor, the level of 
NASFs will raise the auditor's economic reliance on the client (Simunic, 1984; Beck et 
al., 1988a). Similar to the Ashbaugh et al. (2003) study, this research shows that the sum 
of audit and NASFs, and level of NASFs are more appropriate measures to capture the 
economic importance of the client to the audit firm than the ratio of NAS.  
 
Although the two fee ratio such as (FEERATIO 2) and (FEERATIO 1) do not necessarily 
capture the importance of the client, they explain the financial relationship between the 
client and the auditor, and have an impact on the perception of independence held by 
regulators (Ashbaugh et al., 2003).   
 
4.6.3.3.2 Audit fees LN (AFEE) 
 
This study will use the AF to measure the AQ. The AF variable (AFEE) is transformed to 
prefixed and natural logarithm through LN for achieving normal distribution of data, in 
order to save the big companies from unduly or inappropriately influencing the results. 
The data collection for this variable LN (AFEE) is collected from the firms’ annual 
report. 
 
4.6.3.3.3 Auditor specialist in the industry (SPEC _AUD)  
 
The existing literature indicates that the auditors' industry specialization can be measured 
using various approaches, such as auditors' portfolio of clients (portfolio approach) 
(Krishnan, 2003a), and the complementary approach (Neal and Riley, 2004), as well as 
industry market share approach developed by Dunn et al., 2000; Balsam et al., 2003; 
Velury et al., 2003; Krishnan, 2003a; Chen et al., 2005. In spite of the restrictions of each 
approach, they are identified as the most important measures for the industry 




The industry market share approach describes the auditor's industry specialism as an 
auditor that can make a distinction between their opponents in the specific industry in 
terms of market shares (Neal and Riley, 2004).  Market shares can be estimated for 
certain industries using the number of clients audited by the firm, clients’ sales, the total 
audit fees and the AFs that are allocated to a certain auditor. The auditor(s) with the 
largest share(s) in the market in a specific industry (within the industry) are supposed to 
have the largest specific industry experience as well as reflecting important audit firms 
investment in developing the industry in particular audit technologies with the expected  
improvement of the economies of scale and AQ. Neal and Riley (2004) argue that there 
are two disadvantages of using the market shares approach in identifying auditors 
industry specialism 1) it is not possible for auditors to designate a specialist in industries 
that are too small to generate significant revenue for audit firms; and (2) highly 
competitive auditors do not necessarily devote significant resources to develop industry 
audit expertise and technologies. 
 
An alternative to the market share approach, the portfolio approach considers each 
auditor individually and takes into consideration the distribution of the client’s sales, AFs 
and the number of audit clients across the various industries for each audit firm 
considered individually. The auditors with the largest portfolio share are considered as a 
specialist in a certain industry if they generate the most revenues from their clients’ sales. 
This may reflect their investments in their industry specific knowledge and the audit 
technologies, even if they do not maintain a leading market share leaders in that certain 
industry (Neal and Riley, 2004).    
 
However, although the portfolio approach recommends that the auditors specialists are 
driven by industry size, the auditors’ investment or efforts may not reflect that. This may 
result in the larger auditors being identified as auditors' specialists in many industries and 







Neal and Riley (2004) propose the market-share weighted approach, which is the 
complementary approach capturing the relationship between the portfolio share and the 
market share attributes of audit specialists. The market-share weighted approach is the 
most important measure that provides a solution for the contradiction between these two 
main approaches. However, Neal and Riley point out that, similar to the other two 
approaches, this approach does not consider the impact of the period lead-lag.  Therefore, 
to ensure the robustness and consistency of the results of this study, this research 
considers all 3 of these approaches in determining the auditors' industry specialist based 
on AFs.     
 
In each of the empirical analyses, the auditor industry specialist is defined in five ways. 
The first 3 measures are identified as the continuous variables that are equal to the 
complement between the auditors’ portfolio share and market share (SPECLST _ 
WEIGHTED), auditors’ market share (SPECLST _M_ S), and the auditors’ portfolio 
share (SPECLST _ P_ S). The final 2 measures are known as dichotomous variables that 
depend on the market shares of the industry of the auditors; first is the market share of the 
auditor, (SPECLST _MS_30), coded as 1 if the auditor has a market share larger than 30 
% in each certain industry and 0 if otherwise, and lastly industry leader, (SPECLST _ 
M_S_LEADER), coded as 1 if the auditor has a larger market share in each certain 















All of these measures are calculated as follows: 
 
1- SPECLST _P_S: is recognized as the total amount of AFs earned by the individual 
auditor in each industry divided by the total amount AFs of all industry earned by the 
certain auditor. The auditor portfolio share is calculated as follows:   
 
 
SPECLS T_P_ Si k = 
         
     
   
          
    
   
 
   
      (1) 
Where: 
 
i = (i =1, 2, 3, 4) = district indicator of the auditors  
k = industries indicator   
j = represents the clients;  
Jikt = the number of clients served by audit firm ( i ), in industry ( k ), in year ( t ); 
Ik = the number of audit firms in industry ( k ), in year ( t ); 
AFEEijkt = the AFs for auditor’s ( i ) client ( j ), in year ( t ); 
(AFEE) indicates the total AFs of the client and is collected from the annual report. As 
with the market share approach the numerator is the sum of the AFs of all ( Jik ) clients of 
audit firm ( i ) in industry ( k ), where the sector level of the industry is recognized as the 
Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB). The denominator is the sum of the AFs of all 












2- SPECLST _M_S: is recognized as the total amount of AFs earned by the individual 
auditor relative to the total amount of AFs earned by all the auditors in that certain 
industry (Velury et al., 2003). 
   
SPECLS T_M_Sik = 
         
     
   
          
     
   
  
   




i = (i =1, 2, 3, 4) = district indicator of the auditors  
k = industries indicator   
j = represents the clients;  
Jikt = the number of clients served by audit firm ( i ), in industry ( k ), in year ( t ); 
Ik = the number of audit firms in industry ( k ), in year ( t ); 
AFEEijkt = the AFs for auditor’s ( i ) client ( j ), in year ( t ); 
 
The variable (AFEE) indicates the total AFs of the client and is collected from the annual 
report. The numerator is the sum of the AFs of all ( Jik ) clients of audit firm ( i ) in 
industry ( k ), where the sector level of the industry is recognized as the Industry 
Classification Benchmark (ICB). The denominator in equation (1) is the numerator of  the 
sum of the AFs of all ( Jikt ) clients of audit firm in year ( t ) and industry ( k ), summed 
over all ( Ik ) audit firms (all Big 4 auditors) providing audits to that certain industry and 
year.   
 
3- SPECLST _ WEIGHTED: The final measure is recognized as a combination of a 
portfolio measure and a market share measure. This is a continuous variable and was 
recommended by Neal and Riley (2004). SPECLST _ WEIGHTED and is calculated as a  






4- SPECLST _MS_30: is a dichotomous variable, coded as ‘one’ if the auditor has a 
market share larger than 30% in each certain industry and ‘zero’ if otherwise. The market 
share cut off for specialization is recognized as at 30% without specialization, with each 
company having a market share of about 0.25 % (1 firm/4 firms = 0.25). The 0.25 % is 
multiplied by 1.20 to yield 30 % (Neal and Riley, 2004). This measure is calculated in the 
same way as Equation (1).  
 
5- SPECLST _ M_S_LEADER: This measure defines the auditor as the industry market 
leader.  
 
This is a dichotomous variable, is coded as ‘one’ if the incumbent auditor receives the 
largest market share in a certain industry, ‘zero’ if otherwise. This measure is calculated 
the same as Equation (1).  
 
Based on the calculation of the market share and the share of the portfolio approach, 
tables 4.5 and 4.6 give summary details about Big 4 auditor specialists by year and 
pooled samples respectively. By reviewing the years and pooled tables, as per the 
SPECLST _MS_30 definition, it can be considered that KPMG is the specialist in most 
industries, while EY is considered to specialise only in Food and Beverage, Basic 
Resources, Insurance, Real Estate, and Banks. DL has no clients in any industries, and 
PWC has only two industries - Banks and Financial Services, and they are less than 30 
percent.  In the period 2010 to 2013 (pooled), EY is a specialist in five industries: Food 
and Beverage, Basic, Resources, Banks, Insurance, and Real Estate, and KPMG is a 











Table 4.5: The auditor industry specialists (Big 4) (by year) 




DL PWC EY KPMG DL PWC EY KPMG 
1700 - - 60 40 - - 76.92 23.08 
2700 - - - 100 - - - 100 
2300 - - - 100 - - - 100 
3500 - - 50 50 - - 53.33 46.67 
5300 - - 50 50 - - 20 80 
5700 - - 31.91 68.09 - - 30.30 69.70 
6500 - - - 0 - - - 100 
8300 - 5.99 59.28 34.73 - 8.51 56.38 35.11 
8500 - - 45.45 54.55 - - 20.83 79.17 
8600 - - 52.57 46.43 - - 0 100 




















DL PWC EY KPMG DL PWC EY KPMG 
1700 - - 34.78 65.22 - - 71.43 28.57 
2700 - - - 100 - - - 100 
2300 - - - 100 - - - 100 
3500 - - 66.67 33.33 - - 63.64 36.36 
5300 - - 16.13 83.87 - - 22.28 77.72 
5700 - - 25 75 - - 25 75 
6500 - - - 0 - - - 100 
8300 - 6.52 67.39 26.09 - 7.61 63.04 29.35 
8500 - - 36.84 63.16 - - 52.94 47.06 
8600 - - 52.63 47.37 - - 46.67 53.33 
8700 - 22.86 - 77.14 - 28 - 72 
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Table 4.5: Continued 




DL PWC EY KPMG DL PWC EY KPMG 
1700 - - 8.38 4.81 - - 10.75 1.45 
2700 - - - 7.21 - - - 4.83 
2300 - - - 4.81 - - - 2.41 
3500 - - 3.91 4.80 - - 8.60 3.38 
5300 - - 5.59 4.80 - - 8.60 3.38 
5700 - - 8.38 15.38 - - 10.75 11.10 
6500 - - - 0 - - - 23.28 
8300 - 50 55.30 27.88 - 57.14 56.99 15.92 
8500 - - 8.38 8.65 - - 5.38 9.17 
8600 - - 8.30 6.25 - - 0 3.38 





DL PWC EY KPMG DL PWC EY KPMG 
1700 - - 5.71 9.04 - - 5.05 1.04 
2700 - - - 3.01 - - - 2.60 
2300 - - - 6.02 - - - 3.63 
3500 - - 7.14 3.01 - - 7.07 2.07 
5300 - - 3.57 15.66 - - 8.08 14.47 
5700 - - 5 12.65 - - 5.05 7.78 
6500 - - - - - - - 36.79 
8300 - 47.06 66.43 21.69 - 58.33 58.58 14.0 
8500 - - 5 7.23 - - 9.09 4.15 
8600 - - 7.14 5.42 - - 7.07 4.15 
8700 - 47.06 - 16.27 - 50.33 - 9.33 
ICB Code (levels of supersector): 1700- Basic Resources; 2700- Industrial Goods and 
Services; 3500- Food and Beverage; 5300- Retail, 5700- Travel and Leisure, 6500- 
Telecommunications; 8300-Banks; 8500- Insurance; 8600- Real Estate; 8700; Financial 
Services.  KPMG Fakhro; EY: Ernst & Young; PWC: Price Waterhouse Coopers; DL: 
Deloitte. The AFs are used as a basis to calculate the auditor's industry expertise. The 
following examples explain how the auditor industry expertise has been calculated. For the 
period 2010, the total AFs earned by EY in the Basic Resources industry amounted= 15,000 
and the total amount of the AFs of EY for all industries amounted= 179,000. During the same 
period, the combined AFs of all auditors (KPMG Fakhro, EY, PWC, and DL) in the Basic 
Resources industry amounted=25,000.The EY market share in the Basic Resources industry, 
2010= BHD 15,000/ BHD 25,000 * 100= 60 percent.  The EY portfolio share in the Basic 
Resources industry, 2010= BHD 15,000/ BHD179, 000 * 100=8.38 percent.  The industry 
expertise for other auditors and the subsequence years have also been calculated in a similar 
method. The auditor expertise mark in bold is where market shares are larger than 30 percent. 






Table 4.6: The Big 4 auditor industry specialist (by pool) 
ICB 
Code 
Expertise of the auditor Industry for 2010-2013 (in percentage) 
DL PWC EY KPMG 
MS PS MS PS MS PS MS PS 
1700 - - - - 55.88 7.44 44.12 3.90 
2700 - - - - - - 100 4.52 
2300 - - - - - - 100 4.13 
3500 - - - - 57.38 6.85 42.62 3.36 
5300 - - - - 24.61 5.87 75.38 11.87 
5700 - - - - 28.90 7.24 71.10 11.75 
6500 - - - - - - 100 15.39 
8300 - - 6.54 50.80 61.96 59.30 31.50 19.90 
8500 - - - - 38.71 7.04 61.29 7.35 
8600 - - - - 46.38 6.26 53.62 4.78 
8700 - - 23.48 49.21 - - 76.52 13.05 
ICB Code (levels of supersector): 1700- Basic Resources; 2700- Industrial Goods and 
Services; 3500- Food and Beverage; 5300- Retail, 5700- Travel and Leisure, 6500- 
Telecommunications; 8300-Banks; 8500- Insurance; 8600- Real Estate; 8700; Financial 
Services.  KPMG Fakhro; EY: Ernst & Young; PWC: Price Waterhouse Coopers; DL: 
Deloitte; MKS: market share, PFS: Portfolio share. The AFs are used as a basis to calculate the 
auditor's industry expertise. The following examples illustrate how the auditor industry 
expertise has been calculated. For the period 2010 to 2013, the total AFs received by EY in the 
Basic Resources industry amounted= BHD 38,000 and the total AFs of EY for all industries 
amounted= 511,000. During the same period, the combined AFs of all auditors (KPMG 
Fakhro, EY, PWC, and DL) in the Basic Resources industry amounted= BHD 68,000. The EY 
market share in the Basic Resources industry, 2010 to 2013= BHD 38,000/ BHD 68, 000 * 
100= 55.88 percent.  The EY portfolio share in the Basic Resources industry, 2010 to 2013= 
BHD 38,000/ BHD 511,000 * 100=7.44 percent. The EY weighted market share Basic 
Resources industry 2010 to 2013= 55.88 * 7.44/100 = 4.16. The industry expertise for other 
auditors has been calculated in a similar way. The auditor expertise mark in bold is consider to 
be a specialist according to the (SPECLST_MS_30) definitions (the auditors are considered to 











4.6.3.4 EM variables 
 
The current research uses the absolute value of discretionary accruals to measure the EM. 
The EM is the dependent variable in the second empirical investigation. According to 
Becker et al. (1998) the absolute value of discretionary accruals measures the activities of  
managers in opportunistic EM and reporting decisions by the managers. The total 
accruals are identified in order to measure discretionary accruals. There are 2 ways to 
calculate the total accrual accruals; it uses either the cash flow approach (Subramanyam, 
1996; Becker et al., 1998; Xie et al., 2003) or the traditional balance sheet approach 
(Healy, 1985; Dechow et al., 1995). Both methods are used widely in previous studies. 
However, Hribar and Collins (2002) indicate that the cash flow statement is a more 
accurate measure than the balance sheet approach when measuring the accruals for EM. 
They claim that when using the balance sheet approach to test for EM, there is potentially 
an error of measurement in the accruals estimates, which is likely to erroneously 
conclude that the EM exists when no such EM was detected. The Hribar and Collins 
(2002) study used the cash flow approach to compute the total accruals.  The 
discretionary accruals are calculated using a version of the cross section of the Jones 
Model (1991), the modified Jones Model (1991) by Dechow et al. (1995) and the 
performance adjusted model as suggested by Kothari et al (2005). DeFond and Jiambalvo 
(1994) indicate that the version of the cross section works as it is more appropriate than 
the time version model because of the small sample observations (Subramanyam, 1996). 
The source of data will be from the firms’ annual reports. 
 
4.6.3.4.1 Jones discretionary accrual models (DACC _JM) 
 
The discretionary accruals use two steps for measures. The first step is measuring the 
term of error in the model that denotes the discretionary component of accrual. This term 







The second step is to measure the accruals of non discretionary, using the model below. It  
measures the coefficients ά1, ά2, and ά3 using the Ordinary Least Squares regression for 
each year-industry (at least 6 companies in each industry).     
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t = year, t-1 refers to the prior year; 
TACCijt = total accruals for firm ( i ) , in year ( t ) and industry (  j  ), 
TAijt -1 = total assets for firm ( i ) ,  in year ( t-1 ) and industry (  j ); 
DACC ij = discretionary accruals of the firm ( i ) ,  in year ( t ) and industry (  j ); 
ΔRECijt = change in receivable for firm ( i ) ,  in year ( t ) and industry (  j ); 
PPEijt = year-end property, plant and equipment for firm ( i ) ,  in year ( t ) and industry ( 
j ); 
eijt = error term for sample firm ( i ) ,  in year ( t ) and industry (  j );  
 
The total accruals are calculated as net income before extraordinary items and earnings 
discontinued operations, minus the cash flows from operating activities. The industry is 
classified using the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB).   
  
4.6.3.4.2 Modified-Jones discretionary accrual models (DACC_MJM) 
 
The measurement of discretionary accruals under the modified Jones Model (1991) by 
Dechow et al. (1995) is comparatively similar to the original Jones model (1991), but it 









The accruals of non discretionary are measured using the following model; the steps are 
comparatively similar to Jones (1991), the original model. 
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Where: 
t = year, t-1 refers to the prior year; 
TACCijt = total accruals for firm ( i ) , in year ( t ) and industry (  j  ), 
TAijt -1 = total assets for firm ( i ) ,  in year ( t-1 ) and industry (  j ); 
DACC ij = discretionary accruals of the firm ( i ) ,  in year ( t ) and industry (  j ); 
ΔREVijt = change in revenues from the preceding year for firm ( i )  in year ( t ) and 
industry (  j ); 
ΔRECijt = change in receivable for firm ( i ) ,  in year ( t ) and industry (  j ); 
PPEijt = year-end property, plant and equipment for firm ( i ) ,  in year ( t ) and industry ( 
j ); 
eijt = error term for sample firm ( i ) ,  in year ( t ) and industry (  j );  
 
4.6.3.4.3 Performance Adjusted Discretionary Accruals models (DACC_ROA) 
 
Kothari et al. (2005) indicate that there are two approaches to control the performance of  
firms for measuring the accruals. The first method is matching the observations per firm-
year with another from the same industry and year with the closest return on assets 
(ROA) in the current. On the other hand, the performance of the firm, including ROA, 
can be contained in the regression of discretionary accruals as an additional variable. Due 








Similar steps are included in the second study. It starts with measuring of coefficients ά1, 
ά2, ά3 and ά4 using the Ordinary Least Squares regression for each year-industry to extract 
the non discretionary accruals. Then, the terms of error are measured as the difference 
between the accruals of non discretionary and the total accruals, which represents the 
discretionary component of accruals. This measure uses the following model; 
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t = year, t-1 refers to the prior year; 
TACCijt = total accruals for firm ( i ) , in year ( t ) and industry (  j  ), 
TAijt -1 = total assets for firm ( i ) ,  in year ( t-1 ) and industry (  j ); 
DACC ij = discretionary accruals of the firm ( i ) ,  in year ( t ) and industry (  j ); 
ΔREVijt = change in revenues from the preceding year for firm ( i )  in year ( t ) and 
industry (  j ); 
ΔRECijt = change in receivable for firm ( i ) ,  in year ( t ) and industry (  j ); 
PPEijt = year-end property, plant and equipment for firm ( i ) ,  in year ( t ) and industry ( 
j ); 
eijt = error term for sample firm ( i ) ,  in year ( t ) and industry (  j );  
ROAijt -1 = return on asset of the firm ( i ) ,  in year ( t-1 ) and industry (  j ); 
 
4.6.4 Model specifications and related control variables  
 
There are 3 models of AQ that have been used to test the relationship between the 
characteristics of the AC and the effectiveness of the BoD on AQ. The models are 
included as follows: the auditor industry specialist model, AFs and the NASFs models. 
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Also, the model of EM is used for examining the association between the AC, the BoDs, 
and AQ in constraining opportunistic earnings management. 
  
In addition to the independent variables discussed in this chapter, a number of control 
variables are included in this study to control the characteristics of the company which 
could affect the extent of EM. The inclusion of the variables of non GC to control other 
characteristics of the firm that can influence the EM is essential to ensure that the tests 
focus more specifically on the differences created by the variations in GC.  As this study 
aims to examine the relationship between the characteristics of Corporate Governance 
(Audit Committee and board of directors), and Audit Quality (by the external audit) in 
constraining Earnings Management, it is essential that other factors that influence EM are 
also controlled. 
 
It is difficult to control some of the factors in EM behavior, such as integrity, corporate 
culture and style of the management because they are problematic to measure 
(Archambeault, 2002). A review of previous research determines that, among the various 
incentives, ten variables are of particular relevance to this study. These twelve control 
variables are BLOCK, CFO, FORGN, INOWN, LEVERG, LNASSET, MTBV, 
NEWDIR, RETURN, GROWTH, LIQ and ROA. The related control variables and each 
of these models are described below. 
 
4.6.4.1 Model of AFs 
 
Simunic (1980) recommends that the AFs are a function of two main elements: (1) the 
expected future loss elements and (2) the quantity of resources. The first element refers to 
the possibility of expected future losses that the auditor may suffer, such as sanctions by 
litigation and regulatory agencies and the second element refers to the cost of the 
resources of audit related with audit hours or auditor effort. These 2 elements can be 
classified into 3 set of variables, recognized as risk-sharing, size, and the last is 
complexity (Simunic, 1980).   DeFond et al. (2000) recommend that the model of AFs 
that contain these variables is more robust across samples, higher explanatory power, 
time periods and countries.    
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Thus, the following models are used to examine the relationship between the AC and 
characteristics BoD, and AFs:  
 
LNAFEE =    + β1 C ND+ β2 CM  T+ β3 CS Z + β4 ACEXP 
+ β5 BRD XP+ β6  BRDM  T+ β7 BRDN D+β8  BRDS Z + β9 FORGN 
+β10 L V RG+ β11 LN SS T+ ε 








ACIND = coded as one if AC had solely NEDs; zero otherwise; 
ACMEET = the number of AC meetings for the year;  
ACSIZE = the total number of AC members; 
ACEXP = the proportion of AC members with accounting experience and financial 
qualification to AC size; 
BRDEXP = the proportion of directors on the AC with accounting or finance 
qualifications to board size; 
BRDMEET = the number of board meetings during the year; 
BDRNED = the composition/numbers of NEDs on BOD size; 




FORGN = proportion of foreign subsidiaries to total subsidiaries; 
LEVERG = Total liabilities divided by total assets; 




The selection of control variables captures the complexity, size, and sharing of risk 
factors (Simunic, 1980). These variables are comparatively similar to those adopted by 
Abbott and Parker’s (2003) study, which also examines the AC and board characteristics 
and AFs.  Menon and Williams (2001) indicate that the variable of the opinion of the 
audit is a proxy for sharing of risk; the current study replaces it with LEVERG. This 
study believes that the LEVERG variable is sufficient to represent the risk-sharing factor. 
The variable FORGN is proxy for the complexity of firm operation. FORGN is measured 
in terms of the number of foreign subsidiaries to total subsidiaries. 
 
Previous studies indicate that with the increasing complexities of companies’ business, 
the auditors may need to put more audit hours and efforts in dealing with complex 
business processes, which in turn lead to a rise of AFs (Simunic, 1980; Craswell and 
Francis, 1999; Carcello et al., 2002; Abbott et al., 2003b). These studies claim that the 
audit effort level increases with the number of transactions in subsidiaries and 
transactions within geographical coverage. This research expects these variables to be 
positively related to AFs.      
 
LNASSETS is defined as the natural logarithm of total assets and is a measure of the size 
of the firm (Simunic, 1980; Carcello et al., 2002; Abbott et al., 2003b).  As the size of the 
company increases, the scope of the audit through the auditors will increase.  Such 
extensive efforts increase AFs and hours of audit, and therefore the current research 
expects a positive association between AFs and total assets. 
 
The LEVERG variable is a proxy for sharing of risk factors, where LEVERGN is 
described as the proportion of debts to total assets and measures the financial condition of 
the clients. According to Pratt and Stice (1994), clients in poor financial situations may 
cause more failure of audits because companies suffering from weak financial situations 





Previous studies treated leverage as perceived auditor litigation risk (Pratt and Stice, 
1994; Simunic and Stein, 1996; Menon and Williams, 2001). The higher the risk of 
litigation, the higher the perception of auditors being included in the litigation. It has been 
claimed that  auditors can increase the AFs and audit effort in companies facing a high 
level of leverage, in order that the auditors have a trade off litigation risk. Thus, the 
LEVERGN is predicted as positively related to the AFs.  
4.6.4.2 Model of NASFs 
 
Parkash and Venable (1993) and Firth (1997) indicate that NASFs are the function of the 
audit’s complexity and risk, agency cost, and demand for advisory services.  
 
In line with these, this research uses the following model:  
 
     β0+ β1 C XP+ β2 C ND+ β3 CM  T+ β4 CS Z  + β5 BRDEXP 
+ β6 BRDM  T + β7 BRDN D +β8 BRDS Z  + β9 BLOCK+ β10  NOWN+ β11 
L V RG+β12 LN SS T+ β13N WD R+ β14 R TURN+ ε 













ACIND = coded as one if AC had solely NEDs; zero otherwise; 
ACMEET = the number of AC meetings for the year;  
ACSIZE = the total number of AC members; 
ACEXP = the proportion of AC members with accounting experience and financial 
qualification to AC size; 
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BRDEXP = the proportion of directors on the AC with accounting or finance 
qualifications to board size; 
BRDMEET = the number of board meetings during the year; 
BDRNED = the composition/numbers of NEDs on BOD size; 
BRDSIZE = the total numbers number of members existed in board during the year; 
  
Control variables:  
  
BLOCK = the cumulative percentage of outstanding common stock shares held by block 
holders holding at least 5 percent of such shares and who are unaffiliated with 
management;   
INOWN = the cumulative percentage of total shares owned by the directors of a firm; 
LEVERG = Total liabilities divided by total assets; 
LNASSET = the natural log of total assets; 
NEWDIR = coded as one if the new external director appointed to the firm during the 
year, zero otherwise; 
RETURN = the financial year total stock return; 
 
The selection of control is consistent with the Abbott et al. (2003a) study which examines 
the association between the characteristics of the BoD and AC, and non audit services. 
The previous studies found these variables to be significant in explaining the magnitude 
of  purchase of non audit services, which include LNASSET, NEWDIR, RETURN,  
LEVERG, BLOCK and INOWN (Parkash and Venable, 1993; Firth, 1997).  
 
The variables LEVERG, BLOCK and INOWN control costs of agency. The INOWN 
variable is measured by the percentage of total shares owned by the company’s directors 







Jensen and Meckling (1976) indicate that the lower the costs of the agency, the higher the  
levels of insider ownership, since the external directors owned firms will apparently 
realign their interests with the outside owners. Such alignment is probably to start more 
monitoring because the directors believe themselves to be more accountable for their 
actions, and therefore require a higher AQ. In line with this argument, this research 
predicts a negative association between FEE and INOWN. 
 
BLOCK  is defined as the cumulative percentage of outstanding common stock shares 
held by block holders holding at least 5 percent of such shares and who are unaffiliated 
with management. Parkash and Venable (1993) argue that when outside ownership is 
higher, the cost of agency declines because high investments by the ownership provide 
incentives for direct monitoring. More monitoring appears to reduce the purchase of non 
audit services, as it appears that higher non audit services obtained from the auditor's 
independence, lead to low AQ.  
 
Furthermore, Abbott et al. (2003a) argue that, because of the asymmetry of information 
between the outside block owners and management, the latter may have limited-access to 
insider information and therefore more probably rely on information provided by the 
management to facilitate the function of their own monitoring.  As there are two adverse 
claims with regards to the BLOCK variable, this research does not make any specific 
expectation about the association between FEE and BLOCK. 
 
RETURN is described as the total stock return for the financial year and it is a measure of 
the performance of the firm.  According to Houghton and Ikin (2001), a poor 
performance of firms is related to obsolescence of technology, inappropriate management 
strategies, lack of competitiveness, and inefficient and ineffective processing. These 
concerns may increase the motivation for companies to employ external consultants to 
get advice from the experts. In fact, Firth (1997) claims that companies with weak stock 
market return are more likely to ask for external advice on how to improve their 
performance. Therefore, this research predicts a positive association between the FEE 
and RETURN variables.  
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The new appointment of external NEDs (NEWDIR) is the variable related to non audit 
services (Firths, 1997). The current study predicts positive association between FEE and 
NEWDIR. 
 
LNASSET is known as the size of the company. The requirement for non-audit services 
increases as the company size expands (Houghton and Ikin, 2001; Firths, 1997).  When 
the size of the company is growing, the company becomes more complex, and therefore 
may require more non audit services. FEE is predicted to be positively related to 
LNASSET.  
 
LEVERG acts as a measure for the cost of agency.  Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue 
that the theory of agency indicates that managers have the motivation to transfer wealth 
from debt holders to shareholders using various procedures. Moreover, when the debt 
amount is increased, the incentive for wealth will be transferred from the debt holders to 
shareholders, and the result will be an increased demand for independent auditora 
(DeFond, 1992; Francis and Wilson, 1988; Simunic and Stein, 1987; Palmrose, 1986a). 
In other words, companies that suffer from high leverage are more likely to demand more 
independence from their auditor or a higher AQ.  Since previous studies indicate that the 
independence of auditors decreases as the amount of the purchase of non audit services 














4.6.4.3 Model industry specialist  
 
Previous studies model the auditor specialist as a function of the cost of agency, firm 
business risk and audit complexities (DeFond, 1992 Firth and Smith, 1992; Francis and 
Wilson, 1988). In line with these, this research measures the following model:  
 
SP C_ UD  β0 + β1 C XP+ β2 C ND+ β3 CM  T +β4 ACSIZE 
+ β5 BRD XP+ β6 BRDM  T+ β7 BRDN D+β8 BRDS Z + β9   NOWN+ β10 LEVERG 
+β11 LN SS T+ β12 RO + ε 






SPEC _AUD = (SPECLST _M_S_LEADER), (SPECLST _MS_30), (SPECLIST _M_S), 




ACIND = coded as one if AC had solely NEDs; zero otherwise; 
ACMEET = the number of AC meetings for the year;  
ACSIZE = the total number of AC members; 
ACEXP = the proportion of AC members with accounting experience and financial 
qualification to AC size; 
BRDEXP = the proportion of directors on the AC with accounting or finance 
qualifications to board size; 
BRDMEET = the number of board meetings during the year; 
BDRNED = the composition/numbers of NEDs on BOD size; 






Control variables:  
  
INOWN = the cumulative percentage of total shares owned by the directors of a firm; 
LEVERG = Total liabilities divided by total assets; 
LNASSET = the natural log of total assets; 
ROA = return on assets; 
 
The selection of control variables are comparatively similar to those adopted by Chen et 
al. (2005) and Abbott and Parker (2000), and include ROA, LEVERG, LNASSET and 
INOWN.  The theoretical foundation for these variables comes from prior studies on big e 
auditors (Firth and Smith, 1992; DeFond, 1992; Francis and Wilson, 1988).  
 
LEVERG, LN (ASSETS), and INOWN act as proxies of the agency variables.  INOWN 
is acts as a measure for insider ownership, and there are two basic types of claims to 
describe the association between SPEC _AUD and INOWN. The first claim indicates 
that, as insider ownership increases, the directors get more detailed internal information 
about companies (Firth, 1997), and therefore have less need for higher AQ. This claim 
leads to a negative correlation between SPEC _AUD and INOWN. The second claim 
indicates that as the insider ownership increases, the interests of external stakeholders 
align with the interests of directors; this leads to the monitoring of management 
procedures (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). As they see themselves as part of the structure 
of the company, they require a higher AQ, such as hiring specialist auditors.  
 
This research expects a positive association between INOWN and SPEC_AUD (Abbott 









LEVERG measures the total liabilities divided by total assets. When leverage  increases, 
the costs of agency also increase due to the possibility of raising the wealth of 
transferrable debt holders to shareholders. Such conditions create demand for higher AQ 
to verify the accounting figures in debt held by reducing the information asymmetry 
between managers and holders of the debt. In addition to Chen et al. (2005) and Abbott 
and Parker (2000), this research controls LEVERG to measure the costs of agency in the 
auditor specialist model. This research predicts that LEVERG will be positively 
correlated with the engagement of auditors’ specialists. 
 
LNASSET acts as a proxy for the size of the company. Chen et al. (2005) claim that the 
large companies are more likely to engage with higher AQ, since the costs of agency 
increase with the growth of the size of the company (Firth and Smith, 1992; Francis and 
Wilson, 1988). The higher the costs of the agency, the higher requirement there will be 
for  auditors' specialists.  This research expects a positive correlation between SPEC 
_AUD and LNASSET.      
 
ROA acts as a measure of risk and client profitability. Referring to Abbott and Parker 
(2000), profitable companies are more likely to engage in specialist auditors because they 
are ready to pay a premium fee.   In additional, ROA also acts as a proxy for sharing of 
risk. Previous studies indicate that companies that have a high level of risk are more 
likely to engage in high AQ in order to signal their credibility to outsiders (Copley and 
Douthett, 2002; Hogan, 1997; Datar et al., 1991). These studies claim that the demand for 
higher quality auditors increases with the firm risk. Since there are two possible 
arguments, there are no predictions made for this variable. These studies claim that the 









4.6.4.4 Model of EM  
 
The EM model conducted by Bédard et al. (2004) and Klein (2002) examines the 
effectiveness of the characteristics of AC and the board and the AQ on opportunistic 
earnings.  In line with these, this research will use the following model:  
 
D CC  β0 + β1 C XP+ β2 C ND+ β3 CM  T+ β4 CS Z + β5 AQ 
+ β6 BRD XP + β7 BRDM  T + β8 BRDN D + β9 BRDS Z  + β10 BLOCK+ β11 CFO+ 










ACIND = coded as one if AC had solely NEDs; zero otherwise; 
ACMEET = the number of AC meetings for the year;  
ACSIZE = the total number of AC members; 
ACEXP = the proportion of AC members with accounting experience and financial 
qualification to AC size; 
Audit Quality proxies = LN (AFEE), LN (NAF), LN (TOTALFEES), (FEERATIO 1), 
(FEERATIO 2), (SPECLST _M_S_LEADER), (SPECLST _MS_30), (SPECLST _M_S), 
(SPECLST _P_S) and (SPECLST _WEIGHTED) 
BRDEXP = the proportion of directors on the AC with accounting or finance 
qualifications to board size; 
BRDMEET = the number of board meetings during the year; 
BDRNED = the composition/numbers of NEDs on BOD size; 






BLOCK = the cumulative percentage of outstanding common stock shares held by block 
holders holding at least 5 percent of such shares and who are unaffiliated with 
management;   
INOWN = the cumulative percentage of total shares owned by the directors of a firm; 
LEVERG = Total liabilities divided by total assets; 
LNASSET = the natural log of total assets; 
CFO = cash flow from operating activities scaled by lagged total assets; 
MTBV = the market to book value ratio; 
 
The selection of control variables are comparatively similar to those adopted by Bédard 
et al. (2004) and Klein (2002), and involve (CFO), (MTBV), (BLOCK), (INOWN), 
(LNASSET) and (LEVERG).   The majority of previous studies on manipulation of 
earnings found these variables to be significantly associated with the level of 
discretionary accruals (Park and Shin, 2004; Ferguson et al., 2004).  
 
In a similar way to the models of auditor specialist and non-audit services fees, the 
variables (BLOCK) and (INOWN) are grounded in agency theory. When the level of 
managerial or insider ownership increases, they are more aligned with external 
shareholder's interests and therefore, less likely to pursue opportunistic behavior at the 
expense of the shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  Evidence indicates that 
managers of firms with the highest level of ownership are more likely to report reliable 
earnings (Warfield et al., 1995). This condition appears since they consider themselves as 
part of the company, and thus, they have more responsibility for their actions. In line with 









LN(ASSET) is described as a proxy for the size of the company. The larger the size of 
the company, the more likely that the manager will manipulate the earnings of the 
company. Watt and Zimmerman (1990) indicate that the higher costs of politics are 
associated with the large companies and therefore there is more incentive to manipulate 
the reported earnings to prevent political actions. Evidence from other literature also 
indicates a positive correlation between EM and size (DeFond and Park, 1997; Becker et 
al., 1998). However, Park and Shin (2004) give a different claim. They argue that large 
companies are followed by the external capital market, and are therefore less able to hide 
the manipulation of earnings because they are monitored closely by analysts and the 
press. This indicates a negative correlation between (DACC) and LN(ASSET). The 
mixed claims indicate the absence of a clear direction on the relationship between 
(DACC) and LN(ASSET). 
 
(LEVERG) is described as a proxy for the violation of debt covenants. Duke and Hunt 
(1990) and Press and Weintrop (1990) argue that a company with high leverage is more 
likely to be involved with the violation of debt covenants. This is because as the level of 
debt rises, the company could face more severe accounting constraints and this in turn 
increases the likelihood of violation of debt covenants. Various studies indicate that when 
avoiding the violation of restrictive debt covenants, higher leveraged companies are more 
likely to select accounting procedures that support increasing income (Bowen et al., 
1981; Dhaliwal et al., 1982).    Furthermore, DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) and Jiang et 
al. (2008) indicate that high-leveraged companies have more incentive to make income 
by increasing discretionary accruals; the reason of this is to avoid the violation of debt 
covenants. This claim may indicate a positive correlation between EM and leverage. 
DeAngelo et al. (1994) argue that when companies are in or nearing financial distress, 
they may engage in contractual re-negotiations with lenders that intentionally reduce the 
reported earnings. This situation may indicate negative correlation between EM and 
leverage.  Park and Shin (2004) and Yang et al. (2008) found a negative correlation 





They claim that high-leveraged companies could be less able to practice their EM 
because they are under close scrutiny of the lenders. As a result of these various 
arguments, the direction of this variable is not predicted for this research. 
 
(MTBV) acts as a proxy for growth opportunities and is known as the 'market to book' 
value ratio. Matsumoto (2002) and Skinner and Sloan (2002) indicate that managers of 
the companies with the highest growth opportunities face the greatest pressure to achieve 
the earnings targets. Therefore, the higher 'the market to book' values of equity ratio, the 
higher levels of incentive for managers to manipulate earnings. In line with Collin and 
Kothari (1989), Gaver and Gaver (1993), and Klein (2002), this research predicts positive 
correlation between (MTBV) and EM. 
 
From the theory of agency, (BLOCK) or institutional investors could be an alternative 
monitoring incentive. Monks and Minow (1995) indicate that institutional investors have 
the ability to monitor the actions and decisions of management and influence resources, 
discipline, and opportunity. When outside ownership is concentrated, such as gathering 
information, this encourages management to achieving better results, and collective 
shareholdings provide institutional investors with more incentive to monitor operations 
(Chung et al., 2002). In other words, when the shareholdings of institutional investors 
increases, this is more likely to constrain management opportunistic behavior, and this in 
turn reduces EM. In line with Bédard et al (2004) and Klein (2002), (BLOCK) is 
predicted to be negatively related with the level of opportunistic earnings.  
 
(CFO) acts as a cash flow from operating activities of the company scaled by lagged total 
assets. Managers with less cash flow have a greater incentive to manipulate earnings by 
delaying the current costs or by reporting on future earnings in order to report that they 
are in a good financial situation (Leuz et al., 2003).  This claim indicates negative 
correlation between (DACC) and (CFO), in line with the evidence documented by Becker 
et al. (1998). On the other hand, companies with high cash flow also manipulate earnings 
or do not declare strong performance through the creation of a reserve for future needs 




The Han Wang study (1998) also supports this. They argue that oil refining companies 
that have benefited from high oil prices use income decreasing accruals to decrease the 
possibility of political risk. In addition, Frankel et al. (2002) claim that  companies that 
have a high cash flow are more likely to overcome the earnings benchmark.  This 
indicates a positive correlation between EM and performance of the firm, but as the  
claims are mixed, no direction for this variable was concluded. 
 
4.6.5 The procedures of data analysis  
 
For data analysis, the statistical software SPSS and Stata13 are used. Data analysis 
includes  multivariate regression, robustness tests correlation, and descriptive statistics. 
All of them will be described below. 
4.6.5.1 Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
 
Descriptive statistics are used to describe the sample data on a single variable in an 
organized form. It contains the first quartile, third quartile, standard deviation, median, 
mean, minimum, maximum, kurtosis and skewness. The kurtosis and skewness describe 
the form of the data distribution. In particular, the kurtosis provides an indication of the 
flatness or peakedness of the distribution relative to the normal distribution, while 
skewness indicates a symmetrical distribution (Hair et al., 2010). The first quartile, third 
quartile, standard deviation, median, and mean measure the central tendency relating to 
statistics. The correlation between the variables is given by the pair-wise correlation 
matrix. This describes the degree of linear relationship between two variables. The 
correlation coefficient can range from range from -1 to +1, with +1 indicating a perfect 
positive correlation, -1 indicating a perfect negative correlation and zero indicating no 
correlation at all.  Nevertheless, according to Hair et al. (2010), the high level of 
intercorrelations among the independent variables may cause several problems of 
multicollinearity when the coefficient of correlation values are exceeding  0.90.  
Multicolinearity could affect the predictive power of the model of regression as well as 





4.6.5.2 Multivariate regression 
 
Multivariate regression in previous studies uses ordinary least square estimators to 
examine the correlation between one dependent variable and several independent 
variables (predictors).  However, there are 5 basic assumptions that have to be made for 
the ordinary least square estimator model to be valid (Gujarati, 2003; Chen et al., 2003; 
Hair et al., 2010).  
 
These assumptions contain: (1) Homogeneity of variance (Homoscedasticity) - the error 
variance should be constant (2) Multicollinearity - there must be no linear relationship 
among the variables (3) Independent - the errors term associated with a single 
observation should not be associated with any other errors of observation (4) Linearity - 
the correlation between the outcome and predictors variables should be linear (5) 
Normality – the errors should be normally distributed.   
 
In addition to these assumptions, Chen et al. (2006) indicate that the analyst consider any 
influential and unusual data that can make a difference in the estimation of coefficients.   
When the five assumptions are violated, the results of estimators of ordinary least-square 
may be biased and distorted (Gujarati, 2003; Chen et al., 2003; Hair et al., 2010).  
 
Various regression estimators, such as robust estimator, quantile estimator, least square 
estimator with robust standard error, and weighted least square (WLS) estimator or 
generalized least square (GLS) provide an alternative to the ordinary least-square 
estimator when the assumptions are violated. For instance, when the assumption of 
normality has not been achieved and the outliers moderate, the robust estimator will 









In the presence of serial correlation and heteroscedasticity, either the robust standard 
error with least square estimator or the generalized least-squares estimator are capable of  
reweighting the contrast error to correct autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity (Gujarati, 
2003; Adkins and Hill, 2007). Furthermore, the estimator of Nonparametric, such as the 
Quantile estimator disregards all the ordinary least-square assumptions (Gujarati, 2003). 
In general, this research found that most of the assumptions of the ordinary least-square 
are not sufficiently carried out, even though various steps were taken to comply with 
these assumptions (for instance, using transformation of data).  
 
Many statisticians agree that light violations of the ordinary least-square assumptions are 
unaffected and robust in many cases (Newman et al., 1989; Glass and Hopkins, 1984; 
Glass et al., 1972; Box, 1953). Therefore, in the main analysis of this research, most of 
the estimator’s models will be analyzed using the ordinary least-square estimator, except 
the heteroscedastic models, where the use of ordinary least-square estimator might be 
highly questionable.   
 
Where the models show clear heteroscedasticity, the analysis used the least square 
regression with robust standard error. This regression is estimated using Huber-White or 
sandwich (standard errors) estimator. This can be explained in the same way as the 
ordinary least square estimator, but it is more efficient and accurate than the ordinary 
least square regression and has the ability to correct the autocorrelation and 
heteroscedasticity (Adkins and Hill, 2007). In sensitivity analysis, the alternative 
estimation methods can be used as benchmarks for comparison. 
 
Ordinary least-square estimator applies when the dependent variable acts as a continuous 
variable. However, when the dependent variable acts as a dichotomous variable , the 
estimator of ordinary least square may not be able to meet the assumptions of the 
ordinary least square, and this can lead to ineffective estimates (Menard, 2002; Pampel, 
2000). When response data are dichotomous, transforming the dichotomous 




As indicated by Menard (2002): 
“In particular with a dichotomous dependent variable, assumptions of 
normality, linearity, and homoskedasticity are violated, and ordinary least-
square estimates are inefficient at best. The maximum likelihood estimation 
of a logistic estimator overcomes this inefficiency, transforming Y ( 1, 0) 
into a logistic (log of the odds of falling into the “1”category).”  
 
Therefore, taking into consideration these conditions, when the dependent variable is 
dichotomous, a multivariate estimator is used to estimate the heteroskedastic ordinal 
estimator as a control for heteroscedasticity (Williams, 2009). When conducting the 
sensitivity analysis, the probit estimator is used as an alternative regression. According to 
Pampel (2000), probit and logistic estimator models tend to produce very similar 
predictions, and it is up to the researcher to select one of these estimators.  Various tests 
will be conducted after the multivariate estimator analysis. The reason for the additional 
tests is to confirm the robustness of the main results to the alternative model 
specifications. The tests of robustness include tests for various definitions of CG 
characteristics, various regression estimators, tests for additional control endogeneity and 
variables multicollinearity and heteroscedasticity. 
 
To test the multicollinearity, the current study applies the variance inflation factor (VIF) 
and correlation coefficient tests. The VIF and tolerance factor of each characteristics of 
the ACs and BoDs, AQ and EM variables are calculated. If variables have VIF values 
more than 10 or less than the tolerance values of 0.10, then they are considered to have 
the problem of multicollinearity (Gujarati, 2003). Hair et al. (1998) and Kennedy (2008) 
indicates that a VIF of more than 10 shows harmful multicollinearity. 
 
In view of the above discussion, the tests are conducted against Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) assumptions. Non-parametric tests are adopted in this study to analyze the data. 
This is because the data from this study does not meet the required conditions for 







Under the violation of normality, Ordinary Least Squares estimates are ineffective 
(Greene, 2007). The standard errors estimated are inconsistent and biased, and therefore, 
test statistics are inconsistent and biased (Greene, 2007; Baltagi, 2001). Provided that 
coefficients are constant over time, estimates using pooled regression becomes more 
efficient.  Also, estimating the pool is a simple way to check the sensitivity of the results 
to alternative specifications (Beaver, 1998). The main advantage of pooled regression 
over the cross-section is that it allows greater flexibility in modeling differences in 
samples of  particular behavior (Greene, 2007). 
 
Another reason for preferring the Generalize least square (GLS) regression over pooled 
Ordinary Least Squares regression is because there is no serial correlation in pooled 
Ordinary Least Squares - an important assumptions of homoscedasticity (Greene, 2007). 
For the estimator to be produced unbiased and consistent, pooled Ordinary Least Squares 
requires the errors in each time period to be uncorrelated with the independent variables 
in the same time period.  A Generalized least square regression has the additional 
advantage that it corrects for the omitted variable bias, heteroskedasticity and the 



















The current chapter started with a discussion about the research methodology and 
research paradigm. The methodology that has been adopted is justified by the objectivist 
(realism) ontological position. According to this methodology, this research adopts 
quantitative methods to increase confidence in the results. One important way of trying to 
understand the mechanisms of the CG and the practices of EM in the initial phase and of 
independent audit is to use a quantitative method, as it is applied in this study.  In 
addition, quantitative methods are not only meaningful in order to get an accurate image 
of the nature of the issue, but also to provide a deeper understanding of the phenomenon 
(Cooper and Schindler, 2003). For instance, Filatotchev and Nakajima (2010) propose an 
understanding of CG relying on the variety of information published, for example the 
firms’ annual reports. Therefore, quantitative methods will be implemented in order to 
enhance the quality of the data and seek to fill the gap in the literature. Furthermore, the 
quantitative approach gives this research the ability to examine theory with a large 
sample size, and enable it to get an in depth understanding of the research problems.   
 
The initial sample consists of the Bahrain Stock Exchange of 192 firm-year observations 
for the period 2010-2013. After eliminating some firms, firms that are suspended from 
operating and firms were not audited by auditors of Big 4, the final sample consisted of 
152 and 148 firm year observations for 2 empirical investigations. The data was collected 
from firms’ annual reports, Thomson One Banker and by telephone. Furthermore, the 
description of 3 main groups of hypothesis variables has been also explained in this 
chapter: (1) the characteristics of the AC and the BoDs (include: composition, size, level 
of activities and expertise), (2) the AQ proxies (include: AFs, NASF and industry-
specialist auditors), and (3) EM. Table No.4.7 provides a summary of the variables used 
in this research. Most analysis use the least square estimator with robust standard error 









Table 4.7: Summary of all variables  




The composition/numbers of 





The proportion of AC members 
with accounting experience and 






The number of board meetings 
during the year 
Annual 
report 
BRDSIZE BoDs size The total number of members 






The proportion of AC members 
with accounting experience and 






Coded as one if AC had sole 









LNAFEE AFs The natural log of AFs Telephone/ 
Annual 
report 
FEERATIO 1 NASFs The fee ratio of non-audit 




FEERATIO 2 NASFs The fee ratio of non-audit 




LNNAF NASFs Natural log of NASFs Telephone 
/Annual 
report 
LNTOTALFEES NASFs Natural logarithm of the sum of 




SPECLIST_M_S Auditors specialist 
in the industry 
 
Continuous variable which 








in the industry 
 
Coded as one if the auditor 
earned the largest market share 













in the industry 
 
Continuous variable which 
equals the compliment between  
portfolio share (SPECLST _P_S)  
and auditor market share 






SPECLST_MS_30 Auditors specialist 
in the industry 
 
Coded as one if the auditor's 
market share exceeds 30 percent 






SPECLST _P_S Specialist Auditors  
in the industry 
 
Continuous variable which 









DACC_MJM EM Discretionary accruals based on 
Modified Jones model 
Annual 
report 
DACC_ROA EM Discretionary accruals by 
Kothari et al. (2005), involving 
lagged ROA in the accrual 
regression to control for the 
performance of the company 
Annual 
report 
BLOCK Block holder 
ownership 
The cumulative percentage of 
outstanding common stock 
shares held by block holders 
holding at least 5 percent of such 
shares and who are unaffiliated 





Proportion of foreign subsidiaries 
to total subsidiaries 
Annual 
report 
INOWN BoD  
ownership 
The cumulative percentage of 
total shares owned by the 
directors of a firm 
Annual 
report 




LNASSET Total asset The natural logarithm of Total 















Table 4.7  (continued) 
CFO  Cash flow  Cash flow from operating activities 
scaled by lagged total assets 
Annual 
report 
GROWTH  Sales growth  Growth rate in sales over the 
previous fiscal year 
Annual 
report 




MTBV Growth The market to book value ratio Annual 
report 
NEWDIR New external 
director 
Coded as one if there was a new 
external director appointed to the 






































THE RESULTS OF THE FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS: THE 




This chapter provides the results of the first empirical analysis of the ACs and BoDs 
characteristics and their relationship to AQ. There are 3 proxies of AQ to be examined, 
namely the AFs, the non audit services fees and the use of auditor’s specialists in the 
industry (SPEC _AUD).  
 
This chapter is structured as follows: the next section provides descriptive statistics and 
correlation matrix. This is followed by separate sections on multivariate test results and a 
sensitivity analysis for each proxy. The final section summarizes and concludes the 
chapter. 
 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 5.1 provide descriptive statistics for the three measures of the AQ - auditor 
independence or non-audit services measures (LNTOTALFEES, LNNAF, FEERATIO 1 
and FEERATIO 2), audit fees LN(AFEE), and auditor industry specialist measures 
(SPECLST _WEIGHTED, SPECLST_M_S, SPECLST_P_S, SPECLST_M_S_LEADER 
and, SPECLST _MS_30), the hypothesis variables (ACMEET, ACEXP, ACIND, 
ACSIZE, BRDMEET, BRDEXP, BRDNED, BRDSIZE) and the related control variables 
that contain the mean, median, standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis, minimum and 








The following descriptive statistics are important to highlight. The mean (median) of 
audit and non-audit services fees for 152 firm-years were BHD 8.856 million (BHD 
8.000 million) and BHD 7.467 million (BHD 5.000 million) respectively. Non-audit 
services fees have captured nearly 46.97 % of the total audit fees. In a United Kingdom 
study, O’ Sullivan (2000) found that the mean (median) of audit and non-audit fees for 
the largest 402 firms in the financial year of 1992 were 0.638 million British pounds 
(0.279 million British pounds) and 0.320 million British pounds (0.144 million British 
pounds) respectively. In comparison with the O’Sullivan (2000) study, this study found 
that the AFs (BHD 8.856 million) have increased 1288 % and the non-audit services fees 
(BHD 7.467 million) of Bahraini firms have grown by about 2233%, which indicates the 
importance of non-audit services as an alternative income source for auditors.  These 
statistics support Lee's (2008) argument that non-audit services seems to be associated 
with luxury income as it has a higher profit margin than audit fees.   
 
The mean (median) ratio of non-audit services fees to total fees (FEERATIO 1) and ratio 
of non-audit services fees to total audit fees (FEERATIO 2) are 0.409 (0.410) and 0.798 
(0.700) respectively. Under SPECLST _MS_30 and SPECLST _M_S_LEADER 
definitions, 80.9 % and 65.1 % of the firms, respectively, have engaged the services of an  
industry specialist auditor.  
 
The mean (median) of the total cumulative percentage of block holders (BLOCK) and 
total shares owned by the directors of a firm (INOWN) are 78.097 % (58.200 %) and 
4.285 % (0.000 %) respectively. O’Sullivan (2000) split the shares of the block 
shareholders into external and institutional shareholders and the directors into non-
executive and executive directors. To make a comparison, the current study presents the 
mean (median) of the O’Sullivan (2000) study, as he reported that the mean (median) of 
the shares owned by external shareholders at about 31.292 % (21.640 %), while the 







In comparison with the O’Sullivan (2000) study, the mean (median) of the BLOCK of the 
current study is higher and INOWN is comparatively similar to that reported by 
O’Sullivan. The change in the mean (median) may be due to different definitions of the 
variables. The  O’Sullivan (2000) study defines BLOCK as the block holders holding at 
least 3 % of the shares and the current study defines this at 5 % of the shares.  Allowing 
for the time difference from the earlier United Kingdom study, it shows that there is not a 
lot of change in the pattern of ownership of directors. 
 
The mean (median) of the total cumulative percentage of leverage is 14.5 % (10 %), 
which is comparatively less than that reported in Australia. Chen et al. (2005) reported 
that the total percentage of the mean (median) leverage for the 458 Australian firms was 
48.84 % (44.42 %). The lower leverage may indicate that the firms in the Kingdom of 
Bahrain have lower risk levels than firms in Australia. In terms of the performance of the 
firm, total of the ROA mean (median) is 3.959 (2.92). 
 
The variables for the BoD show that the average board size is 6, which is less than the 
figure reported by Peasnell et al. (2005), at between 8 and 9. The total percentage of  
independent non-executive directors on boards is 2.73 %. The percentage of the BoDs 
with experience and financial or accounting qualifications is 2.74 % and the total meeting 
of the board is 4 times a year. This can be compared to the United States studies by 
Carcello et al. (2002) and Abbott et al. (2003) who report that the total percentage of the 
non-executive directors on boards are 75 % and 68.2 % respectively, and that on average 
meetings of the board are held 7 times per year. This comparison indicates that the United 
States firms are more likely to be controlled by non-executive directors, while in the 
Kingdom of Bahrain  members of the board have an almost balanced representation of 








With respect to the variables of the AC, the mean (median) of the size of the AC is 3.960 
(4.000). 76 % of the samples report that their ACs consists solely of independent non-
executive directors with a total percentage of only 2.11 % of them having financial and 
accounting expertise. The average frequency of the meetings of the AC is 4 times per 
year. In the United States, Abbott et al. (2003) report that 75 % of their samples had 
committees of audit consisting solely of independent non-executive directors, and 80 % 
had at least 1 financial expert. This indicates that the proportions of firms that have a 
solely independent AC percentage of members are comparatively similar in the United 
Kingdom and United States.  However, the percentage of firms that have at least one 
member of the audit committee equipped with financial expertise in the Kingdom of 
Bahrain are comparatively lower than what is reported in the United States. One possible 
reason for this is because the Bahraini listed companies have a lack of experience 
applying the AC and board systems because the CG code has been relatively recently 
established.  
 
The mean (median) of LNASSET in natural logarithm form is 5.335 (4.700). The mean 
(median) of the RETURN is 0.030 (0.000). In the past, Firth (1997) reported that for the 
500 largest UK industrial firms in 1993 (listed companies ranked in The Times in 1000), 
the means of the RETURN was 0.43. Abbott et al. (2003) reported that the means of 
RETURN is 0.0415.  In comparison with previous studies, the mean of the RETURN 
which is documented in this study is relatively lower. This difference may be due to 
differences in the sample. The listed companies in (The Times 1000) and the sample 
examined by Abbott et al (2003a) may include both smaller and the larger companies. 
This study examined both the small and the large 38 listed companies in the Bahrain 
Stock Exchange, therefore, on average, larger companies have a more stable return of the 








The NEWDIR is dichotomous variables. The previous variable is connected with special 
events that require non-audit services. The means of the NEWDIR is 0.140.  Specifically, 
there are 152 firm-years in which new directors were appointed. Abbott et al. (2003a) and 
Firth (1997) reported that the means of the previous variable is 0.09 for NEWDIR. The 
total numbers of foreign subsidiaries approximately is 26 %. The Australian and United 
Kingdom studies, Chen et al (2005) and O’Sullivan (2000) reported that the total 
numbers of subsidiaries in the samples are 27.72 and 23.686 respectively. This indicates 
that the levels of the complexities of the companies in Australia and the United Kingdom 
are relatively similar. 
 
As shown in the columns of kurtosis and skewness in Table 5.1, most of the variables are 
not normally distributed. The normal distribution expecta the value 0 and above and 
below 0 denotes departures from normality. To get to the normal distribution, many 
variables are been transformed such as (LNASSET, LNAFEE) using the natural 
logarithm. One of the possibilities that violates the assumption of normality may cause 
the problem of heteroscedasticity. Diagnostics on the problem of heteroscedasticity will 
be provided in a later section.  
 
5.2 The correlation matrix 
 
This section will provide the correlation matrix for all variables that been used in the AQ 
models (see Table 5.2). The related control variables and the hypotheses variables are 
measured by 3 proxies of AQ, namely AQ- auditor independence or non-audit services 
measures (LNTOTALFEES, LNNAF, FEERATIO 1 and FEERATIO 2), auditor 
specialist in the industry measures (SPECLST_WEIGHTED, SPECLST_M_S, 
SPECLST_P_S, SPECLST _M_S_LEADER and, SPECLST _MS_30), and AFs 
LN(AFEE). It is always expected the highest correlations among the measurements of the 
AQ because they are highly interrelated.  Only one measure of AQ in the empirical test 






In general, the correlation matrix shows that all the measures of the AQ with all variables 
(ACMEET, ACEXP, ACIND, ACSIZE, BRDMEET, BRDEXP, BRDNED, BRDSIZE, 
and the related control variable) are inter correlated with one another and with the 
exception of variables LNTOTALFEES and LNAFEE with LNASSET (coefficients of 
correlation of -0.30 % for LNTOTALFEES and 4.1 % for LNAFEE). The 
LNTOTALFEES, FEERATIO 1 and FEERATIO 2 are insignificantly correlated with 
four of the AC variables and board variables, while LNNAF is significantly correlated 
with one board variable, and insignificantly correlated with four of the AC variables. 
 
BRDEXP is negatively correlated with LNTOTALFEES and LNNAF with coefficients 
of correlation -6.8 % and -4.6 % respectively, suggesting that the firms with a higher 
proportion of the members of the board with financial expertise are likely to report lower 
total fees and non-audit services fees. BRDMEET is insignificantly and negatively 
correlated with LNTOTALFEES and LNNAF (correlation coefficients are -2.4 % and-
11.1 % respectively). LNNAF are positively correlated with BRDSIZE and significantly 
and positively correlated with BRDNED. LNTOTALFEES is positively correlated with 
BRDSIZE and BRDNED. The positive correlation between BRDNED and LNNAF are 
consistent with O’Sullivan (2000). ACIND is positively correlated with LNNAF and 
LNTOTALFEES, and negatively with FEERATIO 2, while ACSIZE is insignificantly 
and positively correlated with LNTOTALFEES and positively correlated with LNNAF.  
 
LNAFEE is insignificantly correlated with all the variables of AC and insignificantly 
with all the variables of the board. The correlation coefficients range is between -67 % 
and 15.9 %. LNAFEE is insignificantly and negatively correlated with ACMEET, and 
positively correlated with ACIND and ACSIZE. The values of their correlation 
coefficients are -67.0 % for ACMEET, 6.6 % for ACIND and 1.9 % for ACSIZE, 
suggesting that the firms who have more AC members (consisting solely of independent 







However, the AC expertise (ACEXP) was found negatively correlated with LNAFE and 
this is consistent with Krishnan and Visvanathan (2009) study. LNAFEE is negatively 
correlated with BRDEXP (correlation coefficients is -5.4 %) and positively correlated 
with BRDSIZE and BRDNED (correlation coefficients are 9.5 % and 15.9 respectively). 
The positive correlation between LNAFEE and BRDNED is consistent with the finding 
with Carcello et al. (2002), Abbott et al. (2003b) 
 
The coefficients of correlation of the specialist auditors in the industry with the variables 
of the AC and board are mixed, depending on how the data of the industry-specialist 
auditor has been calculated. They are either marginally insignificantly correlated or in 
opposite directions with variables of the AC and board. For example, BRDEXP is 
negatively correlated with SPECLST_M_S, SPECLST_MS_30 and 
SPECLST_M_S_LEADER (correlation coefficients are -35.3 %, -25.7 %, -23.7% 
respectively), while is also positively correlated with SPECLST_P_S (the correlation 
coefficient is 37.9%). BRDSIZE is found positively correlated with all the industry-
specialist auditor measures except for SPECLST_M_S and SPECLST_MS_30, which 
were found negatively correlated with BRDSIZE. BRDNED is negatively correlated with 
SPECLST_M_S, SPECLST_MS_30 and SPECLST_M_S_LEADER, but positively 
correlated with SPECLST_P_S.   
  
For the variables of the AC, ACIND is found to be significantly and positively correlated 
only with SPECLST_P_S. ACMEET is positively correlated with all the industry-
specialist auditor measures, while ACEXP is significantly and positively correlated with 
SPECLST_P_S and negatively correlated with SPECLST_MS_30 and 
SPECLST_M_S_LEADER. ACSIZE is negatively correlated with SPECLST_M_S, 
SPECLST_M_S_LEADER and SPECLST_MS_30, but significantly and positively 
correlated with SPECLST_P_S. 








Table 5.1 : Descriptive statistics (Number of observations =152) 
Variables Mean Median Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis Minimum Maximum 
Audit. Fees 
(BHD’000)  
8855.970 8000.000 7185.475 5.493 41.997 0.000 70957.000 
NAS. Fees 
(BHD’000) 
7466.950 5000.000 14230.794 8.679 83.941 0.000 156008.000 
Total. Fees 
(BHD’000) 
16322.92 13000.000 20283.279 7.430 61.645 0.000 204258 
ACEXP 2.110 2.000 0.855 -0.204 -1.606 1.000 3.000 
ACIND 0.763 1.000 0.426 -1.250 -0.443 0.000 1.000 
ACMEET  3.960 4.000 0.254 -6.872 48.451 2.000 4.000 
ACSIZE 3.394 3.000 0.490 0.435 -1.835 3.000 4.000 
BDRNED 2.736 3.000 1.232 -0.043 -0.592 1.000 7.000 
BLOCK 78.097 58.200 143.512 5.546 30.858 0.000 928.000 
BRDEXP 2.743 3.000 1.204 -0.161 -0.967 1.000 5.000 
BRDMEET 3.960 4.000 0.254 -6.872 48.451 2.000 4.000 
BRDSIZE 6.243 6.000 1.000 0.002 -0.838 4.000 8.000 
FEERATIO 1 0.409 0.410 0.138 -0.592 1.710 0.000 0.760 
FEERATIO 2 0.798 0.700 0.484 1.810 5.321 0.000 3.230 
FORGN 0.260 0.000 0.874 3.668 12.372 0.000 4.000 
INOWN 4.285 0.000 14.172 3.598 12.121 0.000 68.500 
LEVERG 0.145 0.100 0.159 0.917 -0.035 0.000 0.600 
LNAFEE 2.000 2.080 0.600 -0.604 4.011 0.000 4.260 
LNASSET 5.335 4.700 2.147 0.354 -0.323 0.000 11.062 
LNNAF 1.688 1.610 0.650 0.940 7.174 0.000 5.050 






Table 5.1: Continued 
Variables Mean Median Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis Minimum Maximum 
NEWDIR 0.552 1.000 0.498 -0.214 -1.981 0.000 1.000 
RETURN 0.030 0.000 0.227 0.327 1.369 -0.710 0.724 
ROA 0.039 0.029 0.053 0.031 1.861 -0.196 0.183 
SPECLIST_M_S 0.552 0.592 0.238 -0.193 -0.404 0.000 1.000 
SPECLST_ 
M_S_LEADER 
0.651 1.000 0.478 -0.641 -1.610 0.000 1.000 
SPECLST_ 
WEIGHTED 
0.133 0.067 0.139 1.129 -0.281 0.000 0.448 
SPECLST_MS_30 0.809 1.000 0.394 -1.590 0.534 0.000 1.000 














Table 5.1: Continued 
ACEXP = the proportion of AC members with accounting experience and financial qualification to AC size; ACIND = coded as 1 if 
AC had solely NEDs; zero otherwise; ACMEET = number of AC meetings during the year; ACQ = the number of acquisitions made 
by the company during the year; ACSIZE = number of AC members; BLOCK = the cumulative percentage shares ownership of the 
block holders who hold at least 5 % or more of outstanding common shares and who are unaffiliated with management;  BRDEXP = 
the total number of directors with financial qualification and accounting experience to the size of the board; BRDMEET = total 
number of the meetings  of the board during the year; BRDNED = the proportion of NEDs on BoD size; BRDSIZE = numbers of 
board members during the year; FEERATIO 1= the fee ratio of non audit service fees to total fees; FEERATIO 2= the fee ratio of non 
audit service fees to AFs;  FORGN=the proportion of foreign subsidiaries to total consolidated subsidiaries;  FORGNSALE= The 
proportion of the firm foreign sales; INOWN = the cumulative percentage of total shares owned by the directors of a firm; LEVERG = 
the proportion of debts to total assets; LNAFEE= the natural log of AFs;  LNASSET = the natural logarithm of total assets; 
LNNAF=natural log of non audit service fees;  LNTOTALFEES= natural log of the sum of audit and non audit service fees;  
NEWDIR = coded as 1 if the firm appoint new external director during the year, zero otherwise; RETURN = the fiscal year total stock 
return; ROA= return on assets; SPECLIST_M_S: continuous variable which equals to the respective auditor market share; 
SPECLST_M_S_LEADER: coded as 1 if the auditor earned the largest market share in each particular industry, zero if otherwise; 
SPECLST_MS_30: coded as 1 if the auditor market share exceeds 30 percent in each particular industry, zero if otherwise; 
SPECLST_P_S: continuous variable which equals to the respective auditor portfolio share; SPECLST_WEIGHTED= continuous 





































































































































1 LNAFEE 1.000           
2 LNNAF 0.636** 1.000          
3 LNTOTALFEES 0.929** 0.843** 1.000         
4 FEERATIO 1 0.097 0.718** 0.451** 1.000        
5 FEERATIO 2 -0.013 0.658** 0.350** 0.910** 1.000       
6 SPECLST_M_S 0.350** 0.255** 0.358** 0.097 0.102 1.000      
7 SPECLST_P_S 0.130 -0.010 0.092 -0.060 -0.078 -0.010 1.000     
8 SPECLST_WEIGHTED 0.184* 0.035 0.145 -0.070 -0.050 0.289** 0.901** 1.000    
9 SPECLST_M_S_LEADER 0.166* 0.052 0.122 -0.095 -0.063 0.751** 0.226** 0.474** 1.000   
10 SPECLST_MS_30 0.325** 0.222** 0.303** 0.030 -0.002 0.719** 0.065 0.326** 0.628** 1.000  
11 BRDSIZE  0.095 0.037 0.050 -0.104 -0.089 -0.166* 0.386** 0.346** 0.026 -0.032 1.000 
12 BDRNED  0.159 0.187* 0.141 0.006 -0.032 -0.180* 0.201* 0.119 -0.145 -0.118 0.408** 
13 BRDEXP  -0.054 -0.046 -0.068 -0.068 -0.028 -0.353** 0.379** 0.285** -0.237** -0.257** 0.438** 
14 BRDMEET 0.010 -0.111 -0.024 -0.074 -0.096 -0.184* 0.088 0.033 -0.220** -0.121 -0.059 
15 ACSIZE 0.019 0.087 0.023 -0.019 0.046 -0.114 0.335** 0.305** -0.002 -0.019 0.179* 
16 ACIND 0.066 0.077 0.059 0.005 -0.010 -0.086 0.271** 0.192* -0.083 -0.074 0.242** 
17 ACEXP  0.006 -0.023 -0.017 -0.068 -0.052 -0.159 0.358** 0.253** -0.136 -0.137 0.170* 
18 ACMEET  -0.670 -0.050 -0.058 0.000 0.018 0.171* 0.113 0.123 0.213** 0.057 -0.117 






































































































































20 BLOCK  -0.026 0.053 0.004 0.085 0.056 -0.193* 0.009 -0.063 -0.231** -0.144 -0.140 
21 LEVERG 0.036 -0.008 0.033 0.024 -0.029 -0.072 0.420** 0.317** -0.012 -0.006 0.127 
22 RETURN 0.008 -0.026 -0.016 -0.067 -0.054 0.016 -0.103 -0.096 0.058 -0.095 -0.154 
24 FORGN 0.059 -0.046 0.030 -0.076 -0.045 0.075 0.461** 0.493** 0.213** 0.140 0.255** 
25 LNASSET  0.041 -0.038 -0.003 -0.113 -0.100 -0.163* 0.532** 0.449** -0.026 -0.068 0.232** 
26 NEWDIR  0.009 0.002 -0.008 -0.057 -0.029 -0.277** 0.234** 0.190* -0.159 -0.100 0.349** 























































































12 BDRNED  1.000           
13 BRDEXP  0.418** 1.000          
14 BRDMEET 0.061 -0.041 1.000         
15 ACSIZE -0.024 0.004 0.062 1.000        
16 ACIND 0.485** 0.397** 0.160* 0.007 1.000       
17 ACEXP  0.064 0.586** -0.083 0.058 0.359** 1.000      
18 ACMEET  -0.166* -0.033 0.045 -0.087 0.280** 0.202* 1.000     
19 INOWN  -0.006 -0.018 -0.009 -0.124 -0.054 0.016 0.047 1.000    
20 BLOCK  -0.127 0.225** -0.017 -0.091 0.102 0.210** -0.009 -0.067 1.000   
21 LEVERG -0.034 0.251** 0.029 -0.034 0.128 0.333** 0.030 0.174* 0.140 1.000  
22 RETURN 0.005 -0.077 -0.049 0.084 0.010 -0.139 0.019 0.078 -0.010 -0.049 1.000 
24 FORGN 0.153 0.205* -0.079 0.245** 0.165* 0.232** 0.047 0.144 -0.079 -0.033 -0.010 
25 LNASSET  0.162* 0.412** 0.321** 0.135 0.358** 0.473** 0.065 0.081 0.430** 0.290** -0.164* 
26 NEWDIR  0.464** 0.579** 0.011 -0.058 0.370** 0.422** -0.140 0.050 -0.124 0.059 -0.151 



































24 FORGN 1.000    
25 LNASSET  0.335** 1.000   
26 NEWDIR  0.201* 0.433** 1.000  
27 ROA  -0.170* -0.211** -0.232** 1.000 
 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) in bold.  








5.3 Audit Fees: Analysis No.1 
 
5.3.1 Multivariate regression for AFs model 
 
Table 5.3 provides the regression results of the AFs model for each year for the period 
2010 to 2013 and for the pooled sample for the combined period. The explanatory power 
for all models ranges from adjusted R2 between 6.8 % and 39.1 %. The hypotheses 
variables such as ACMEET, ACEXP, ACIND, ACSIZE, BRDMEET, BRDEXP, 
BRDNED, and BRDSIZE are either insignificant or significant with AFs in pooled 
samples or from year to year.  
  
ACSIZE is significantly and negatively related to AFs in the year 2010 sample at p < 
0.10 (t = -1.97). This weak relationship is also shown in other models and indicates that 
there is no evidence that it is associated with AFs. The other characteristics of AC such as 
ACEXP were found positively related to all models of the AFs, and for ACIND which 
was found positively and significantly related to AFs in the year 2011 sample at p < 0.05 
(t = 2.84), and significantly and negatively related to AFs in the year 2010 sample at p < 
0.05 (t = -2.27).  ACMEET was found insignificant with all models of the AFs. The 
insignificant results in these variables contradict the result of Abbott et al. (2003b). The 
mixed results may be due to the difference in nature of the selections of the sample. 
Abbott et al. (2003b) investigate a comprehensive sample of companies that submitted 
their data to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), which contains both large 
and small companies. On the other hand, Carcello et al. (2002) investigate on the sample 
of Fortune 1000 companies, which mainly contain larger companies than are found in the 
sample population examined through Abbott et al. (2003b). The nature of the sample 
examined and analyzed in this study is similar to that which has been examined and 
analyzed by Carcello et al (2002).  Therefore, the expectation was for different results to 








BRDSIZE is insignificant with AFs in all models. However, from the year 2010 to the 
pooled sample, the result contradicts the findings of Carcello et al. (2002). BRDEXP is 
found negatively and significantly related to AFs in the year 2011 sample at p < 0.05 (t = 
-2.28), and significantly and negatively related to AFs in the pooled sample at p < 0.05 (t 
= -2.37), while BRDMEET is insignificant and negatively related to AFs in the year 
2011, 2013 and pooled samples, which indicates that the BoDs that are equipped with 
financial expertise, which have a higher frequency of board meetings are associated with 
lower AFs. The BRDNED was found negatively and significantly related to AFs in the 
year 2012 sample at p < 0.10 (t = -1.89), and positively and significantly related to AFs in 
the year 2010, 2013 and pooled sample at p < 0.05 (t = 2.69), p < 0.10 (t = 1.77),   and p 
< 0.05 (t = 1.94) respectively. These results are consistent with Abbot et al. (2003) and 
Carcello et al. (2002) who disputed that the independent NEDs on boards demand extra 
effort in audit for ratification of the monitoring function, therefore increasing the AFs and 
the perceived quality of the audit, primarily for the purpose of protecting their interests. 
Compared with the previous British studies by Adelopo (2010) and O’Sullivan (2000), 
the primary evidence suggests that in terms of the "independent", there is little to 
differentiate between the types of non-executive director. This result is consistent with 
previous studies in the United Kingdom. 
 
LEVERG is insignificantly and negatively related to all AFs models except for year 2010 
and pooled samples which were found positively related to AFs.  The positive results 
indicate that the auditors believe that companies that have high leverage are linked with a 
higher risk of litigation, which may lead to more failures in audit, due to their poor 
financial situations. Therefore, an auditor may increase their fees and effort of audit for 
these companies so as to compensate their risk of litigation. These results are consistent 
with the results of prior study such as Menon and Williams, 2001. 
 
The size of the company LNASSET is negatively related to all AF models except for year 
2013 and pooled samples which were found positively related to AFs.  The positive 
results may indicate that with the increase in the size of the company, auditors extend the 
auditing hours and expand the scope of the audit, which in turn results in higher AFs.  
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This finding is consistent with the findings of Carcello et al. (2002), Abbott et al. (2003b) 
and Simunic (1980).  
 
FORGN is negatively related to AFs models in year 2011; year 2012 samples were found 
significantly and positively related to AFs and year 2010 and pooled samples were found 
insignificantly and positively related to AFs. As expected, the companies that have the 
largest number of foreign subsidiaries are likely to have higher AFs since the auditors 
need to put more effort and auditing hours in dealing with complex processes, thereby 
increasing AFs. The positive results of FORGN are consistent with Abbott et al. (2003b), 
Carcello et al. (2002), Craswell and Francis (1999), and Simunic (1980).   
 
In brief, findings from the regression are consistent with agency theory, which indicates 
that the independent NEDs on the boards are linked with effective monitoring. They 
complement their function of monitoring by demanding a higher AQ from the external 
auditor in terms of extending the auditing hours and effort of the audit, resulting in higher 
perceived AQ and higher AFs. The other variables of CG seem to provide inconsistent 
results or insignificant relationships with AFs across the samples by pooled data and 
samples by year. Therefore, there is no consistent evidence that board size, the financial 
expertise and meeting frequency of boards, and all AC characteristics (e.g. size, 
composition of independent members, financial expertise and meeting frequency) are 
associated with increased AFs. Specifically, the impact of the supervisory role of 
“Independent” board outweighs the other effective characteristics of the AC and BoD. 
Consequently, there is no evidence that the all characteristics of BoD (such as size of the 
board, financial expertise, number of meeting and number of independent members) and 
AC (such as size of the AC, financial expertise, number of meeting and number of 










The findings for all the control variables are insignificant in the predicted directions and 
consistent with the previous studies. 
 
Table 5. 3: Regression results for AFs model 
LNAFEE =    + β1 ACIND+ β2 ACMEET+ β3 ACSIZE+ β4 ACEXP+  
β5 BRDEXP+ β6  BRDMEET+ β7 BRDNED+β8  BRDSIZE+ β9 FORGN+ 































































































































Adjusted. R2 0.367 0.391 0.259 0.234 0.068 
Note:  














5.3.2 The additional analyses:  
 
This section provides additional data to the primary analysis. The reason for the 
additional analysis is to give reasonable assurance that the main results are robust with 
the specifications of different models.  
 
5.3.2.1 The test of heteroscedasticity and multicollinearity (via the STATA 13) 
 
To confirm whether heteroscedasticity exists, this study used the Breush-Pagan or Cook-
Weisberg test through STATA 13 software. If the p value is significant, then the null-
hypothesis, that the variance of the residuals is constant, will be rejected, which indicates 
the presence of heteroscedasticity.  The heteroscedasticity test was carried out for the 
pooled sample and analyzed using the Ordinary least square regression. As can be seen 
from (Table No.5.4), the p value is insignificant at p < 0.05. Thus, the null-hypothesis 
should be accepted, which indicates a lack of heteroscedasticity.   
 
 
Table 5. 4: Test of heteroscedasticity for AFs model 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
 
H0: variance of the residual term is constant 
 
Reject H0 if p value is significant 
chi2(1)      =    2.66 
 















The correlation matrix in section 5.2 (Table No. 5.2) presents the variables that have the 
largest correlations. BRDEXP has the highest correlation with ACEXP. The highest level 
of correlations between BRDEXP and ACEXP are expected since the expertise of the AC 
is part of the expertise of the BoDs. For the purpose of further investigation as to whether 
these higher correlations may indicate the multicollinearity problem, this study calculates 
the tolerance value, and the variance inflation factor (VIF). The results are displayed in 
Table No.5.5. If variables have VIF values of more than 10 or less than the tolerance 
values of 0.10, then they are considered to have a problem of multicollinearity (Gujarati, 
2003). As all the variables have values of VIF that are 1.164 to 2.240 and the value of 
tolerance, which is higher than 0.10,  this indicates that there is no problem of 
multicollinearity. 
 
Table 5.5: Value of the tolerance and VIF for AFs model 
Name of the Variables Tolerance VIF 
BRDSIZE 0.653 1.531 
BRDEXP 0.446 2.240 
BRDMEET 0.758 1.320 
BRDNED 0.532 1.879 
ACSIZE 0.859 1.164 
ACEXP 0.458 2.183 
ACMEET 0.766 1.305 
ACIND 0.533 1.877 
FORGN 0.758 1.319 
LEVERG 0.815 1.226 
LNASSET 0.523 1.913 
 Mean VIF                                                                                   = 1.632
 
5.3.2.2 Various regression estimators 
 
This section gives different regression estimators such as quantile regressions, least 
square with clustered robust regression and robust regression. The least square with 
clustered robust regression and the robust regression give the best estimates when the 
sample contains mild outliers and does not sufficiently fulfill the ordinary least-squares 
assumptions (Adkins and Hill, 2007; Gujarati, 2003; Chen et al., 2003; Hamilton, 1999), 
while quantile regression is found to ignore all the ordinary least-squares assumptions 
(Gujarati, 2003).  
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The findings are displayed in Table No 5.6. As can be seen, the findings of these 
estimators are consistent with the main finding. There is no significant difference 
between the findings of other different estimators and the OLS regression. BRDMEET 
was found negatively and insignificantly related to AFs across the quantile regression, 
least square with clustered robust regression and the robust regression. BRDNED was 
found significantly and positively related to AFs with quantile regression, least square 
with clustered robust regression and the robust regression at p < 0.05. BRDEXP found 
significantly and negatively related to AFs across all regression estimators. Similarly, 
ACSIZE is found insignificantly and negatively related to regressions except with 
quantile regression, where it was found positively related to AFs models. Most of the 
control variables are insignificantly correlated in predicted directions. This is consistent 
with the findings reported in the primary results. Generally, the current results may 
indicate that the main findings reported in Table No.5.6 are robust to alternative 

































































































































0.065 0.068 0.068 
Note: 














5.4.2.3 New definitions for AC and BoD variables  
 
The primary findings indicate that most of the AC variables are significant with AFs, 
except the ACEXP and ACMEET. Following Abbott et al. (2003b), this study provides 
new definitions for the variables of AC to see whether alternative definitions influence 
the main findings. Details of the new definition are as follows:  
 
1. ACMEET known as a dichotomous variable, ACMEET_1, coded as 1 if the 
frequency of the AC meeting is larger than the sample median, and zero if 
otherwise. 
 
2. ACEXP is also known as a dichotomous variable, ACEXP_1, and coded as 1 if 
the AC had at least one director equipped with accounting or finance expertise, 
and zero if otherwise.  
 
3. ACIND is now a continuous version, which is defined as the proportion of 
independent NED of the AC (ACIND_1).  
 
In addition to the new definitions of the variables of the AC, this study also presents an 
alternative specification of the variables of the BoD. Instead of continuous versions, 
BRDSIZE is now known as a dummy variable, coded as 1 if the size of the company’s 
board is less than sample median, and zero if otherwise. This variable is known as 
BRDSIZE_1. Similarly, BRDNED is also now known as a dummy variable; BRDNED_1 
is coded as 1 if 60 % of the directors of the company are independent, and zero if 
otherwise. These specifications have been cited from DeFond et al. (2005). The 
descriptions of the other variables remain unchanged. The current results are displayed in 
Table No.5.7. Most of the AC variables were found significant except ACMEET_1, 
which was found insignificant to the AFs in every year and pooled samples, and this is 
consistent with the primary results. The result of BRDNED_1 is remains significant to all 





BRDSIZE_1 variable remains insignificant to AFs except in pooled samples, and is found 
significantly and positively related to AFs. The result of BRDMEET remains 
insignificantly related to all AF models, while BRDEXP is significantly and negatively 
related to AFs only in year 2012 samples. The control variable such as LEVERG is found 
insignificantly related to all the AF models. FORGN is found significantly and positively 
related to AFs only in year 2012 samples, while LNASSET was found significant and 
positively related to AFs only in year 2013 samples. In brief, the primary results are 
robust to the alternative definitions of AC and BoD variables.    
 







































































































































Adjusted. R2 0.082 0.080 0.087 0.083 0.080 
Note:  








5.3.2.4 The other control variables 
 
In addition to the control variables included in the AFs model, there are other variables 
that affect the AFs. These variables are GROWTH= growth, ROA= return on assets and 
LIQ=liquidity ratio. This study tested whether the inclusion of these variables would  
influence the primary findings. All the variables in this study are sourced from Thomson 
One Banker and the firms’ annual report. Following Lee and Mande (2005) and 
Whisenant et al. (2003), growth was deemed to be the growth in sales during the previous 
fiscal year, while LIQ stands for the ratio of the total current assets divided by total 
current liabilities. Consistent with Whisenant et al. (2003), LIQ and ROA are proxies for 
factors of risk sharing, therefore positive correlation was expected between the AFs and 
these variables. Growth is a proxy for the size of the client and the larger companies were 
expected to have higher AFs because of the increase in audit testing and the audits’ scope 
(Lee and Mande, 2005; Whisenant et al., 2003). Thus, the control variable (GROWTH) is 
expected to be positively related to the AFs. The results are displayed in Table No.5.8. 
BRDSIZE is found positively and insignificantly related to the AFs only in the pooled 
samples, while BRDEXP is found negatively and significantly related with the AFs in 
year 2011 and pooled samples. BRDMEET is insignificant in all years and pooled 
samples, while BRDNED is found positively and significantly related to the AFs in years 
2010, 2012, 2013 and pooled samples. ACSIZE is found significantly and positively 
related to AFs in year 2013 samples, and negatively and significantly with the AFs in 
year 2010 samples. ACIND is found significantly and positively related to AFs only in 
year 2011 samples. ACMEET is found significantly and negatively related to the AFs in 
pooled samples, but ACEXP found insignificantly related to AFs across all models. The 
results for all control variables are insignificantly related to AFs across all models except 
for FORGN and ROA which are significantly and positively related to AFs in year 2012 
and 2013 samples respectively, also LIQ and FORGN are found significantly and 
negatively related to AFs in year 2012 and 2013 samples respectively. In general, the 











































































































































































Adjusted. R2 0.050 0.049 0.059 0.054 0.060 
Note:  
















5.3.2.5 The two-stage least-squares (2SLS) regression and endogeneity  
 
The previous literature indicates that there is a significant correlation between non audit 
services and audit services when they are both provided by the same auditor (Palmrose, 
1986; Simunic, 1984). There are two sets of arguments that non audit services fees may 
influence the AFs or vice versa. The first argument is that there is a probability that the 
services of auditing could be used as a "loss leader" with the purpose of making a higher 
profit margin on the non audit services fees (Hillson and Kennelley, 1988). In other 
words, the auditor discounts auditing services for the purpose of holding on to the income 
on non audit services fees, and this in turn indicates that there will be a negative 
correlation between the non audit services fees and AFs. The second argument relates to 
the knowledge spillovers which are believed to reduce the fixed or marginal costs of non 
audit services or audits. These decreases in the marginal cost of non audit services or 
audits may influence the level of non audit services fees or AFs, and this depends on the 
elasticity of demand for the function of the audit or the price of non audit services 
(Siminuc, 1984). This indicates that there will be a positive correlation between non audit 
services fees and AFs.  
 
Evidence from previous literature also indicates that the AC characteristics and BoD may 
affect an auditors’ audit planning and risk assessment, and this in turn influences the 
pricing of audit (Krishnan and Visvanathan, 2009; Boo and Sharma, 2008; Tsui et al., 
2001). To address these issues, this study first determines whether the AC characteristic 
and BoD or non audit services fees may suffer from the problem of endogeneity by 
carrying out the test of Durbin-Wu-Hausman on each of these variables. Following the 
methodology used by Larcker and Rusticus (2010) the instrumental variables are the 
lagged values of the endogenous variables. The Durbin and Wu–Hausman tests the null 
hypothesis that the residual values of the characteristics of the BoDs include (BDRNED, 
BRDSIZE, BRDEXP, and BRDMEET) and the characteristics of ACs include (ACIND, 







If the F statistic is significant, then the null hypothesis would be rejected, which indicates 
that endogeneity exists. Table No.5.9 displays the results of Durbin and Wu–Hausman 
tests. All the variables indicate insignificant F statistics except LNNAF, which indicates 
that there is endogeneity, since the F statistic is significant. The results are displayed in 
Table No.5.10.  Compared with the main result; the 2SLS regression results are 
comparatively consistent, which found LNNAF significant and positively related to 
LNAFEE, indicating that companies with higher AFs are likely to have high non-audit 
services fees. The other variables found some changes in the 2SLS model.  
 
Table 5.9: AFs model and the Endogeneity test 
The Durbin and Wu–Hausman tests  
 
H0 = the residual of the characteristics of the BoDs and ACs include (BDRNED, 
BRDSIZE, BRDEXP, and BRDMEET, ACIND, ACSIZE, ACEXP, and ACMEET) and 
LNNAF are exogenous 
 
Reject H0 if F statistic significant 
Variable name Chi2 (1) 
BRDSIZE 0.277 (p = 0.598)  
BRDEXP 0.001 (p = 0.990) 
BRDMEET 0.020 (p = 0.884) 
BRDNED 0.099 (p = 0.752) 
ACSIZE 0.774 (p = 0.378) 
ACEXP 0.130 (p = 0.717) 
ACMEET 0.021 (p = 0.884) 
ACIND 0.035 (p = 0.850) 

































































5.4 Non-audit services: Analysis No.2 
 
5.4.1 Multivariate regression non audit services fees model 
 
Table No.5.11 provides the results of non audit services fees by both samples of year-by-
year and the pooled. All models used ordinary least square regression, except the 
dependent variable (FEERATIO 2), which is regressed by using the least square 
regression with robust standard errors, the reason is that the FEERATIO 2 model is 
heteroscedastic. The result of the heteroscedastic test is provided in section (5.4.2) the 
additional analyses and robustness tests.  
 
Both the FEERATIO 2 and FEERATIO 1 are regressed only on pooled samples since 
year-by-year samples have a lack of significant F statistics. The adjusted R-square (R
2
) 
for LNTOTALFEES and LNNAF models were between 14.1 % and 42.5 % relatively. 
The adjusted R
2
 for LNTOTALFEES in year 2010, 2011, and 2013 are relatively lower to 
that reported by Ashbaugh et al. (2003). Compared to LNTOTALFEES, the adjusted 
R
2
for the LNNAF in pooled sample is relatively lower and the reason for this is because 
some firms  reported that the amount of the AFs is higher than the amount of the non 
audit services fees. The adjusted R
2 
for FEERATIO 2 is 6.4 % and FEERATIO 1 is 7.8 
%, which is relatively lower than that reported in the study of Abbott et al. (2003b), 
which documented that the adjusted R
2
 for FEERATIO 2 was in between 9.3 % and 17.4 
%. 
 
Overall, the results of the regression of the LNTOTALFEES model are consistent with 
the LNNAF model, while the results of FEERATIO 2 are relatively similar to 
FEERATIO 1. BRDSIZE has positive correlation coefficients with all the auditor 
independence measurements, except with LNNAF in year 2012 and pooled sample, 
LNTOTALFEES in the years 2011, 2012 and 2013 sample, and with both FEERATIO 1 
and FEERATIO 2 were negative correlation coefficients.   It is insignificant to most of 





The positive relationship may indicate that companies that have a smaller size of BoD are 
more likely to reduce the purchase of non audit services fees because they believe that a 
higher level of non audit services may compromise auditor independence. 
 
The positive results are relatively consistent with the prior study of AQ reported by 
Abbott et al (2004), which concluded that a smaller BoD is more effective in controlling 
the cases of restatement.  
 
Contrary to expectations, BRDNED is found insignificant with positive correlation 
coefficients related to LNTOTALFEES and to LNNAF in year 2011, 2012 and 2013 
sample. However, there are significant positive correlation coefficients with FEERATIO 
2 and FEERATIO 1. Larcker and Richardson (2004) and Ashbaugh et al. (2003) argue 
that LNTOTALFEES and LNNAF are better measurements than the ratios of non audit 
services to capture the economic importance of the client to the auditor.  
 
The positive relationship of LNNAF and BRDNED to LNTOTALFEES may indicate that 
the independent boards view joint provision of non audit services and audit as not 
necessarily compromising audit independence but perhaps expanding the knowledge of 
the auditors and improving their judgments, which increases the AQ (Goldman and 
Barlev, 1974; Simunic, 1984; Beck et al., 1988a; Wallman, 1996; Arrunada, 1999a; 
1999b; 2000). 
 
BRDEXP is significantly related to LNNAF and LNTOTALFEES in the pooled sample, 
but insignificantly with both FEERATIO 2 and FEERATIO 1 in the pooled sample. Lee 
(2008) reported that the BRDEXP as (a composite index) is positively related to the 
changes in FEERATIO 2. In particular, the composite index is measured as a 
dichotomous variable, coded as one if there are more than fifty percent of non-audit 
committee board members in financial year 2001 and at least 27.27 percent (sample 






Nevertheless, Lee’s study does not document the results for BRDEXP and BRDNED as a 
single variable. BRDMEET is found negatively and significantly related to 
LNTOTALFEES in the pooled sample, and negatively and significantly related to 
LNNAF in year 2012 and the pooled sample, but there is no statistical evidence to relate 
it with other measures.  
 
ACEXP is insignificant across all auditor independence measures; this is consistent with 
the prior study of LNNAF reported by Abbott et al (2003a). Lee (2008) documents 
ACEXP to have significant correlation coefficients with LNNAF when it is modelled as a 
composite index variable. ACIND is significantly and positively related to 
LNTOTALFEES (in the year 2011 model), but significantly and negatively with 
LNTOTALFEES (in the year 2010 model). According to previous studies, ACIND has 
significant and negative correlation coefficients related to FEERATIO 2 variables 
(Abbott et al., 2003a), and as composite index variables (Lee, 2008; Abbott et al., 2003a 
and Lee and Mande, 2005). ACSIZE has significant and positive correlation coefficients 
related to LNNAF (in the year 2011 sample), and insignificant with FEERATIO 2 and 
FEERATIO 1 (in the pooled sample), but there is no statistical evidence found to relate it 
with LNTOTALFEES.   
  
This study found the ACMEET negative correlation coefficients across all auditor 
independence measures in the pooled models with LNNAF and LNTOTALFEES. These 
results indicate that the companies that have an active AC are likely to have stable total 
fees, and stable non-audit services fees. It been noticed that, where higher levels of non-
audit services are purchased, the knowledge of the auditor is expanded and thus improved 
the overall AQ. As previous studies have acknowledged, the flow of the potential benefits 
of the joint provision for non-audit services and audit (Goldman and Barlev, 1974; 
Simunic, 1984; Beck et al., 1988a; Wallman, 1996; Arrunada, 1999a; 1999b; 2000). Prior 
studies document ACMEET to be significantly and negatively coefficient related to 
LNNAF and FEERATIO 2 when it is known as the composite index (Lee and Mande, 
2005; Abbott et al., 2003a), but does not provide any such evidence when it is modelled 




In general, the control variables are relatively stable and significant across all auditor 
independence measures. INOWN and LEVERG were insignificant across all auditor 
independence measures. BLOCK coefficient positive and significant only with LNNAF 
and FEERATIO 1 (in the pooled samples), and insignificant with positive correlation 
coefficients with FEERATIO 2 (in the pooled samples).   
 
This result of FEERATIO 2 is consistent with the findings of Firth (1997), while the 
result of FEERATIO 1 is consistent with the findings of Abbott et al (2003a). RETURN 
coefficient is found to be insignificant across all auditor independence measures. 
LNASSET is found to be insignificant across all auditor independence measures except 
for FEERATIO 2 and FEERATIO 1, which found significant and negative correlation 
coefficients in the pooled samples, but there is no statistical evidence found to relate it 
with FEERATIO 1 and FEERATIO 2.   
 
In general, the multivariate regression finds consistent evidence that the independent BoD 
is positively associated with the non-audit services purchase.  Instead of  holding the view 
that higher levels of non-audit services weakens the auditor independence, independent 
NED on the BoD seem to support the view that the provision of the highest non-audit 
services improve the AQ and the judgment of the auditor because of the impact of an 
extension of knowledge. The other variables (the hypothesis) provide inconsistent support 
for the view that they are associated with non-audit services fees. The LNASSET has 
positive correlation coefficients with LNNAF only in the year 2013 sample. 
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Table 5.11: Multivariate regression for non audit services fees model 
FEE = β0+ β1 ACEXP+ β2 ACIND+ β3 ACMEET+ β4 ACSIZE + β5 BRDEXP+ β6 BRDMEET + β7 BRDNED +β8 BRDSIZE + 






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Adjusted. R2 0.406 0.393 0.299 0.310 0.425 0.144 0.302 0.284 0.103 0.139 0.078 0.064 
Note:  
* are significant at p-value <0.10, ** are significant at p-value <0.05 and *** at p-value <0.01. 
*All models are been estimated using the ordinary least square regression except for FEERATIO 2 which been regressed using the regression with robust 







5.4.2 The additional analyses: 
 
In this section, the current study investigates the primary results in the case of violation of 
assumptions of the OLS, and whether they are robust to the specifications of different 
models. The tests contain the heteroscedasticity and multicollinearity tests, various 
regression estimators, analysis of the size of the client, new definitions for hypotheses 
variables, the other control variables, the two-stage least-squares (2SLS) regression and 
the Endogeneity. 
5.4.2.1 Heteroscedasticity and multicollinearity tests 
 
To confirm whether the heteroscedasticity exists, table No.5.12 provide the results of the 
heteroscedasticity test using the Breush-Pagan or Cook-Weisberg test. The variable 
LNNAF is indicating an insignificant p value, which indicates that the variance of the 
residual is homogeneous, the other models indicating a significant p value at p < 0.01, 
which indicates the existence of heteroscedasticity 
 
The results of tolerance tests and VIF value are displayed in table No.5.13. Because all 
the variables have values of VIF that are nearly 1.087 to 3.040 and the values of 




Table 5.12: Test the non-audit services model with the Heteroscedasticity test 
Breush-Pagan or Cook-Weisberg test  
 
H0 = The variance of the residuals is constant 
 
Reject H0 if F statistic significant 
Dependent variable  Chi2 (1) Prob > chi2 
FEERATIO 1  5.67 0.017 
FEERATIO 2 5.31 0.021 
LNNAF  0.47 0.492 






Table 5.13: value of the tolerance and VIF for non-audit services model 
Name of the Variables Tolerance VIF 
BRDSIZE 0.567 1.763 
BRDEXP 0.383 2.612 
BRDMEET 0.647 1.546 
BRDNED 0.920 1.087 
ACSIZE 0.833 1.201 
ACEXP 0.492 2.033 
ACMEET 0.852 1.174 
ACIND 0.719 1.390 
BLOCK 0.472 2.118 
INOWN 0.829 1.206 
LEVERG 0.769 1.300 
LNASSET 0.329 3.040 
NEWDIR 0.401 2.493 
RETURN 0.884 1.131 
 Mean VIF                                                                                   = 1.721
Note:  
* are significant at p-value <0.10, ** are significant at p-value <0.05 and *** at p-value <0.01. 
 
5.4.2.2 Various regression estimators  
 
This section presents the findings of the multivariate regression by using several 
estimators. Previously, the variables FEERATIO 1, LNNAF and LNTOTALFEES were 
regressed using the ordinary least square estimator, while the variables FEERATIO 2 was 
regressed by using least-square regression with robust standard errors. In this section, the 
variables FEERATIO 1, LNTOTALFEES and LNNAF will be regressed using quantile 
and robust regression, while the variable FEERATIO 2 will be regressed using the 
Generalize least square (GLS) and ordinary least square estimator regressions. The 
findings are displayed in the table No.5.14. The quantile regression is one of the tests of 
non-parametric that do not require any assumptions (Gujarati, 2003). The robust 
regression is efficient when the models do not meet the normality assumption and when 
the models consist of mild outliers (Adkins and Hill, 2007; Chen et al., 2003; Gujarati, 
2003; Hamilton, 1992). The Generalize least square regression is an alternative to the 





As can be seen from Table No.5.14, the results of quantile and robust regressions are 
relatively consistent with the OLS estimator regressions displayed in the main findings 
(Table No.5.6) except for the relationship between BLOCK and FEERATIO 1 and the 
relationship between INOWN and LNNAF. The variables of the hypothesis remain 
unchanged. For the model of LNNAF, robust regression provides consistent findings with 
the Quantile regression, as shown in the main results (No.5.6 table).This may be due to 
the efficiency of both estimators to control the error so that each sample observation 




























































































































































































































































































































Adjusted. R2  / Pseudo R2 0.090 0.099 0.044 0.138 0.086 0.077 0.025 0.011 
Note:  




5.4.2.3 New definitions for AC and BoD variables 
 
As with the model of the AFs, this study provides new definitions for the hypotheses 
variables to see whether alternative definitions influence the main findings. Following 
DeFond et al. (2005) and Abbott et al. (2003b) approaches, the new definitions for the 
variables of the BoD and AC (BRDSIZE, BRDNED, ACEXP, ACMEET, and ACIND) 
are as follows: 
 
1. BRDSIZE_1 is coded as 1 if the size of the company’s board is less than sample 
median, and zero if otherwise. 
 
2. BRDNED_1 is coded as 1 if 60 % of the directors of the company are 
independent, and zero if otherwise. 
 
3. ACEXP_1, is coded as 1 if the AC has at least one director with accounting or 
finance expertise, and zero if otherwise.  
 
4. ACMEET_1 is coded as 1 if the frequency of the AC meeting is larger than the 
sample median and zero if otherwise. 
 
5. ACIND_1 defines the proportion of independent NED of the AC. 
 
The other variables definitions remain unchanged. Table No.5.15 provides the results of 
the new definitions. As can be seen, the results for the new definitions are relatively 
consistent with the main findings, except for ACMEET_1. ACMEET_1 and BRDNED_1 
were found to have positive correlation coefficients related to the non-audit services fees, 
indicating that the companies with BoDs that have an independent membership of less 
than 60 percent, and whose AC meetings are more frequent than the sample median, are 






BRDSIZE_1 is found insignificantly and with positive correlation coefficients related to 
the measurements of the non-audit services fees, which indicate that the companies with a 
large size board that is more than the sample median are likely to have a stable amount of 
non-audit services fees.  
 
This may suggest that companies with large numbers of members of the board are likely 
to have limited the level of non-audit services. The results for the variables of the non-
audit service fees seem to be sensitive to the new definition of size of the board.  
 
ACEXP_1 is found to have positive correlation coefficients related to the all auditor 
independence measurements, except for LNTOTALFEES, which is found to be 
negatively related to the auditor independence measurements. This indicates that the ACs 
with at least one member equipped with financial expertise are more likely to reduce the 
level of non-audit services fees as they have the perception that higher non-audit services 
may weaken the auditor independence. The results of the control variables are relatively 
unchanged. Generally the main findings on the independence of BoDs are not modified 
by new definitions for independent NEDs. 
5.4.2.4 The other control variables 
 
Various control variables are provided in the main model to see whether the inclusion of 
these variables influence the results. As with the model of the AFs, these variables are: 
(Growth=GROWTH), (liquidity ratio=LIQ), and (Return on assets=ROA). They are 
expected to be positively related to the non-audit services fees. Previous literature 
indicates that higher growth companies and more profitable companies are likely to have 
more resources to purchase non-audit services (Antle et al., 2006; Habib and Islam, 
2007). The results are displayed in the table No.5.16. The results for the main control 
variables and the hypotheses variables are relatively similar to the main results. 
GROWTH is found to be insignificant with positive correlation coefficients related to 
FEERATIO 2 and FEERATIO 1. The results of FEERATIO 2 is relatively consistent 
with the result of Habib and Islam (2007), who indicate that companies that have higher 




ROA is found to have insignificant and positive correlation coefficients related to 
LNNAF, but negative and insignificant related with other measures. In general, the main 
results are unchanged and the extra control variables are unlikely to influence the results. 
 





























































































































































 0.073 0.083 0.018 0.026 
Note:  

































































































































































































 0.045 0.096 0.063 0.090 
Note:  






5.4.2.5 The two-stage least-squares (2SLS) regression and the endogeneity  
 
As highlighted previously in the section robustness tests and additional analysis for the 
AFs model, evidence from previous studies indicate that there are two potentials 
outcomes of the joint provision of non-audit services and audit. There are two sets of 
disputes that non-audit services fees may influence the AFs, or vice versa. The first 
potential is that higher non-audit services fees are used to discount the audit services in 
order to obtain a higher profit margin on the lucrative non-audit services fees. The second 
dispute relates to the knowledge spillovers which are believed to reduce the fixed or 
marginal costs of non-audit services or audits. This indicates that there will be a negative 
correlation between non-audit services fees and AFs. Both disputes lead to the 
endogeneity problem. Furthermore, previous literature also indicates that the 
characteristics of the AC and BoD are likely to be associated with endogeneity (Larcker 
and Rusticus, 2010; Larcker and Richardson, 2004). To address these issues, this study 
first determines whether these variables suffer from the problem of endogeneity by 
carrying out the test of Durbin and Wu-Hausman on each of these variables. Table 
No.5.17 displays the results of Durbin and Wu–Hausman tests on each variable analyzed 
under FEERATIO 1, FEERATIO 2, LNNAF, and LNTOTALFEES models. As can be 
seen, the F statistics are insignificant in all models, which indicates that there is no 
existence of endogeneity. This may not require the test through the two-stage least-
squares (2SLS) regression. Baum et al. (2003), argue that in the absence of the problem 
of the endogeneity, the results of the two-stage least-squares regressions are biased and 
unacceptable. In brief, the estimated results using the least square regression with robust 
standard error in the main analysis is more efficient because of the absence of the 








Table 5.17: Test the non-audit services model with the endogeneity test 
The Durbin and Wu–Hausman tests  
 
H0 = the residual of the characteristics of the BoDs and ACs include (BRDSIZE, 
BRDEXP, BRDMEET, and BDRNED, ACSIZE, ACEXP, ACMEET, and ACIND_1) 
and LNNAF are exogenous 
 
Reject H0 if F statistic significant 
Variable 
name 
LNNAF LNTOTALFEES FEERATIO 1 FEERATIO 2 
Chi2 (1) Chi2 (1) Chi2 (1) Chi2 (1) 
BRDSIZE 0.052 (p=0.819) 0.909 (p=0.340) 1.152 (p=0.283) 0.135 (p=0.712) 
BRDEXP 0.337 (p=0.561) 0.011 (p=0.913) 0.764 (p=0.382) 0.002 (p=0.958) 
BRDMEET 0.306 (p=0.580) 0.010 (p=0.916) 0.067 (p=0.794) 0.011 (p=0.914) 
BRDNED 0.088 (p=0.765) 0.005 (p=0.942) 0.124 (p=0.723) 0.278 (p=0.597) 
ACSIZE 1.863 (p=0.172) 0.021 (p=0.883) 1.110 (p=0.290) 0.878 (p=0.348) 
ACEXP 0.000 (p=0.988) 0.383 (p=0.535) 0.211 (p=0.645) 0.010 (p=0.916) 
ACMEET 0.596 (p=0.439) 0.066 (p=0.796) 0.543 (p=0.461) 1.234 (p=0.266) 
ACIND_1 2.586 (p=0.107) 0.157 (p=0.691) 0.190 (p=0.662) 0.832 (p=0.361) 
LNNAF 1.155 (p=0.282) 0.486 (p=0.485) 0.388 (p=0.533) 0.669 (p=0.413) 
 
5.5 Auditor industry specialist: Analysis No.3 
5.5.1 Multivariate regression for auditor industry specialist model 
 
The results for the industry specialist model are displayed in Table No.5.18, by year to 
year and pooled samples. Nevertheless, SPECLST_WEIGHTED, SPECLST_M_S and 
SPECLST_P_S are modeled when they are on the pooled sample, because of the lack of 
F statistics for several years. The pseudo- R
2
 or adjusted R
2
 for all models are between 
0.4% and 53.8%, and these values are comparatively higher than those documented by 
Chen et al. (2005) and Abbott et al. (2003a), who report them to be in between 6.7% and 
7.6% and  2% and 10% respectively. Overall, the regression results for (SPEC_AUD), 
which is measured using the approach of the market share, are comparatively consistent 
across both the pooled samples and year to year. Contrary to expectations, the study 
found that BRDNED has significant and negative correlation coefficients with 
SPECLST_M_S_LEADER in a pooled sample, and found to be significant and positive 
with SPECLST_MS_30 in year 2011 and 2012 samples, and SPECLST_M_S_LEADER 





Similarly, BRDSIZE has significant and negative correlation coefficients with 
SPECLST_MS_30 in the year 2011, and significant and positive correlation coefficients 
with SPECLST_M_S_LEADER in the pooled samples. Likely, BRDMEET has 
significant and negative correlation coefficients with SPECLST_MS_30, 
SPECLST_M_S, SPECLST_P_S and SPECLST_WEIGHTED in the pooled samples, 
and significant and negative correlation coefficients with SPECLST_M_S_LEADER in 
the year 2010, 2011 and pooled samples. BRDEXP has significant and negative 
correlation coefficients with SPECLST_MS_30 in the year 2011, 2013 and pooled 
samples, and significant and negative correlation coefficients with 
SPECLST_M_S_LEADER in the year 2013 and pooled sample, and significant and 
negative correlation coefficients with SPECLST_M_S in the pooled samples. 
 
ACSIZE has significant and negative correlation coefficients with SPECLST_MS_30 in 
the year 2010 sample, and significant and positive correlation coefficients with 
SPECLST_P_S and SPECLST_WEIGHTED in the pooled samples, while ACIND is 
found insignificantly across all the industry specialist measures except for the 
SPECLST_M_S, which is found to be significant and positively related to ACIND in the 
pooled models.  This positive relationship may indicate that the ACs that consist solely of 
independent members are more likely to employ industry specialist auditors than non-
specialist auditors. ACEXP is found to be insignificantly related across all the industry 
specialist auditors measures, except with SPECLST_M_S_LEADER, SPECLST_P_S 
and SPECLST_WEIGHTED, which are found significantly and negatively with 
SPECLST_M_S_LEADER in the year 2010 sample, SPECLST_P_S and 
SPECLST_WEIGHTED in pooled samples. However, ACMEET is found to be 
insignificantly related across all the industry specialist auditors’ measures, except with 
SPECLST_MS_30, which is found significantly and negatively with SPECLST_MS_30 
in the pooled sample. This indicates that the companies with less AC meetings 








INOWN is found to be significantly and positively correlated to 
SPECLST_M_S_LEADER, SPECLST_MS_30, and SPECLST_M_S in pooled models. 
This may suggest that, as the percentage of insider ownership rises, there is more demand 
for industry specialist auditors because of the detailed information that is received by the 
companies’ directors. However, both variables (LEVERGN) and (LNASSET) show 
positive relationships with some of the SPEC_AUD measures, this indicates that higher 
leverage companies and big companies demand more industry specialist auditors in order 
to compensate for the increases in costs.   
 
ROA is found to be insignificant across all the industry specialist auditors’ measures, 
except with SPECLST_MS_30, SPECLST_P_S and SPECLST_WEIGHTED, which is 
found significantly and negatively with SPECLST_MS_30 in year 2010 sample, 
SPECLST_P_S and SPECLST_WEIGHTED in pooled samples. This indicates that the 
more complex firms and high-risk companies have increased demand for industry 
specialist auditors.  
 
In general, the findings of the characteristics of the AC and BoD and related control 
variables are sensitive to the choice of industry specialist measures. Nevertheless, 
although the results are inconsistent in year to year analysis in the pooled sample, in one 
out of five of SPEC_AUD measures, ACMEET and ACIND are found significantly with 
the use of industry specialist auditors. Companies with ACs that consist solely of 
independent members are more likely to employ industry specialist auditors. Also, 
contradictory to the expectation, higher frequency AC meetings are not necessarily 
correlated to the choice of higher quality auditors.  
 
5.5.2 The additional analyses: 
 
In this section, the current study investigates whether the primary results of the 
(SPEC_AUD) model are robust to the specifications of different models. The tests 
contain the heteroscedasticity and multicollinearity tests, various regression estimators, 
new definitions for hypotheses variables, the other control variables, the two-stage least-
squares (2SLS) regression and the endogeneity. 
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5.5.2.1 Heteroscedasticity and multicollinearity tests 
 
To confirm whether heteroscedasticity exists, table No.5.19 providse the results of the 
auditor industry specialist measures. All models indicate a significant p value between p 
< 0.10 and p < 0.01, indicating the existing of heteroscedasticity. The results of tolerance 
test and VIF value are displayed in table No.5.20. Because all the variables have values 
of VIF 1.103 to 2.192 and the values of tolerance, which is higher than 0.10 indicate that 
there is no problem of multicollinearity existing. 
 
Note: The dependent variables, which are the continuous version (such as 
SPECLST_M_S, SPECLST_P_S and SPECLST_WEIGHTED), and the 
heteroscedasticity test are carried out by using the Breush-Pagan or Cook-Weisberg test, 
while for the dichotomous version (such as SPECLST_M_S_LEADER and 
SPECLST_MS_30), this study used a heteroscedasticity test for Probit / Logit model that 
is available in Stata software.  
5.5.2.2 Various regression estimators 
 
Previously, both variables (SPECLST_MS_30 and SPECLST_M_S_LEADER) were 
estimated using heteroscedastic (OLS) regression, the other measures were regressed by 
using a least square regression with robust standard errors, which is effective in 
controlling for heteroscedasticity. As the benchmark of comparison, in this section, 
(SPECLST_MS_30 and SPECLST_M_S_LEADER) were regressed by probit regression, 
while the other measures are estimated using Generalized least square (GLS) and OLS 
regressions. The results are displayed in Table No.5.21. As can be seen, the results of 
Probit, OLS and GLS regressions are comparatively consistent with the main result, 








5.5.2.3 New definitions for AC and BoD variables 
 
As with the model of the AFs and non-audit services fees, this study provides new 
definitions for AC and BoD variables to see whether alternative definitions influence the 
main findings. Following DeFond et al. (2005) and Abbott et al.'s (2003) approaches, 
new definitions for the variables of the BoD and AC (BRDSIZE, BRDNED, ACEXP, 
ACMEET, and ACIND) are as follows:  
 
1. BRDSIZE_1 is coded as 1 if the size of the company’s board is less than sample 
median, and zero if otherwise. 
 
2. BRDNED_1 is coded as 1 if 60 % of the directors of the company are 
independent, and zero if otherwise. 
 
3. ACEXP_1, and coded as 1 if the AC had at least one director is equipped with 
accounting or finance expertise, and zero if otherwise.  
 
4. ACMEET_1 is coded as 1 if the frequency of the AC meeting is larger than the 
sample median and zero if otherwise. 
 
5. ACIND_1 is defines the proportion of independent NED of the AC. 
 
The other variables' definitions remain unchanged. The results are displayed in Table 
No.5.22. The main findings indicate that in the pooled sample, four out of five, the 
industry specialist model indicates that ACs with lower frequencies of AC meetings and 
solely independent members are more likely to employ industry specialist auditors. 
However, when the new definitions are introduced, none of these variables are 
significant. Furthermore, this study found consistent evidence that companies that have 
ACs with at least 1 member with financial expertise are more likely to appoint auditor 
industry specialists.  In brief, the results for the ACMEET variable and ACIND variable 
in the main findings are sensitive to the new definitions.   
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5.5.2.4 The other control variables 
 
In line with the AFs and non audit services fees model, various control variables are 
provided in the main model to see whether the inclusion of these variables influences the 
results.  These variables are: (Growth=GROWTH), and (liquidity ratio=LIQ), which are 
expected to positively correlate to the appointment of industry specialist auditors. 
Previous literature indicates that higher growth companies and higher risk companies are 
associated with a higher cost of agency (Firth and Smith, 1992; Francis and Wilson, 
1988), and that they are therefore likely to employ industry specialist auditors. The results 
are displayed in Table No.5.23. The results for the main control variables and the 
hypothesis variables are comparatively similar to the main results. LIQ and GROWTH 
were found insignificant with all models of the SPEC_AUD. In general, the main finding 
is unchanged, and the other control variables did not influence the results.  
 
5.5.2.5 The two-stage least-squares (2SLS) regression and the endogeneity  
 
Consistent with the approach used with the prior models, this study carries out the Wald 
test for dichotomous dependent variables and Durbin-Wu-Hausman test for continuous 
dependent variables to see whether the CG variables are associated with the problem of  
endogeneity. The characteristics of the BoDs include (BDRNED, BRDSIZE, BRDEXP, 
and BRDMEET) and the characteristics of ACs include (ACIND_1, ACSIZE, ACEXP, 
and ACMEET) and are treated as endogenous variables. Table No.5.24 is displays the 
results of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test. As can be seen, all the variables of CG show 






Table 5.18: Multivariate regression for industry specialist model 
SPEC_AUD = β0 + β1 ACEXP+ β2 ACIND+ β3 ACMEET +β4 ACSIZE+ β5 BRDEXP+ β6 BRDMEET+ β7 BRDNED+β8 BRDSIZE+ β9 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































0.154 0.088 0.023 0.062 0.004 0.081 0.271 0.057 0.152 0.095 0.226 0.538 0.364 
Note:  











Table 5.19: Test the industry specialist model with the Heteroscedasticity test 
Breush-Pagan or Cook-Weisberg test  
 
H0 = The variance of the residuals is constant 
 
Reject H0 if F statistic significant 
Dependent variable  Chi2 (1) Prob > chi2 
SPECLST_M_S_LEADER 3.44 0.0638 
SPECLST_MS_30 33.18 0.0000 
SPECLIST_M_S 6.05 0.0139 
SPECLIST_P_S 4.92 0.0266 




Table 5.20: value of the tolerance and VIF for industry specialist model 
Name of the Variables Tolerance VIF 
BRDSIZE 0.659 1.517 
BRDEXP 0.499 2.003 
BRDMEET 0.688 1.453 
BRDNED 0.906 1.103 
ACSIZE 0.904 1.106 
ACEXP 0.459 2.192 
ACMEET 0.869 1.151 
ACIND 0.727 1.375 
INOWN 0.878 1.139 
LEVERG 0.817 1.224 
LNASSET 0.570 1.753 
ROA 0.781 1.280 
 Mean VIF                                                                                   = 1.441
Note:  




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Adjusted. R2  / Pseudo R2 0.226 0.538 0.365 0.547 0.464 0.416 0.191 0.154 
Note:  




























































































































































































































































Adjusted. R2  / 
Pseudo R2 
0.184 0.208 0.193 0.526 0.349 
Note:  
* are significant at p-value <0.10, ** are significant at p-value <0.05 and *** at p-value <0.01, a=z-statistics for 















































































































































































































































































0.207 0.172 0.216 0.539 0.369 
Note:  
* are significant at p-value <0.10, ** are significant at p-value <0.05 and *** at p-value <0.01, a=z-statistics for 







Table 5.24: Test the industry specialist model with the endogeneity test 
The Durbin and Wu–Hausman tests and Wald test 
 
H0 = the residual of the characteristics of the BoDs and ACs include (BRDSIZE, 
BRDEXP, BRDMEET, and BDRNED, ACSIZE, ACEXP, ACMEET, and ACIND_1) 
are exogenous 
 

















































































































































































5.6 The summary 
 
This chapter shows empirical findings on the effects of the ACs and BoDs characteristics 
on AQ. The hypothesis variables for the frequencies of meetings of the ACs and BoDs, 
the number of independent members, the size of ACs, and financial expertise are 
examined with three models of AQ: AFs, non audit services, and industry specialist 
auditors. The employment of auditor industry specialists, higher AFs and lower non audit 
services fees are all associated with higher AQs. 
 
In the model of the AFs, multivariate regression indicates that independent BoDs are 
positively related to AFs. These may suggest that independent BODs use their 
supervisory function to demand intensive audit efforts from auditors, resulting in higher 
AFs. The other ACs and BoDs characteristics provide inconsistent results with AFs 
across all models (year to year and in the pooled samples). The control variables are 
significant in the predicted direction, except of GROWTH and LEVERG, which were 
found insignificant in relation to the AFs model. The result for independent BoDs is 
robust to the specifications of different models including various regression estimators, 
analysis of the size of the client, new definitions for hypotheses variables, other control 
variables, and two-stage least-squares (2SLS) regression. 
 
There are 4 auditor independence measures (FEE) examined in the non audit services 
model, include: FEERATIO 1, FEERATIO 2, LNNAF and LNTOTALFEE. This study  
found a positive relationship between the independent BoD and measures of auditor 
independence, especially the measures of LNTOTALFEES and LNNAF, in most year to 
year models. FEERATIO 2 and FEERATIO 1 are insignificant with the independent 
BoDs but report similar positive correlation coefficients. Previous studies argue that the 
variables LNTOTALFEES and LNNAF are better measurements than the ratios of non 
audit services to capture the economic importance of the client to the auditor relationship 
(Larcker and Richardson, 2004; Ashbaugh et al., 2003). The positive relationship may 
indicate that independent BoDs seem to support that higher provision of non audit 
services do not necessarily weaken the audit independence, but it may improve the AQs 
due to the effects of more experience of the auditors.  
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The effects of more experience of the auditors and improving their judgments, leads to an 
increase in the AQ. The other hypothesis variables provide inconsistent support 
associated with non audit services. Amongst the control variables, LNASSET is found 
negatively correlated with non audit services in most year to year and pooled models. The 
results for independent NED on BoDs are robust to the specifications of different models 
and tests.   
 
In the auditor industry specialist model (SPEC_AUD), there are five measures: 
SPECLST_M_S_LEADER, SPECLST_MS_30, SPECLST_M_S, SPECLST_P_S and 
SPECLST_WEIGHTED. The multivariate regressions of the auditor industry specialist 
model indicate that the AC and BoD characteristics with the related control variables are 
sensitive to the choice of industry specialist measures. Furthermore, in the pooled sample, 
when four out of five auditor industry specialist measures were used, the results indicate 
that ACs with less frequencies of AC meetings and which consist of solely independent 
members are more likely to employ industry specialist auditors. 
 
Although these results are robust to various regression estimators and 2SLS tests, they are 
sensitive to the new variables definitions.  When the definition of ACMEET is changed 
from the total number of AC meeting to be a dichotomous variable (ACMEET_1),  
(coded as 1 if the frequency of the AC meeting is larger than the sample median and zero 
if otherwise), and the definition of ACEXP is changed from the proportion of AC 
members with accounting experience and financial qualification to be a dichotomous 
variable, (ACEXP_1), (coded as 1 if the AC had at least one director is equipped with 
accounting or finance expertise, and zero if otherwise), the results are no longer 
significant. The summary of the results and hypothesis are displayed in Table No.5.25. 
The significant findings are based on the consistency of the findings in the samples of the 
pooled and year to year.  
 
For Hypothesis 1,  that there is a positive relationship between the size of the board and 
non-audit services fees, the result was the opposite and provided inconsistent support 




Inconsistent with hypothesis 2, board sizesis insignificant with AFs in all models. A 
possible explanation of this result is that the small board sizes pay high AFs. 
 
Consistent with hypothesis 3,  that there is a positive relationship between the 
independent board and AFs, the result indicates that the independent NEDs on boards 
demand extra effort in audit for ratification of the monitoring function., therefore 
increasing the AFs and the perceived quality of the audit, primarily for the purpose of 
protecting their interests. 
 
Hypothesis 4 predicts that there is a negative relationship between the size of the board 
and the engagement of industry-specialist auditors. The insignificant negative coefficient 
on the size of the board does not support this hypothesis. Therefore, in respect to the 
small number of board members, this study does not support the view that a small 
number of  board members employ more industry specialist auditors. 
 
Hypothesis 5 predicts a positive relationship between the independent board and 
engagement of industry-specialist auditors. The results do not support this hypothesis. 
The results show lower percentages of independent board members are more likely to 
employ industry specialist auditors. 
 
Hypothesis 6 predicts a negative relationship between the independent board and non-
audit services fees. The results do not support this hypothesis. The positive relationship 
may indicate that the independent boards view joint provision of non audit services and 
audit as not necessarily compromising audit independence but perhaps expanding the 
knowledge of the auditors and improving their judgments, which leads to increase the 
AQ.  
 
Hypothesis 7 predicts a negative relationship between the financial expertise of the board 
and non-audit services fees. The results do not support this hypothesis. The positive 
relationship indicates that boards of directors with financial expertise can increase the 
non-audit services fees through the auditors’ services. 
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Hypothesis 8 predicts a positive relationship between the financial expertise of the board 
and AFs. The results do not support this hypothesis. The negative relationship with audit 
fees suggests that boards of directors that are equipped with financial expertise and that 
also have a higher frequency of board meetings are associated with increased audit fees. 
 
Hypothesis 9 predicts a positive relationship between the frequency of the meeting of the 
board and AFs. The results do not support this hypothesis. The negative relationship with 
audit fees, suggests that boards of directors that are equipped with financial expertise and 
that have a higher frequency of board meetings are associated with lower audit fees. 
 
Hypothesis 10 predicts a positive relationship between the financial expertise of the board 
and the engagement of industry-specialist auditors. The results do not support this 
hypothesis. The negative relationship with the engagement of industry-specialist auditors 
indicates that the financial expertise of the board may reduce the audit effort and fees.  
 
Hypothesis 11 predicts a negative relationship between the meeting frequency of the 
board and non-audit services fees. The results do not support this hypothesis. The positive 
relationship with non-audit services fees, indicates that the boards of directors that are 
equipped with financial expertise and that have a higher frequency of board meetings are  
paying more non-audit services fees for the auditor’s services. 
 
Hypothesis 12 predicts a positive relationship between the size of the AC and AFs. The 
results do not support this hypothesis. The results indicate that a small size of the AC 
pays high audit fees for the auditors' effort.  
 
Hypothesis 13 predicts a positive relationship between the meeting frequency of the 
board and the engagements of industry-specialist auditors. The results do not support this 
hypothesis. The negative relationship with engagements of industry-specialist auditors 
indicate that small boards that have a lower frequency of meetings are more likely to 




Hypothesis 14 predicts a positive relationship between the size of the AC and the 
engagement of industry-specialist auditors. The results do not support this hypothesis. 
The negative relationship with engagements of industry-specialist auditors indicate that 
the small audit committees’ members that have a lower frequency of meetings are more 
likely to engage industry specialist auditors. 
 
Hypothesis 15 predicts a negative relationship between the size of the AC and non-audit 
services fees. The results do not support this hypothesis. The results indicate that the 
small size ACs pay high non-audit services fees for the auditor’s efforts.   
 
Hypothesis 16 predicts a negative relationship between the solely independent AC and 
non-audit services fees. The results do not support this hypothesis. The positive 
relationship with non-audit services fees indicates that a solely independent AC demands 
extra effort in audit therefore increasing the non-audit services fees and the perceived 
quality of the audit. 
 
Hypothesis 17 predicts a positive relationship between the solely independent AC and 
AFs.  The results do not support this hypothesis. The negative relationship with audit fees 
indicates that solely independent AC members that have a lower frequency of meetings  
demand extra effort in audit therefore increasing the audit fees and the perceived quality 
of the audit. 
 
Hypothesis 18 predicts a positive relationship between the financial expertise of the AC 
and AFs. The results do not support this hypothesis. The negative relationship with audit 
fees, suggests that ACs that are equipped with financial expertise and that have a higher 
frequency of AC meetings are associated with increased audit fees. 
 
Hypothesis 19 predicts that there is a positive relationship between the solely independent 
AC and the engagement of industry-specialist auditors. The negative relationship with 
engagement of industry-specialist auditors indicates that solely independent members that 
have a lower frequency of meetings are more likely to engage industry-specialist auditors. 
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Hypothesis 20 predicts a positive relationship between the financial expertise of the AC 
and the engagement of industry-specialist auditors. The results do not support this 
hypothesis. The negative relationship with the engagement of industry-specialist auditors 
indicates that the financial expertise of the ACs that have a lower frequency of meetings 
are more likely to engage industry specialist auditors.  
 
Hypothesis 21 predicts a negative relationship between the financial expertise of the AC 
and non-audit services fees. The results do not support this hypothesis. The positive 
relationship indicates that ACs with financial expertise can increase the non-audit 
services fees through the auditors’ services. 
 
Hypothesis 22 predicts a negative relationship between the frequency of the meetings of 
the AC and non-audit services fees. The results do not support this hypothesis. The 
positive relationship between audit committee meetings and non-audit services fees 
indicates that a higher number of audit committee meetings demand a higher quality audit 
from their auditors.  
 
Hypothesis 23 predicts a positive relationship between the frequency of meetings of the 
ACs and AFs. The results do not support this hypothesis. The negative relationship with 
audit fees suggests that ACs that are equipped with financial expertise and that have a 
higher frequency of AC meetings are associated with increased audit fees. 
 
Hypothesis 24 predicts a positive relationship between frequency of the meetings of the 
AC and the engagement of industry-specialist auditors. The results do not support this 
hypothesis. The negative relationship with the engagement of industry-specialist auditors 
indicates that the ACs which have a lower frequency of AC meetings are more likely to 
engage industry specialist auditors.  
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H1:  There is a positive relationship 
between the size of the board and non-
audit services fees.  
Not supported 
H2:  There is a negative relationship 
between the size of the board and AFs. 
 
Not supported 
H3:  There is a positive relationship 
between the independent board and AFs.  
 
Supported 
H4:  There is a negative relationship 
between the size of the board and the 
engagement of industry-specialist auditor. 
Not supported 
H5:  There is a positive relationship 
between the independent board and 
engagement of industry-specialist auditors. 
Not supported 
H6:  There is a negative relationship 
between the independent board and non-
audit services fees. 
Not supported 
H7:  There is a negative relationship 
between the financial expertise of the 
board and non-audit services fees.   
Not supported 
H8:  There is a positive relationship 
between the financial expertise of the 
board and AFs.   
Not supported 
H9:  There is a positive relationship 
between the frequency of the meeting of 
the board and AFs. 
 
Not supported 
H10:  There is a positive relationship 
between the financial expertise of the 
board and the engagement of industry-
specialist auditors.  
Not supported 
H11:  There is a negative relationship 
between the meeting frequency of the 
board and non-audit services fees.  
Not supported 
H12:  There is a positive relationship 
between the size of the AC and AFs. 
 
Not supported 
H13:  There is a positive relationship 
between the meeting frequency of the 
board and the engagements of industry-
specialist auditors. 
Not supported 
H14:  There is a positive relationship 
between the size of the AC and the 
engagement of industry-specialist auditors. 
 
Not supported 
H15:  There is a negative relationship 
between the size of the AC and non-audit 
services fees. 
Not supported 
H16:  There is a negative relationship 
between the solely independent AC and 














H17:  There is a positive relationship 
between the solely independent AC and 
AFs.   
Not supported 
H18:  There is a positive relationship 
between the financial expertise of the AC 
and AFs. 
Not supported 
H19:  There is a positive relationship 
between the solely independent AC and the 
engagement of industry-specialist auditors.  
Not supported 
H20:  There is a positive relationship 
between the financial expertise of the AC 
and the engagement of industry-specialist 
auditors. 
Not supported 
H21:  There is a negative relationship 
between the financial expertise of the AC 
and non-audit services fees. 
Not supported 
H22:  There is a negative relationship 
between the frequency of the meeting of 
the AC and non-audit services fees. 
Not supported 
H23:  There is a positive relationship 
between the frequency of a meeting of the 
AC and AFs. 
 
Not supported 
H24:  There is a positive relationship 
between frequency of the meeting of the 














THE RESULTS OF THE FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS: THE 
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE AC, BODs, AQ AND EM 
  
6.0 Introduction 
This chapter provides the results of the second empirical analysis of the ACs and BoDs' 
characteristics and the quality of the external auditor in constraining EM. Consistent with 
the previous chapter, the proxies of the AQ, the variables of the AC and BoD are 
measured in terms of their effectiveness (such as size of the board, financial expertise, 
number of meeting, and number of independent members). This chapter is structured as 
follows: the next section provides the descriptive statistics and correlation matrix. This is 
followed by separate sections on research design, multivariate test results and a 
sensitivity analysis. The final section summarizes and concludes the chapter.  
 
6.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
This section reports the results of the univariate test and descriptive statistics. Table 
No.6.1 provides descriptive statistics for all relevant variables used to examine the 
relationship between the AC, BoDs, AQ and EM for the sample of 148 firm-year 
observations. This study highlights the descriptive statistics for EM, CFO, and MTBV, 
because the other variables have similar standard deviations and means as described in 
Chapter 5. 
 
Across the three measures of DACC, the mean and median of DACC_JM, DACC_MJM 
and DACC_ROA are relatively consistent, at 0.041 (0.020), 0.041 (0.020), and 0.045 
(0.030), respectively. Furgeson et al. (2004) using the modified Jones (1991) model, 
found that the mean (median) absolute values of the sample companies’ discretionary 
accruals during the period 1996 to 1998 to be 0.092 and 0.073, which is much higher than 




This is most likely due to the reforms initiated by the regulatory body in the promotion of 
best practices in corporate behavior. These improvements, for instance, can be seen from 
the Peasnell at al. (2000) study that argue that in the post-Cadbury time period, EM 
(income-increasing accrual management to avoid earnings losses or a declines in 
earnings) occurred in smaller firms that have a BoD membership higher than the number 
of NEDs. This is in contrast to the pre-Cadbury time period, where there is no evidence to 
indicate the composition of NEDs on BoDs is associated with manipulating earnings. 
They conclude that the publication of the Cadbury Report (1992) had a material effect on 
the  monitoring function of the board by helping companies to raise the level of corporate 
behavior, especially the monitoring of non-executive roles. 
 
The mean (median) of CFO and MTBV are 0.194 (0.012) and 0.814 (0.656), 
respectively.  Peasnell et al. (2005) report that the mean (median) of CFO was 0.116 
(0.108). In  comparison with previous studies, the mean (median) of the CFO which is 
documented in this study is relatively higher.  
 
6.2 The correlation matrix 
 
This section will provide the correlation matrix for all variables that have been used in 
the EM models (see Table 6.2). High correlations between AQ measures and 
discretionary accruals are expected because they are interconnected. The AQ, the 
SPECLST_ WEIGHTED and SPECLST _P_S variables are negatively correlated with 
DACC_ROA and DACC_JM measures (correlation coefficients between -0.119 and -
0.061), which indicates that the auditors' specialists in the industry are effective in 
constraining opportunistic earnings. In addition, none of the non-audit services and AFs 
measures are significantly correlated with all DACC. However, with respect to the AC 
and independence of the BoDs, BRDNED is significantly and negatively correlated with 
all DACC measures. This may indicate that independent NEDs either on the AC or BODs 
contribute to the supervision of the company, and are therefore likely to constrain 
opportunistic earnings. The other AC or BoDs characteristics are insignificantly 
correlated with all DACC measures.   
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Table 6.1: Descriptive statistics (Number of observations =148) 











DACC_JM 0.041 0.020 0.093 -0.020 0.090 -0.150 0.590 
DACC_MJM 0.041 0.020 0.088 -0.020 0.090 -0.120 0.590 
DACC_ROA 0.045 0.030 0.092 -0.020 1.000 -0.130 0.590 
ACEXP 2.081 2.000 0.853 1.000 3.000 1.000 3.000 
ACIND 0.756 1.000 0.430 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 
ACMEET  3.959 4.000 0.257 2.000 4.000 4.010 4.000 
ACSIZE 3.391 3.000 0.489 3.000 4.000 3.000 4.000 
BRDNED 2.750 3.000 1.488 1.000 4.000 1.000 7.000 
BLOCK 77.505 56.510 145.406 30.840 77.000 0.000 928.000 
BRDEXP 2.736 3.000 1.219 1.250 4.000 1.000 5.000 
BRDMEET 4.189 4.000 0.653 4.000 4.000 4.000 7.000 
BRDSIZE 6.236 6.000 1.019 5.000 6.000 4.000 8.000 
FEERATIO 1 0.409 0.410 0.139 0.360 0.467 0.000 0.760 
FEERATIO 2 0.798 0.700 0.488 0.467 0.875 0.000 3.230 
MTBV 0.814 0.656 1.000 0.000 1.140 0.000 9.729 
INOWN 4.400 0.000 14.346 0.000 0.000 0.000 68.500 
LEVERG 0.141 0.100 0.158 0.000 0.357 0.000 0.600 
LNAFEE 2.000 2.015 0.606 1.610 2.300 0.000 4.260 
LNASSET 5.266 4.620 2.134 3.823 6.825 0.000 11.062 
LNNAF 1.686 1.610 0.658 1.445 1.950 0.000 5.050 
LNTOTALFEES 2.560 2.560 0.662 2.400 2.770 0.000 5.320 








Table No.6.1: (continued) 











SPECLIST_M_S 0.623 0660 0.206 0.530 0.720 0.000 1.000 
SPECLST_ 
M_S_LEADER 
0.668 1.000 0.472 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 
SPECLST_ 
WEIGHTED 
0.156 0.100 0.149 0.040 0.332 0.000 0.480 
SPECLST_MS_30 0.864 1.000 0.343 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 
SPECLST_P_S 0.249 0.140 0.251 0.070 0.550 0.000 1.000 
ACEXP = the proportion of AC members with accounting experience and financial qualification to AC size; ACIND = coded 
as 1 if AC had solely NEDs; zero otherwise; ACMEET = number of AC meetings during the year; ACSIZE = number of AC 
members; BLOCK = the cumulative percentage shares ownership of the block holders who hold at least 5 % or more of 
outstanding common shares and who are unaffiliated with management; BRDEXP = the total number of directors with 
financial qualification and accounting experience to the size of the board; BRDMEET = total number of the meetings of the 
board during the year; BRDNED = the proportion of NEDs on BoD size; BRDSIZE = numbers of board members during the 
year; CFO=cash flow from operation scaled by lagged total asset; DACC_JM=discretionary accrual based on Jones’ Model 
(1991),  DACC_MJM=discretionary accruals based on Modified Jones model; DACC_ROA=discretionary accruals by 
Kothari et al. (2005), including lagged (ROA) in the accrual regression to control for performance of the firm; FEERATIO 1= 
the fee ratio of non audit service fees to total fees; FEERATIO 2= the fee ratio of non audit service fees to AFs; INOWN = the 
cumulative percentage of total shares owned by the directors of a firm; LEVERG = the proportion of debts to total assets; 
LNAFEE= the natural log of AFs; LNASSET = the natural logarithm of total assets; ; LNNAF=natural log of non audit service 
fees; LNTOTALFEES=natural log of the sum of audit and non audit service fees; MTBV= market to book value ratio; 
SPECLIST_M_S: continuous variable which equals to the respective auditor market share; SPECLST_M_S_LEADER: coded 
as 1 if the auditor earned the largest market share in each particular industry, zero if otherwise; SPECLST_MS_30: coded as 1 
if the auditor market share exceeds 30 percent in each particular industry, zero if otherwise; SPECLST_P_S: continuous 
variable which equals to the respective auditor portfolio share; SPECLST_WEIGHTED= continuous variable which equals to 


















































































































































1 DACC_JM 1.000           
2 DACC_MJM 0.980** 1.000          
3 DACC_ROA 0.936** 0.943** 1.000         
4 LNAFEE 0.010 0.049 0.001 1.000        
5 LNNAF -0.018 0.043 -0.017 0.638** 1.000       
6 LNTOTALFEES -0.012 0.035 -0.023 0.929** 0.844** 1.000      
7 FEERATIO 1 -0.057 -0.125 -0.057 0.103 0.720** 0.456** 1.000     
8 FEERATIO 2 -0.054 -0.027 -0.067 -0.007 0.660** 0.354** 0.910** 1.000    
9 SPECLST_M_S_LEADER 0.159 0.165* 0.174* 0.174* 0.056 0.128 -0.094 -0.067 1.000   
10 SPECLST_MS_30 0.055 0.073 0.093 0.331** 0.246** 0.321** 0.086 0.015 0.520** 1.000  
11 SPECLST_M_S -0.065 -0.066 -0.061 0.391** 0.259** 0.401** 0.134 0.099 0.525** 0.587** 1.000 
12 SPECLST_P_S -0.119 -0.085 -0.108 0.109 -0.012 0.077 -0.049 -0.071 0.172* -0.038 0.003 
13 SPECLST_WEIGHTED -0.117 0.073 -0.100 0.174* 0.018 0.134 -0.065 -0.060 0.341** 0.173* 0.228** 
14 BRDSIZE  0.091 0.094 -0.015 0.092 0.036 0.048 -0.103 -0.086 0.037 -0.122 -0.268** 
15 BRDNED -0.299** -0.286** -0.271** 0.048 0.079 0.031 -0.036 -0.034 -0.080 -0.120 -0.095 
16 BRDEXP  -0.061 -0.027 -0.097 -0.055 -0.047 -0.069 -0.069 -0.028 -0.235** -0.248** -0.278** 
17 BRDMEET -0.104 -0.110 -0.118 0.010 -0.110 -0.023 -0.073 -0.097 -0.237** -0.037 0.055 
18 ACSIZE -0.036 -0.006 -0.068 0.035 0.094 0.034 -0.030 0.038 0.006 -0.007 -0.159 
19 ACIND -0.149 -0.105 -0.098 0.065 0.077 0.058 0.003 -0.009 -0.064 0.006 0.082 






















































































































































21 ACMEET -0.037 -0.040 -0.043 -0.067 -0.050 -0.058 -0.001 0.019 0.224** 0.092 0.256** 
22 INOWN -0.001 -0.055 -0.002 0.026 -0.060 -0.002 -0.053 -0.081 0.171* 0.108 0.277** 
23 BLOCK -0.112 -0.105 -0.111 -0.027 0.053 0.003 0.085 0.056 -0.231** -0.067 -0.012 
24 MTBV 0.156 0.151 0.163* 0.053 -0.027 -0.002 -0.140 -0.122 0.046 -0.046 -0.108 
25 CFO 0.021 0.074 -0.031 0.103 0.147 0.129 0.094 0.093 0.284** 0.110 0.068 
26 LEVERG 0.201* 0.243** 0.250** 0.031 -0.012 0.029 0.025 -0.024 0.024 -0.007 -0.024 
























































































































12 SECLST_P_S 1.000           
13 SPECLST_WEIGHTED 0.899** 1.000          
14 BRDSIZE 0.385** 0.351* 1.000         
15 BRDNED 0.274** 0.234** 0.479** 1.000        
16 BRDEXP 0.394** 0.348** 0.439** 0.409** 1.000       
17 BRDMEET   0.073 0.103 -0.057 0.035 -0.039 1.000      
18 ACSIZE 0.344** 0.300** 0.208** 0.089 0.003 0.064 1.000     
19 ACIND 0.261** 0.258** 0.241** 0.541** 0.396** 0.163* 0.003 1.000    
20 ACEXP 0.355** 0.331** 0.166* 0.059 0.589** -0.077 0.070 0.350** 1.000   
21 ACMEET 0.107 0.141 -0.119 -0.133 -0.034 0.046 -0.089 0.279** 0.201* 1.000  
































































































































23 BLOCK 0.013 0.001 -0.142 -0.171* 0.224** -0.016 -0.085 0.100 0.209* -0.009 -0.065 
24 MTBV 0.051 0.068 0.131 0.081 -0.007 -0.008 0.070 0.121 -0.103 0.067 0.009 
25 CFO 0.288** 0.337** 0.348** 0.116 0.176* -0.171* 0.257* 0.095 0.190* 0.036 0.047 
26 LEVERG 0.411** 0.379** 0.115 -0.119 0.250** 0.037 -0.006 0.116 0.316** 0.027 0.185* 
















































      
23 BLOCK 1.000           
24 MTBV -0.145 1.000          
25 CFO -0.023 0.065 1.000         
26 LEVERG 0.139 0.038 0.129 1.000        













Table 6.2 (continued) 
ACEXP = the proportion of AC members with accounting experience and financial qualification to AC size; ACIND = coded as 1 if AC had 
solely NEDs; zero otherwise; ACMEET = number of AC meetings during the year; ACSIZE = number of AC members; BRDEXP = the 
total number of directors with financial qualification and accounting experience to the size of the board; BRDMEET = total number of the 
meetings of the board during the year; BRDNED = the proportion of NEDs on BoD size; BRDSIZE = numbers of board members during 
the year; CFO=cash flow from operation scaled by lagged total asset; DACC_JM=discretionary accrual based on Jones’ Model (1991),  
DACC_MJM=discretionary accruals based on Modified Jones model; DACC_ROA=discretionary accruals by Kothari et al. (2005), 
including lagged (ROA) in the accrual regression to control for performance of the firm; FEERATIO 1= the fee ratio of non audit service 
fees to total fees; FEERATIO 2= the fee ratio of non audit service fees to AFs; INOWN = the cumulative percentage of total shares owned 
by the directors of a firm; LEVERG = the proportion of debts to total assets; LNAFEE= the natural log of AFs; LNASSET = the natural 
logarithm of total assets; ; LNNAF=natural log of non audit service fees; LNTOTALFEES=natural log of the sum of audit and non audit 
service fees; MTBV= market to book value ratio; SPECLIST_M_S: continuous variable which equals to the respective auditor market 
share; SPECLST_M_S_LEADER: coded as 1 if the auditor earned the largest market share in each particular industry, zero if otherwise; 
SPECLST_MS_30: coded as 1 if the auditor market share exceeds 30 percent in each particular industry, zero if otherwise; SPECLST_P_S: 
continuous variable which equals to the respective auditor portfolio share; SPECLST_WEIGHTED= continuous variable which equals to 
the compliment between portfolio share, **Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) in bold, * correlation is significant at the 










6.3 Multivariate regression for Earnings Management  
 
Multivariate regressions are estimated using least square regression with robust standard 
error, which is effective in controlling for heteroscedasticity. Table No.6.3 displays the 
results of the three measures of discretionary accruals: including DACC_ROA, DACC_ 
MJM, and DACC_ JM. Since there is a multiple variables substitute for the proxy of AQ 
and most of them are highly correlated with each other, all of them are included in a 
single empirical model. In total thirty models of EM were examined. The range of the 
adjusted R
2 
is between 0.113 and 0.158, which is lower than that reported in a previous 
United Kingdom study conducted by Peasnell et al. (2005). This may be due to size of the 
sample and specifications of the different model. 
 
As can be seen from Table No.6.3, LNAFEE is found negatively correlated with 
DACC_ROA and DACC_JM measurements, which indicates that companies with higher 
AFs are more likely to constrain EM. There is a possibility that companies with higher 
AFs stimulate more effort to audit, and this in turn reduces the likelihood of opportunistic 
earnings. This result is consistent with the claim made by Caramanis and Lennox (2008), 
who report that when the hours of audit are lower, companies report larger income-
increasing discretionary accruals.   
 
In all models, the non-audit services fees measures are insignificantly associated with 
DACC. This result is consistent with Ruddock et al. (2006), and Chung and Kallapur 
(2003), who found no evidence of a relationship between the EM and non-audit services. 
Although there is no statistically significant relationship, the results provide a mixed 
directional sign of the EM and non-audit services coefficients, indicating that the 
measures of the independent auditor are sensitive to the research design. 
 
The findings for auditors’ specialists in the industry are conditional. The auditors’ 
specialists measured by SPECLST _WEIGHTED and SPECLST _P_S show significant 





However, using the approach of market share to calculate the variables of auditors’ 
industry specialists, it shows that none of these measures are significantly associated with 
all DACC. Krishnan (2001) argues that the portfolio approach is better at capturing the 
efforts of the auditors to differentiate their products, rather than the industry market share 
approach. These negative findings may indicate that EM in companies with auditors 
specialists is lower than companies with non-specialist auditors. This is consistent with 
Krishnan (2003) who indicates that auditors’ specialists in the industry provide a higher 
AQ than non-specialist auditors through the mitigation of accruals based earnings.   
  
In relation to the characteristics of AC and BoDs, none of these variables are significantly 
related with DACC except for BRDMEET, BRDNED and ACMEET. BRDMEET is 
found negatively and significantly related with EM (LNNAF, FEERATIO 2, 
SPECLST_M_S, SPECLST_P_S, and SPECLST_WEIGHTED) in the DACC_ROA 
model for the pooled sample, and negatively and significantly related with EM 
(SPECLST_WEIGHTED) in the DACC_ JM for the pooled sample. BRDNED is found 
to be negatively and significantly related with EM (all variables) only in the DACC_JM 
model for the pooled sample. ACMEET is found significantly negatively correlated with 
the three measures of discretionary accruals (DACC_ROA, DACC_ MJM, and DACC_ 
JM). ACSIZE is found to be negatively related with EM in the DACC_ROA, DACC_ 
MJM, and DACC_ JM models for the pooled sample. Although the relationship is weak, 
these findings are consistent with those of Yang and Krishnan (2005). As compared with 
previous studies in the United Kingdom, the findings are contradictory to Habbash et al 
(2010) and Habbash (2010). The possible explanation for the contradictory findings may 
be due to the differences in research design. Habbash (2010) segregates the variables of 
AC and BoDs in two different EM models, while Habbash et al. (2010) do not control the 









For the control variables, MTBV is found positively related with EM 
(SPECLST_M_S_LEADER and SPECLST_MS_30) in the DACC_ROA model for the 
pooled sample. INOWN indicates a negative significant relationship with EM 
(SPECLST_P_S and SPECLST_WEIGHTED) in the DACC_ MJM model for the pooled 
sample, while BLOCK is found negatively and significantly related with EM 
(SPECLST_P_S and SPECLST_WEIGHTED) in the DACC_ MJM, and DACC_ JM 
models for the pooled sample and with EM (only with SPECLST_WEIGHTED) in the 
DACC_ROA model for the pooled sample, This negative relationship contradicts the 
findings documented by Klein (2002), but is relatively consistent with findings with 
Bowen et al. (2008). CFO is found positively related with EM (SPECLST_P_S and 
SPECLST_WEIGHTED) only in the DACC_ MJM model for the pooled sample, which 
indicates that the companies that have high cash flows and negative income have a 
greater incentive to manage reported earnings. The positive coefficient is consistent with 
the findings of Frankel et al. (2002). In addition, there is a positive and significant 
relationship between DACC and LEVERG in most of the DACC models. LNASSET is 
found positively correlation coefficients with DACC in most models; these findings are 
consistent with the DeFond and Park (1997) and Becker et al. (1998) findings.  
 
In brief, the results of the multivariate analysis suggest that companies engaging auditor 
industry specialists and paying higher AFs are associated with lower EM. This is 
consistent with previous studies such  as Krishnan, 2003; Caramis and Lennox, 2008 that 
indicate that a higher AQ has a greater capacity to constrain earnings manipulation via 
the extent of their function of monitoring thus improving the quality of reported earnings. 
In addition, there is no statistically significant relationship noted between the EM and 
non-audit services, indicating that the joint provision of non-audit services and audit have 
no impact on opportunistic earnings.  
 
This result contradicts a previous study in the United Kingdom carried out by Antle at al. 
(2006) which indicates a negative relationship between EM and non-audit services. One 
of the possible reasons for this may be due to the increase of the non-audit services 




However, none of the results indicate that the AC or the BoD characteristics can be 
clearly linked with EM. As noted by Larker and Richardson (2004), the monitoring role 
of the auditors depends on the strength of the CG structure for the companies, and thus it 
is possible that the auditor monitoring roles outweigh the oversight functions of the ACs 





Table 6.3: The results of the EM model with the multivariate regression. 
DACC = β0 + β1 ACEXP+ β2 ACIND+ β3 ACMEET+ β4 ACSIZE+ β5 AQ+ β6 BRDEXP + β7 BRDMEET + β8 BRDNED + β9 BRDSIZE + β10 
BLOCK+ β11 CFO+ β12 INOWN+ β13 LEVERGN+ β14  LNASSET+ β15  MTBV+ ε 
The (DACC) dependent variable is measured as follows:  
(1) DACC_JM; (2) DACC_MJM; and (3) DACC_ROA 
The AQ proxies are: FEERATIO 1, FEERATIO 2, LNAFEE, LNNAF, LNTOTALFEES, SPECLST_M_S, SPECLST_M_S_LEADER, 
SPECLST_MS_30, SPECLST_P_S or SPECLST_WEIGHTED 











































































































































































        
LNTOTALFEES 
  -0.003 
(-0.30) 
       
FEERATIO 1 
   -0.016 
(-0.31) 
      
FEERATIO 2 
    -0.002 
(-0.18) 
     
SPECLST_M_S_LEADER 
     0.018 
(0.95) 
    
SPECLST_MS_30 
      0.010 
(0.46) 
   
SPECLST_M_S 




























































































































































































































































































































Table 6.3: (continued) 



















































































































































































        
LNTOTALFEES 
  0.001 
(0.11) 
       
FEERATIO 1 
   -0.006 
(-0.13) 
      
FEERATIO 2 
    -0.001 
(-0.05) 
     
SPECLST_M_S_LEADER 
     0.023 
(1.27) 
    
SPECLST_MS_30 
      0.018 
(0.83) 
   
SPECLST_M_S 





































































































































































































































































































































Table 6.3: (continued) 



















































































































































































        
LNTOTALFEES 
  -0.007 
(-0.68) 
       
FEERATIO 1 
   -0.034 
(-0.67) 
      
FEERATIO 2 
    -0.008 
(-0.56) 
     
SPECLST_M_S_LEADER 
     0.029 
(1.57) 
    
SPECLST_MS_30 
      0.022 
(0.96) 
   
SPECLST_M_S 



























































































































































































































































































































Adj. R2 0.114 0.113 0.115 0.115 0.114 0.128 0.118 0.115 0.136 0.132 
Note:  







6.4 The additional analyses 
 
This section details the additional analyses that were conducted in order to see whether 
the primary results are robust to the specifications of different models. The tests contain 
the heteroscedasticity and multicollinearity tests, various regression estimators, new 
definitions for AC and BoD variables, the other control variables, the two-stage least-
squares (2SLS) regression and endogeneity. 
 
6.4.1 Heteroscedasticity and multicollinearity tests 
 
To confirm whether heteroscedasticity exists, table No.6.4 provide the results of the 
heteroscedasticity test by using the Breush-Pagan or Cook-Weisberg test. Most of the 
models indicate a significant p value between p < 0.05 and p < 0.01, which indicates that  
heteroscedasticity exists. The results of the tolerance test and VIF value are displayed in 
table No.6.5. As all the variables have values of VIF thatare between 1.10 to 2.80 and the 
values of tolerance are higher than 0.10, this indicates that there is no problem of 
multicollinearity. 
 
6.4.2 Various regression estimators 
 
Due to the problem of heteroscedasticity, the main analyses were regressed using least 
square regression with a robust standard error. As the benchmark of comparison, in this 
section, the results of the multivariate regression analysis were regressed using GLS 
regression, which is effective in controlling for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. 
The results are displayed in Table No.6.6. As can be seen, the results of GLS regression 
analysis are relatively consistent with the main results. 
 
6.4.3 New definitions for AC and BoD variables 
 
In order to check whether the alternative definitions influence the main findings, as in the 




Following DeFond et al. (2005) and Abbott et al.'s (2003b) approaches, the new 
definitions for the variables of the BoD and AC (BRDSIZE, BRDNED, ACEXP, 
ACMEET, and ACIND) are as follows: 
 
1. BRDSIZE_1 is coded as 1 if the size of the company’s board is less than 
the sample median, and zero if otherwise.  
 
2. BRDNED_1 is coded as 1 if 60 % of the directors of the company are 
independent, and zero if otherwise.  
 
3. ACEXP_1, and coded as 1 if the AC had at least one director is equipped 
with accounting or finance expertise, and zero if otherwise.  
 
4. ACMEET_1 is coded as 1 if the frequency of the AC meeting is larger 
than the sample median and zero if otherwise.  
 
5. ACIND_1 is defines the proportion of independent NED of the AC.  
 
As can be seen from Table No.6.7, the results of the alternative definitions are relatively 
consistent with the main findings except for BRDNED_1, which is found to be 
insignificantly and positively related across all the DACC measures in all the models. 
Furthermore, in contrast to the main findings, BRDSIZE_1 is found positively correlated  
with all the DACC measures in all the models. ACIND1 and ACEXP_1 are found 
negatively correlated with all the measures. Similarly, ACMEET is found negatively 
correlated with all the measures except with DACC_MJM in model (11). The other 









The negative relationship between DACC and ACIND_1 indicates that companies whose 
AC has a higher proportion of independent NEDs is likely to be associated with lower 
EM, although this is not the case for ACs consisting solely of independent members. This 
may suggest the importance of the role of the executive members and their contribution 
to the effective AC. Overall, the results that have been obtained for the auditor’s industry 
specialist variables hold for selected models.  
 
6.4.4 The two-stage least-squares (2SLS) regression and endogeneity 
 
The main results indicate that EM levels reduce when companies hire auditors’ industry 
specialists, and this is consistent with the claim that the auditors’ industry specialists use 
their industry competency (specialist skills) to constrain opportunistic earnings. However, 
it can be claimed that since the NEDs have difficulty in differentiating non-discretionary 
and discretionary accruals, it is possible that the companies will select the auditor’s 
industry specialist to signal that EM is constrained by the presence of higher AQ and not 
necessarily due to their competency (specialist skills) (Francis et al., 1999).  
 
Also, Caramanis and Lennox (2008) claim that companies which have an interest in  
managing earnings would be an incentive to hire lower auditor effort (AFs), which 
indicates a negative relationship between EM and AFs. Moreover, previous literature 
indicates that the characteristics of the CG are associated with the problem of  
endogeneity. Therefore, taking into account all of these possibilities, this study tests 
whether the models of EM containing these variables are subject to the problem of 
endogeneity. 
 
The Durbin-Wu-Hausman test was performed on the selected models. The findings are 
displayed in Table No.6.8. The null hypotheses are the characteristics of the BoDs and 
include (BDRNED, BRDSIZE, BRDEXP, and BRDMEET), the characteristics of ACs 
include (ACIND_1, ACSIZE, ACEXP, and ACMEET), LNAFEE, SPECLST_P_S, and 
SPECLST_WEIGHTED are exogeneous. If the F statistic is significant, then the null 




As can be seen from Table No.6.8, the values of the F statistic from the AC and BoD 
variables and LNAFEE, SPECLST_P_S, and SPECLST_WEIGHTED are insignificant 
in all models, which indicates that there is no endogeneity. 
Table 6.4: Test of heteroscedasticity for EM model 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
H0: variance of the residual term is constant 
Reject H0 if p value is significant 
DACC = β0 + β1 ACEXP+ β2 ACIND+ β3 ACMEET+ β4 ACSIZE+ β5 AQ 
+ β6 BRDEXP + β7 BRDMEET + β8 BRDNED + β9 BRDSIZE + β10 BLOCK+ β11 CFO+ 




Audit quality proxy (AQ) chi2(1) Prob > chi2 
(1) DACC_JM LNAFEE 2.09 0.148 
(2) DACC_JM LNNAF 1.07 0.302 
(3) DACC_JM LNTOTALFEES 0.02 0.892 
(4) DACC_JM FEERATIO 1 10.18 0.001 
(5) DACC_JM FEERATIO 2 16.92 0.000 
(6) DACC_JM SPECLST_M_S_LEADER 5.63 0.017 
(7) DACC_JM SPECLST_MS_30 0.01 0.940 
(8) DACC_JM SPECLST_M_S 0.16 0.685 
(9) DACC_JM SPECLST_P_S 17.61 0.000 
(10) DACC_JM SPECLST_WEIGHTED 21.74 0.000 
(11) DACC_MJM LNAFEE 2.96 0.085 
(12) DACC_MJM LNNAF 0.78 0.378 
(13) DACC_MJM LNTOTALFEES 0.01 0.918 
(14) DACC_MJM FEERATIO 1 12.16 0.000 
(15) DACC_MJM FEERATIO 2 19.28 0.000 
(16) DACC_MJM SPECLST_M_S_LEADER 6.12 0.013 
(17) DACC_MJM SPECLST_MS_30 0.04 0.839 
(18) DACC_MJM SPECLST_M_S 0.22 0.642 
(19) DACC_MJM SPECLST_P_S 22.34 0.000 
(20) DACC_MJM SPECLST_WEIGHTED 28.45 0.000 
(21) DACC_ROA LNAFEE 3.39 0.065 
(22) DACC_ROA LNNAF 0.38 0.538 
(23) DACC_ROA LNTOTALFEES 0.05 0.816 
(24) DACC_ROA FEERATIO 1 8.97 0.003 
(25) DACC_ROA FEERATIO 2 14.47 0.000 
(26) DACC_ROA SPECLST_M_S_LEADER 6.000 0.120 
(27) DACC_ROA SPECLST_MS_30 0.11 0.742 
    (28) DACC_ROA SPECLST_M_S 0.28 0.593 
(29) DACC_ROA SPECLST_P_S 14.11 0.000 
(30) DACC_ROA SPECLST_WEIGHTED 19.37 0.000 
283 
 
Table 6.5: Value of the tolerance and VIF for the EM model 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (8) (9) 
Variable VIF Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF Tolerance 
LNAFEE 1.05 0.950             
LNNAF   1.08 0.920           
LNTOTALFEES     1.05 0.952         
FEERATIO 1       1.10 0.903       
FEERATIO 2         1.08 0.923     
SPECLST_M_S           1.50 0.663   
SPECLST_P_S             1.97 0.506 
BRDSIZE 1.98 0.505 1.96 0.508 1.96 0.508 1.98 0.503 1.99 0.501 2.01 0.496 1.97 0.508 
BRDNED 2.67 0.373 2.69 0.372 2.67 0.373 2.68 0.373 2.67 0.373 2.67 0.373 2.80 0.357 
BRDEXP  2.45 0.407 2.43 0.411 2.44 0.409 2.40 0.415 2.41 0.414 2.64 0.378 2.43 0.440 
BRDMEET 1.46 0.681 1.47 0.677 1.46 0.681 1.46 0.681 1.47 0.678 1.47 0.678 1.46 0.681 
ACSIZE 1.18 0.842 1.19 0.839 1.18 0.843 1.18 0.843 1.19 0.840 1.22 0.815 1.31 0.760 
ACIND 2.28 0.438 2.28 0.438 2.28 0.437 2.27 0.440 2.26 0.441 2.30 0.434 2.29 0.436 
ACEXP 2.32 0.431 2.31 0.432 2.31 0.432 2.32 0.430 2.33 0.429 2.31 0.432 2.31 0.431 
ACMEET 1.34 0.742 1.33 0.749 1.34 0.745 1.33 0.751 1.33 0.750 1.36 0.735 1.39 0.717 
INOWN 1.26 0.790 1.26 0.789 1.26 0.791 1.27 0.787 1.27 0.784 1.30 0.764 1.30 0.765 
BLOCK  1.76 0.567 1.77 0.562 1.76 0.567 1.78 0.561 1.76 0.566 1.78 0.561 1.78 0.561 
MTBV 1.11 0.901 1.11 0.900 1.10 0.901 1.13 0.885 1.12 0.887 1.13 0.879 1.11 0.901 
CFO 1.30 0.765 1.32 0.756 1.31 0.758 1.33 0.749 1.32 0.756 1.33 0.748 1.31 0.763 
LEVERG 1.32 0.754 1.32 0.754 1.32 0.754 1.33 0.748 1.32 0.753 1.32 0.754 1.60 0.622 
LNASSET  2.39 0.418 2.40 0.416 2.39 0.417 2.42 0.412 2.40 0.416 2.52 0.396 2.48 0.402 











Table 6.6: The results of Generalized least square (GLS) estimator regression for the EM model 











































































































































































        
LNTOTALFEES 
  0.002 
(0.19) 
       
FEERATIO 1 
   -0.016 
(-0.25) 
      
FEERATIO 2 
    -0.003 
(-0.12) 
     
SPECLST_M_S_LEADER 
     0.018 
(1.14) 
    
SPECLST_MS_30 
      0.011 
(0.45) 
   
SPECLST_M_S 






































































































































































































































































































































Table 6.6: (continued) 



















































































































































































        
LNTOTALFEES 
  0.002 
(0.16) 
       
FEERATIO 1 
   -0.016 
(-0.31) 
      
FEERATIO 2 
    -0.003 
(-0.18) 
     
SPECLST_M_S_LEADER 
     0.018 
(0.95) 
    
SPECLST_MS_30 
      0.010 
(0.46) 
   
SPECLST_M_S 







































































































































































































































































































































Table 6.6: (continued) 



















































































































































































        
LNTOTALFEES 
  -0.007 
(-0.68) 
       
FEERATIO 1 
   -0.036 
(-0.67) 
      
FEERATIO 2 
    -0.008 
(-0.56) 
     
SPECLST_M_S_LEADER 
     0.029 
(1.57) 
    
SPECLST_MS_30 
      0.022 
(0.96) 
   
SPECLST_M_S 


























































































































































































































































































































Adj. R2 0.148 0.094 0.118 0.097 0.072 0.181 0.127 0.149 0.136 0.164 









Table 6.7: The results of EM model for the different test variable definitions (N=148) 
Variables Coefficient (z-statistics) 





























































































































































  0.005 
(0.52) 







  -0.118 
(3.12)** 





  -0.207 
(-2.90)** 
  -0.177 
(-2.66)** 


































































































































































































































































































Adj. R2 0.138 0.103 0.098 0.158 0.126 0.109 0.187 0.138 0.124 


















Table 6.8: Test of the EM model with the endogeneity test  
Durbin-Wu-Hausman Test 
H0 = the residual of the characteristics of the BODs and ACs include (BRDSIZE, BRDEXP, BRDMEET, and BDRNED, ACSIZE, 
ACEXP, ACMEET, and ACIND_1), LNNAF, SPECLST_P_S, and SPECLST_WEIGHTED are exogenous  
Reject H0 if F statistic significant  
Variables Chi2 (1) 









































































































































  1.614 
(p=0.203) 







  0.104 
(p=0.746) 





  0.063 
(p=0.801) 
  0.065 
(p=0.698) 




































































































































































6.5 The summary 
 
This chapter shows the empirical findings on the relationship between the effectiveness 
of  ACs and BoDs characteristics and AQ in constraining EM. The effectiveness of the 
AC and BoD is measured based on size, number of independent members, financial 
expertise and meeting frequency. The AQ proxies are surrogates by auditors’ industry 
specialist, AFs, and non-audit services fees.  EM is measured by the absolute value of the 
discretionary accruals using the performance-adjusted discretionary accruals, Jones 
model and the modified Jones model.  
 
The multivariate regressions conducted on the sample of 148 firm-year observations 
indicate that companies hiring auditors’ industry specialists and paying higher AFs are 
less likely to manage earnings. These results are robust to the specifications of various 
models. The negative relationship between discretionary accruals and AFs may indicate 
that the effort of the auditor, which is measured by the audit hours, indirectly minimizes 
opportunistic earnings between managers, because of their concern that such measures 
may be discovered by the extensive efforts of the auditor. This claim is consistent with 
Caramanis and Lennox (2008) who indicates that higher audit hours reduce EM. 
 
With regard to measures of the auditor independence, there is no supporting evidence that  
non-audit services fees are associated with EM. Moreover, the result of the auditor’s 
industry specialists is significant only with respect to the complementary 
(SPECLST_WEIGHTED) and portfolio (SPECLST_P_S) approaches. Previously, 
Krishnan (2001) argued that the portfolio approach is better at capturing the efforts of the 
auditors’ industry specialists to differentiate their products rather than the industry market 
share approach. The complementary approach, however, captures the complementary 








In contrast to expectations regarding the effectiveness of the AC and BoDs in 
constraining opportunistic earnings, the current study finds no evidence that the size, 
number of the independent members, financial expertise and meeting frequency affect the 
extent of manipulation of earnings. It may be due to the fact that the monitoring 
characteristics of the ACs and BoDs are offset by the increased AQ. The summary of the 
results and hypothesis are displayed in Table No.6.9. 
 
Hypothesis 24 predicts a positive relationship between frequency of the meeting of the 
AC and the engagement of industry-specialist auditors. The results do not support this 
hypothesis. The negative relationship with the engagement of industry-specialist auditors 
indicates that the ACs which have lower frequency of meetings are more likely to engage 
industry specialist auditors.  
 
Hypothesis 25 predicts a negative relationship between the independent board and EM. 
There is no evidence that the number of independent members affects the extent of the 
manipulation of earnings.  
 
Hypothesis 26 predicts a positive relationship between the board’s size and EM. There is 
no evidence that the size of the board affects the extent of manipulation of earnings.   
 
Hypothesis 27 predicts a negative relationship between the boards’ meeting frequency 
and EM. There is no evidence that the meeting frequency affects the extent of 
manipulation of earnings. 
 
Hypothesis 28 predicts a negative relationship between the board’s financial expertise 
and EM. There is no evidence that financial expertise affects the extent of manipulation 
of earnings.    
 
Hypothesis 29 predicts a negative relationship between the solely independent AC and 
EM. There is no evidence that a solely independent AC affects the extent of manipulation 
of earnings.   
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Hypothesis 30 predicts a negative relationship between the AC’s size and EM. There is 
no evidence that the size of the AC affects the extent of manipulation of earnings.   
 
Hypothesis 31 predicts a negative relationship between the AC’s meeting frequency and 
EM. There is no evidence that the AC’s meeting frequency affects the extent of 
manipulation of earnings.    
 
Hypothesis 32 predicts a negative relationship between the AC’s financial expertise and 
EM. There is no evidence that the AC’s financial expertise affects the extent of 
manipulation of earnings.     
 
Hypothesis 33 predicts a positive relationship between the non audit services fees and 
EM. There is no evidence that the AC’s financial expertise affects the extent of 
manipulation of earnings.  As a result, there is no statistically significant relationship 
between EM and non-audit services. 
 
Consistent with hypothesis 34 that there is a negative relationship between the industry-
specialist auditors and EM, the result indicates that auditor industry specialists provide a 
higher ability to constrain opportunistic earnings than the non specialist auditor. 
 
Consistent with hypothesis 35 that there is a negative relationship between AFs and EM, 
the result indicates that companies paying higher AFs are associated with a higher auditor 
effort, thereby reducing the opportunistic EM because of their concern that it may be 





















H24:  There is a positive relationship 
between frequency of the meeting of the 
AC and the engagement of industry-
specialist auditors. 
Not supported 
H25:  There is a negative relationship 
between the independent board and EM. 
 
Not supported 
H26:  There is a positive relationship 
between the board’s size and EM.  
 
Not supported 
H27:  There is a negative relationship 
between the board’s meeting frequency 
and EM.  
Not supported 
H28:  There is a negative relationship 
between the board’s financial expertise and 
EM.  
Not supported 
H29:  There is a negative relationship 
between the solely independent AC and 
EM.   
Not supported 
H30:  There is a negative relationship 
between the AC’s size and EM.  
 
Not supported 
H31:  There is a negative relationship 
between the AC’s meeting frequency and 
EM.   
Not supported 
H32:  There is a negative relationship 
between the AC’s financial expertise and 
EM.   
Not supported 
H33:  There is a positive relationship 
between the non audit services fees and 
EM. 
Not supported 
H34:  There is a negative relationship 
between the industry-specialist auditor and 
EM.  
Supported 
H35:  There is a negative relationship 












SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
7.0 Introduction 
This final chapter produces the summary and conclusion of the 2 empirical investigations 
that have been examined in this study.  The first investigation take into consideration the 
relationship between the AQ, AC and BoDs characteristics, while the second 
investigation dealt with the relationship between the AC and BoDs and  the quality of the 
external auditor in constraining EM. The chapter also details the contribution that it 
makes, limitations and implications on the investigations, as well as recommendations for 
future research. 
 
7.1 Summary and conclusion 
 
The issues related to the EM and AQ have been the focus of many regulatory and 
academic discussions all over the world. The external auditors, AC and BoDs have been 
recognized as the mechanisms that have the ability to control opportunistic earnings, and 
therefore directly link with the FRQ, in accordance with the proposition of agency theory. 
Unfortunately, prior studies are mainly U.S.A – based research where the reputation of 
the auditor, the structure of the governance and the litigation environment are noticed to 
be different, and therefore limit the generalizability of the results to other developing 
countries. The present thesis examines these issues in the context of the Kingdom of 
Bahrain,  based on the Bahrain Stock Exchange (now Bahrain Bourse) between the 
financial years 2010 and 2013.  
 
Since investors are cannot directly control the EM and AQ, they rely on the external 
auditors, AC and BoDs to obtain financial statements that are free from any errors, 
misstatement or fraud. Therefore, in this thesis, there are 3 proxies of the AQ and 8 





Consistent with the previous evidence and agency theory regarding the effectiveness of 
certain characteristics of the AC and BoDs, this study posits that the smaller number of 
the BoD members, having more independent NEDs, having more regular meetings, and 
having financial experience are identified as effective BoDs. Similarly, an AC with more 
members, having more regular meetings, with independent directors, and more financial 
experience is also defined as an effective AC. Based on the industry specialist auditors, 
AFs and the hypothesis of signaling or reputation are used as the AQ’s proxies. In 
addition, a Non audit service is substituted for auditor independence, that was observed 
with skepticism by the regulators, to reduce the auditor objectivity when providing the 
services of auditing.  
 
Accordingly, the engagement through the use of auditor’s specialists in the industry 
(Carcello and Nagy, 2004; Owhoso et al., 2002; O’Keefe at al., 1994; Bédard and Biggs, 
1991), higher AFs (O’Sullivan, 2000; Carcello et al., 2002; Abbott et al., 2003b), and 
lower Non-audit services fees (Larcker and Richardson, 2004; Raghunandan, 2003; 
Frankel et al. 2002; Firth, 2002; Sharma and Sidhu, 2001; Wines, 1994) are seen as 
higher auditor quality or higher AQ. These proxies of the AQ and characteristics of the 
AC and BoDs are expected to signal to market participants the effectiveness of a 
particular company in the monitoring of financial reporting, therefore the transfer of the 
credibility of the company’s financial statements.  
 
This study examines two empirical studies. The first study examines the relationship 
between the effective monitoring characteristics of the AC and BoDs including financial 
expertise, number of the independent members, frequency of the meeting of AC and 
BoDs, and size on AQ. Specifically, 3 models of AQ are examined: industry specialist 
auditors, non audit services, and AFs. From the model of the AFs, this study finds a 
positive relationship between the independent NEDs on BoD and AFs. This results show 
that the independent NEDs on boards demand extra effort in audit for ratification of the 
monitoring function. This result is consistent with the results of Adelopo (2010), Abbot et 




The other characteristics of the AC and BoD either insignificantly correlated or 
marginally correlated with AFs. This study conjectures that this may be due to the 
independent characteristic of the BoD that counteracts the other effective characteristics 
of the AC and BoD. These results are robust to the specifications of different models and 
tests. 
 
The results from the model of non audit services fees is the opposite, which indicates that 
the higher number of independent BoD members is associated with higher non audit 
services fees. This contrasts with the view that an independent BOD uses its supervisory 
function to reduce the non audit services as they perceive that higher non audit services 
fees weaken the auditor independence.  This may indicate that the independent board's 
view of joint provision of non audit services and audit does not necessarily compromise 
audit independence, but perhaps expands the knowledge of the auditors and improves 
their judgments, which leads to an increase the AQ (Goldman and Barlev, 1974; Simunic, 
1984; Beck et al., 1988; Wallman, 1996; Arrunada, 1999a; 1999b; 2000). However, this 
result is conditional. It is insignificant when applied to LNTOTALFEES (sum of the total 
fees) and the LNNAF (levels of non audit services), but there is no statistical evidence 
found when using the non audit services ratios to measure auditor independence. The 
other characteristics of CG provide inconsistent support associated with non audit 
services fees. The results are robust to the specifications of different models and tests. 
 
In association with the model of the auditor industry specialist, the evidence indicates 
inconsistent results between the effectiveness of the AC and BoD and their engagement 
of auditor industry specialists in the analysis of year to year. In the pooled sample, when 
using four out of five auditor industry specialist measures, the results indicate that 
companies with ACs with less frequency of AC meetings and consisting solely of 
independent members are associated with more likelihood of employing industry 
specialist auditors. Whilst significant, these associations are, however, sensitive to the 
measures of auditor industry expertise, frequencies of ACs meeting, and the new 
definition of independence variable, therefore the current study cautions against drawing 




The second study examines the roles of the AQ, the ACs and BoDs characteristics in 
constraining EM. With the purpose of determining financial reporting decisions and the 
level of opportunistic earnings behavior made by the management, the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals was used (Becker et al., 1998; Subramanyam 1996; DeFond and 
Jiambalvo, 1994; Jones 1991). As in previous studies, the absolute values of discretionary 
accruals were estimated using the performance-adjusted discretionary accruals, Jones 
model and the modified Jones model. As expected, and consistent with previous United 
States studies, this study found that companies hiring auditors’ industry specialists and 
paying higher AFs are less likely to be associated with lower levels of discretionary 
accruals, indicating that a higher AQ constrains opportunistic earnings.  
 
Companies paying higher AFs are associated with a higher auditor effort, thereby 
reducing the opportunistic EM because of their concern that they may be discovered by 
the extensive efforts of the auditor. This proposition is consistent with the previous 
evidence reported by Caramanis and Lennox (2008), who indicate a negative relationship 
between EM and the hours of audit (effort of audit). The results are robust to the 
specifications of different models and tests. With regard to the auditor independence, 
there is no supporting evidence that non-audit services fees are associated with EM. This 
result contrasts with the evidence documented by Antle et al. (2006), and Ferguson et al. 
(2004), who indicate the negative and positive relationships between EM and the non-
audit services of United Kingdom firms in the periods between 1994 to 2000, and 1996 to 
1998 respectively. This may due to the reformation of practices of governance in the 
United Kingdom resulting from the revision of the United Kingdom CG Code (2010), 
which was introduced for the first time in July 2003 and placed major emphasis on 
monitoring functions of the ACs and BoDs. It may also be explained by the developments 
in studies of Non-audit services.  Consistent with this, the first empirical evidence 
reported in this thesis indicates that the fees of Non-audit services are viewed by 
independent BoD members as being able to contribute to a higher AQ. This may 
compensate for the effects of monitoring of Non-audit services on opportunistic earnings. 
As a result, there is no statistically significant relationship between EM and Non-audit 
services.   
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The auditor industry specialist model results seem to be sensitive to the measures of the 
auditor industry expertise. It indicates a statistically significant relationship with EM 
when the industry specialist auditor is measured using complementary 
(SPECLST_WEIGHTED) and portfolio (SPECLST _P_S) approaches, but insignificant 
association when applying the market share approach. The significant relationship 
suggests that the auditor industry specialist provides higher ability to constrain 
opportunistic earnings than the non specialist auditor. 
 
The results for the characteristics of ACs and BoDs indicate no evidence that the size of 
the board, financial expertise, number of meetings, and number of independent members 
affect the extent of manipulation of earnings. Similarly, the results of the structure of the 
ownership also indicate that there is an insignificant relationship with EM. These 
insignificant relationships may be due to the monitoring characteristics of the ACs and 
BoDs and institutional investors being offset by the increased AQ. In general, the results 
may indicate that the auditors are more effective in constraining opportunistic earnings 
than the ACs and BODs and institutional investors. 
 
With regard to the measures of the AQ, both empirical investigations indicate that the AQ 
surrogates by industry specialist auditor and Non-audit services fees are sensitive to 
alternative type of measures. This may support the previous argument that the AQ’s 
measurements are problematic and complex (Jensen and Payne, 2005; Niemi, 2004; 
Wooten, 2003). 
 
In general, this study concludes that the results confirm agency theory proposition on the 
characteristics of the independent BoDs that certify their monitoring function by 
demanding a higher AQ from the auditors, and that higher quality auditors provide higher 
ability to constrain opportunistic earnings than a lower quality auditor, resulting in the 
improvement of FRQ. These results are generally consistent with the previous studies 






This result could be attributed to the differences in regulatory environment, national 
cultures, the relationship between principals and agents, and other institutional factors 
between the USA, UK and Kingdom of Bahrain. Clark (2004) argues that there are no 
relationships between principals and agents in South America and Southern Europe and 
Asia, but it is hard to generalize this concept to the Kingdom of Bahrain, because of 
many factors including the legal system, corporate governance regulations, culture and 
the Islamic framework. Furthermore, Benkel et al. (2006) state that the results of previous 
studies do not necessarily apply to some countries since the CG practices may be 
different between countries as mentioned in this study. Another possible justification for 
the difference between the results of this research and those of previous studies is that 
Bahraini institutional investors do not have the same characteristics, such as culture and 
experience, as European institutional investors, British institutional investors, or 
American institutional investors. 
 
7.2 Contributions to Knowledge 
 
The current thesis represents a comprehensive study on the CG, AQ and EM especially in 
the Kingdom of Bahrain market. Using the current data of the Bahrain Stock Exchange 
companies for fiscal years from 2010-2013, the first part of the current thesis examines 
the relationship between the AQ and the characteristics of the CG. The second part of this 
thesis provides evidence linking CG, AQ and EM. Several proxies were used to measure 
the AQ, including the use of industry-specialist auditors, non audit services fees, and 
AFs. The mechanisms of CG are linked to the effects of the ACs and BoD's 
characteristics and they include the frequency of AC and BoD's meetings, the number of 
independent members, the size of ACs and BoDs, and financial expertise.  
 
Various contributions to knowledge been made through the present thesis. Firstly, it 
contributes to the discussion on the importance of the CG and AQ issues subsequent to 
recent audit failure scandals. The findings from the first empirical investigation indicate 
that independent BoDs use their supervisory function to demand intensive audit efforts 




The second empirical evidence indicates that the auditors’ industry specialists and higher 
AFs are linked with the reduced manipulations of earnings.  
 
Together, both findings support the agency theory’s proposition and the regulatory 
concern that a higher AQ and the effective BoDs are linked to improve the FRQ and 
supervision.  
 
Secondly, the current thesis contributes to the growing literature on studies of EM, CG, 
and AQ. As mentioned in the motivations of the study, most of the previous research in 
these areas has been conducted in the United States, which provides various auditor 
incentives, governance structures, institutional settings, and environmental litigation, 
therefore limits the generalizability of the findings to other countries. 
 
In particular, this study expands the previous literature into 5 areas: 
 
1. To the best knowledge of the author, there are no studies that have examined the 
relationship between the auditors’ industry specialist as proxy for AQ and the 
effectiveness of the AC and BoD in the Kingdom of Bahrain. Prior studies have 
been conducted in this area by Chen et al. (2005), Beasley and Petroni (2001), and 
Abbott and Parker (2000) using Australian and United States samples. The 
investigation in Bahraini companies expands the existing literature by providing 
evidence of the practice of the CG and various environmental litigation and 
institutional settings, each of which, it is claimed, can cause quality differences in 
the audit.  
 
2. None of the previous studies on how the auditors’ industry specialists impact the 
EM and CG have used the complementary approach to calculate the impact of 
auditors’ industry specialists. Most of these studies used the approach of portfolio 
and market share (Chen et al., 2005; Balsam et al., 2003; Krishnan, 2003a; 




3. According to Neal and Riley (2004), the complementary approach, however, 
captures the complementary effects between both the portfolio share approaches 
and market share and offers a solution for inconsistencies between these two main 
approaches. 
 
4. Prior studies that relate to non audit services fees, AFs and CG levels in the 
United Kingdom have been carried out by Zaman et al. (2011), Adelopo (2010), 
O’Sullivan and Diacon (2002), O’Sullivan (1999; 2000), and Collier and Gregory 
(1996). Particularly, Zaman et al. (2011) examine the effect of the effectiveness of 
the AC and several of the characteristics of the BoD (number of the independent 
members, duality role and meeting frequency) on non audit services fees and AFs 
using data from 2001-2004. However, all these studies do not consider the BoD 
and financial expertise. More recently, Adelopo (2010) investigates the 
characteristics of CG using the simultaneous equation of the non audit services 
fees and audit from the FTSE 350 in the periods of two years 2005-2006. 
 
Collier and Gregory examine the impact of the establishment of AFs and AC, 
using 1991 data, while O'Sullivan investigates the establishment of the AC and 
the impact of the number of the independent members on the AC and BoD on 
AFs, using data from 1992-1995 . Prior United States studies indicate that the 
BoDs that are financially educated improve the FRQ (Lee, 2008; Agrawal and 
Chadha, 2005; Xie et al., 2003). By investigating the impact of the financial 
expertise of the BoDs on the non audit services fees and AFs, this study extends 
the previous research on the impact of financial education of BoD members on the 








5. In relation to the studies investigating the impact of the AQ and CG on 
constraining earnings management in the Kingdom of Bahrain, previous studies 
have been carried out by Habbash et al. (2010), Sun et al. (2010) and Habbash 
(2010), Kwon et al. (2007), Antle et al. (2006), Peasnell et al. (2000; 2005), 
Ferguson et al. (2004). Habbash et al. (2010) examine the total meeting of the 
BoD and commitment of independent directors includes (salary of the directors, 
composition and meetings), while Sun et al. (2010) control only on meetings of 
the AC and the size of the BoDs in their EM model.   
 
All of these studies exclude the characteristics of the AC (such as size, financial 
expertise, number of meetings, and number of independent members) and 
financial expertise of the BoD in examining the impact of CG on EM. Recently, 
Habbash (2010) investigates the AQ and characteristics of the CG include 
(characteristics of the AC and BoD) variables separately using two different EM 
models. In his first model, he examines only the characteristics of the BoDs, while 
in second model he examines the variables of the auditor and the characteristics of 
AC.  
 
Antle et al. (2006) examine the joint determination of the discretionary accruals, 
non audit services fees and AFs using data from 1994-2000, while Kwon et al. 
(2007) examine how the legal system of the country impacts the auditors’ industry 
specialists in constraining EM in 28 countries including the United Kingdom from 
1993-2003. Ferguson et al. examine the big 5 auditors, characteristics of BoD, 
including roles of CEO duality and non-executive directors on the BoD, on EM 
using the dates from 1996-1998, while Peasnell et al. investigate characteristics of 
the BoD including the roles of CEO duality, size of the BoD and number of the 
independent BoD members, the establishment of Big 5 auditors and AC using the 
data in the period from 1991-1996. This study fills the gap between all these 
studies by examining the AQ and characteristics of CG including characteristics 




Larcker and Richardson (2004) indicate that when the AQ and CG of the 
companies are isolated from one another, it may lead to incomplete analysis of 
EM because the supervisory role of the auditors varies depending on the strength 
of the CG of the company. 
 
6. In the current thesis, there are 3 proxies of AQ to be examined, namely the AFs, 
the non audit services fees and the use of auditors’ industry specialists. Each 
proxy is measured using various approaches. For instance the non audit services 
fees proxy contains the ratio of non audit services fees to AFs, ratio of non audit 
services fees to total fees and the natural log of total fees (amount of non audit 
services and audit fees).  
 
The auditors’ industry specialist is measured in 5 ways: 2 measures are 
dichotomous variables (the market share of the auditor at 30% in each particular 
industry and the leader of the industry) and 3 measures are continuous variables 
(equal to the respective auditor portfolio share, equal to the respective auditor 
market share, and equal to the compliment between portfolio share and auditor 
market share).  
 
Through investigating the multiple AQ’s proxies and various measures for each 
one, this thesis presents an analysis of the impact of EM and the characteristics of  
CG that is more comprehensive than the previous studies that examined only one 












Finally, the current thesis contributes to the debate on the joint provision of non-audit 
services and audit. The result from the non audit services model indicates that the 
companies with a higher provision of independent directors on the BoD seem to be 
associated with a provision of the highest non audit services. This indicates that an 
independent BoD may provide provision of the highest non audit services which is likely 
to improve the AQ because of the effects of the increase in knowledge of the auditors. 
Moreover, no evidence indicates that the non audit service is associated with 
opportunistic earnings.   This finding contrasts with the regulatory concern that the 
provisions of the non audit service compromise auditor independence, and thus, reduce 
the FRQ. 
 
7.3 Implications of the research 
 
The findings of this study should be of potential interest to the BoDs, academics, 
professionals, and policymakers, especially on issues related to the practice of CG and 
AQ.  
 
The research’s analysis of the AQ and CG may be of use to BoDs as parameter to 
estimate how the choice of auditor and characteristics of the BoD may affect FRQ. The 
findings may help BoDs to see the positive effect of the higher quality auditors and 
independent members on the EM and AQ.  
 
The analysis regarding the auditors’ industry specialist may be of interest for the 
academic community, especially with regard to designing the measures of the auditors’ 









For other professionals, such as financial analysts, the findings may be used to integrate 
the study on how the market sees higher AQ as constraining EM by influencing the 
decisions made in the capital markets. If the market sees companies with audited and 
higher AFs by the auditors’ industry specialists associated with higher FRQ, the reported 
financial statement may be considered as more reliable for credit decisions and 
investment decision-making. 
 
Finally, policymakers may use the findings relating to Non audit services fees to view the 
potential benefits of the joint provision of Non audit services and audit. Previously, they 
argue that the Non audit services compromises the independence of the auditor and 
therefore prevent several of the Non audit services. According to the results of the current 
study, it can be concluded that EM does not exist in the Kingdom of Bahrain and is 
expected to remain so for the foreseeable future.  
 
Consequently, Policy makers can only try to maintain to constrain it by, for example,  
requiring companies to activate the role of CG and enhancing the quality of audit. In 
general, the following recommendations can contribute to limiting the practices of EM 
and increasing the quality of audit and CG:  
 
1. Develop the practices of the CG code in the Kingdom of Bahrain by applying 
practical guidelines and revising the requirements to maintain the actual and 
perceived independence of outside directors. 
2. Increase awareness of the idea of mechanisms of CG and its role in developing 
the Bahrain economy and market. 
3. Increase the importance of the existence of financial expertise in the ACs and the 
presence of independent members and compulsory communication with external 
auditors. 
4. Enhance the competence of the independence auditor and solve the issues that 






5. Audit firms must recognize the legal responsibilities towards shareholders by 
increasing the abilities and skills of their audit teams to detect EM or any 
transaction management, which includes any illegal action in the preparation of 
financial reports.  
 
7.4 Limitations of the research 
 
This thesis is subject to various potential limitations. Firstly, the sample for this study is 
obtained from Bahrain Boursefirms operating in unregulated industries. Therefore, the 
results of the thesis may not be applicable to companies that are not registered under the  
Bahrain Bourse or regulated companies, because the internal strength of the governance 
structure of the firms varies according to industry and size of the company.  
 
Secondly, the variables of the AQ may be a proxy for something other than what is 
expected  in the underlying construct of the tests. In this study, the measures of the AQ 
are driven by the perceived auditor independence and auditor’s reputation capital, and 
therefore the results are based on the perceptions of the market (AQ as perceived by 
participants of the market). The use of other measures of the AQ such as auditor’s 
litigation and restatements may help to generalize the actual AQ, rather than the 
perceived AQ. 
 
Third, the EM phenomena that are referred to in this thesis relate to the opportunistic 
earnings.  Given that the practice of GAAP allows the flexibility in accounting choices, 
managers may also use their discretion in earnings for transfer of private information,  
which may maximize the value of the company.  
 
The auditors may underestimate the discretion of earnings made by management since 
the EM involved is the judgment of the managerial. Thus, the results in this study are 




Fourthly, there is always the probability that the models used in this study have the 
potential for certain omitted variables biases that are associated both with EM and AQ. 
However, several steps have been taken to reduce the likelihood of correlated variables, 
including tests for endogeneity and other control variables.  
 
Finally, it is possible that some of the variables may be subjected to some errors of 
measurement. The measures of accruals are criticized due to the possibility of non-
discretionary accruals and misclassifying discretionary.  
 
Due to these limitations, implications and the findings of the study need to be interpreted 
with caution.  
 
7.5 Recommendations for future research 
 
There are various ways to expand the studies examined in this thesis. Firstly, as 
previously noted in the limitations section, the findings of this study are based on the 
perception of AQ measures that are driven from the reputation of the auditors’ capital 
theory. Francis (2004) claims that the AQ can range from very high to low, and that 
failure of audit can be classified as very low AQ (end quality), that contains various 
forms, such as earnings restatement, failure of the business, regulatory sanctions, and 
litigation. These forms of failure of audit are classified as the actual measures of AQ. 
Thus, future studies should examine how the used of actual measures of the AQ affect the 
EM and CG, and can be different compared to the perception of AQ measures. 
 
Secondly, investigation of the topic of this study might be extended to other Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) Arab States such as Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, 
Kuwait, and Qatar that have similar characteristics to the Kingdom of Bahrain with the 






Thirdly, as well as the characteristics of financial expertise, it is claimed that strong 
backgrounds of the industry increase the understanding of the business environment 
which helps to improve the FRQ.  Cohen et al. (2008) claim that an AC equipped with 
industry expertise, has better access to the resources which contribute to the superior 
ability to understand and explain the activities of risks and business, and they will have 
specific business knowledge.  
 
Therefore, they are able to evaluate whether the companies are using the appropriate 
reporting procedures, make assumptions and estimation that fit accordingly to their 
business and their environment. Subsequently these may reflect the true economic value 
of the company, and thus enhance the FRQ. Therefore, future research should consider 
whether the strong backgrounds of the industry and financial expertise make the AC and 
BoDs more effective. 
 
Fourthly, the studies on AQ and CG in constraining EM can be examined further by 
taking into account the nature of the joint effect of both the mechanisms of the AQ and 
CG. Such research may contribute to understanding the behavior of the mechanisms of 
the CG and auditors in association to the FRQ. 
 
Finally, a recommendation for future research might also consider the importance of 
voluntary corporate disclosure as a mechanism to limit opportunistic earnings. Various 
studies indicate that high quality disclosure reduce manipulation of earnings (Lapointe-
Antunes et al. 2006; Jo and Kim, 2007). In addition, Lapointe-Antunes et al. (2006) and 
Beattie (2005) indicate that the EM and voluntary disclosure studies are not being fully 
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